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Kathryn M. Kroeper 
EXPECTING PREJUDICE CONFRONTATION TO BACKFIRE:  
PREJUDICE NORMS AND MISALIGNMENT BETWEEN FORECASTER EXPECTATIONS 
AND EXPERIENCER REALITIES 
Interpersonal confrontation has been heralded in the stereotyping and prejudice literature 
as a situationally flexible, personally empowering, and highly effective prejudice reduction 
approach (Czopp & Ashburn-Nardo, 2012; Mallett & Monteith, 2019b). Indeed, a number of 
experiments consistently show that confrontation (compared to ‘no confrontation’) reduces 
confrontees’ stereotyping and prejudice endorsement, even among high-prejudice confrontees 
who reject egalitarian values (e.g., Burns & Monteith, 2018; Chaney & Sanchez, 2018; Czopp et 
al., 2006). These experiments, however, have uniformly tested confrontation efficacy in social 
settings where egalitarian norms are strong. This is problematic because norm compliance 
pressure is theorized to be a key mechanism explaining how confrontation regulates prejudice 
expression (Czopp et al., 2006). The present research addresses this limitation by comparing 
confrontation effectiveness across situations where prejudice expression is deemed socially 
acceptable and unacceptable. In Study 1, college students’ forecast how they would feel, think, 
and behave in response to being confronted. In Studies 2 and 3, college students’ biased 
responses were confronted and they reported their feelings, thoughts, and behavioral intentions, 
while their subsequent stereotyping behaviors were unobtrusively measured. A stark divide 
between forecaster expectations and experiencer realities emerged. Study 1 analyses revealed 
that in situations where prejudice acceptability was high (vs. low and moderate), college student 
forecasters expected prejudice expression to be less offensive and, consequently, anticipated 
feeling less guilty for expressing prejudice and weaker motivation to self-correct. These same 
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forecasters also anticipated that confrontation would make them feel angrier and expected to 
express more dismissiveness and hostility. In Studies 2 and 3, however, self-corrective reactions 
to confrontation emerged regardless of prejudice acceptability level. College students confronted 
for expressing prejudice (vs. not confronted) rated their own stereotyping behaviors as more 
offensive. In turn, they reported feeling more guilt and a stronger desire to self-correct. 
Additionally, these students reduced their degree of behavioral stereotyping following the 
confrontation. Taken together, these findings suggest that, despite forecaster intuitions, 
confrontation can be an effective prejudice reduction tool, even in situations where prejudice 
expression is widely considered socially acceptable. Theoretical and applied implications of this 
work are discussed, as well as directions for future research. 
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Expecting Prejudice Confrontation to Backfire:  
Prejudice Norms and Misalignment between Forecaster Expectations and Experiencer Realities 
 “…many of psychology's strategies for curbing prejudice may only have varying degrees of effectiveness. That is 
certainly not an indictment against them, as no one technique, model, or approach to such an ambitious goal as 
improving intergroup relations is likely to be so complete as to not have any limitations.” 
- Czopp & Ashburn-Nardo, 2012, p. 176 
 
Among the many bias interventions developed in recent decades, interpersonal 
confrontation stands out as a situationally flexible, personally empowering, and highly effective 
prejudice reduction approach (Czopp et al., 2006; Czopp & Ashburn-Nardo, 2012). 
Confrontations are interactions that can involve as few as two parties: a confrontee who 
expresses some form of prejudice and a confronter who witnesses and communicates their 
disapproval of that prejudice expression directly to the confrontee (Czopp, 2019). Whereas other 
prejudice reduction approaches are theorized to require large, systemic intervention and to 
blossom under optimal situational conditions (e.g., intergroup contact; Amichai-Hamburger & 
McKenna, 2006; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006), interpersonal confrontation has been positioned as 
requiring only a single person willing to speak out against prejudice expression (Czopp & 
Ashburn-Nardo, 2012). Whereas other prejudice reduction approaches (e.g., invoking a common 
ingroup identity) have been criticized for their ironic backfiring effects (Dixon et al., 2010; 
Dovidio et al., 2016; Saguy et al., 2009) interpersonal confrontation has thus far escaped such 
criticism, appearing to consistently discourage prejudice expression in laboratory contexts, and 
in a modestly enduring fashion (Burns & Monteith, 2018; Chaney & Sanchez, 2018; Czopp et 
al., 2006). 
The confrontation paradigm derived from research aimed at helping well-intentioned 
individuals—people with strong, internalized egalitarian values—to self-regulate their prejudiced 
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responding (Mallett & Monteith, 2019a). When egalitarian individuals ‘slip up’ and say or do 
something prejudiced (Devine, 1989), there exists a discrepancy between how they want to act 
(in a non-prejudiced way) and how they actually acted (in prejudiced way). Recognition of these 
so-called prejudice-related discrepancies can prompt self-directed negative emotions, like guilt 
and embarrassment (Devine et al., 1991; Higgins, 1987; Monteith & Voils, 1998; Zuwerink et 
al., 1996), which motivate the actor to make amends and better self-regulate their prejudiced 
responding in the future (Monteith, 1993; Monteith et al., 2002; Rokeach & Cochkane, 1972; 
Son Hing et al., 2002). Unfortunately, wholesale self-regulation (emphasis on the ‘self’) isn’t 
always possible. This is because individuals aren’t always able or willing to detect their own 
prejudices (Bell et al., 2018; Monteith & Mark, 2005; Monteith & Voils, 1998; Pronin et al., 
2002). Interpersonal confrontation offers one solution to this dilemma. When an observer notices 
another person express bias, they can confront him or her about it. Assuming the confrontee 
agrees that prejudice expression occurred and that it was offensive, the confrontation may 
instigate self-regulation in much the same way as if the confrontee had recognized the prejudice-
related discrepancy all on their own (Czopp et al., 2006). 
Social interactions, however, are complicated. There is subjectivity involved. When a 
confronter construes a confrontee’s behavior as prejudiced, it is not guaranteed that the 
confrontee will agree with that construal. Instead, a confrontee might argue that their behavior 
was actually unbiased and that the confronter had misconstrued it. Or, a confrontee might 
concede that the behavior was biased, but that such bias is perfectly justifiable and/or 
inoffensive. Because people do not like feeling misunderstood (Condon, 2008; Gaillard et al., 
2009; Shattell et al., 2006), in situations where a confrontee disagrees with a confronter’s 
construal of their behavior, the confrontation may fail to prompt guilt and self-regulation. 
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Instead, we might expect the confrontation to incite anger and frustration, possibly even 
attitudinal and behavioral entrenchment (Miron & Brehm, 2006; Plant & Devine, 2001). That is, 
we would expect the confrontation to backfire.1  
What does the research literature on interpersonal confrontation have to say about the rate 
at which confrontations backfire or about the social conditions that make backfiring more likely? 
Surprisingly little. Thus far, published research assessing the effectiveness of interpersonal 
confrontation has been conducted under seemingly optimal social conditions, wherein (a) 
confrontees have strong self-standards for non-prejudiced behavior and/or are in laboratory 
contexts with strong social-standards for non-prejudiced behavior and, therefore, (b) confrontees 
are predisposed to accept the notion that prejudice expression is offensive and/or causes harm. In 
fairness, it is quite reasonable that, as a starting point, researchers would rigidly hold contextual 
features of confrontations constant in their testing. Indeed, these highly controlled laboratory 
studies consistently show that confrontation (compared to ‘no confrontation’) reduces 
confrontees’ stereotyping and prejudice endorsement (e.g., Burns & Monteith, 2018; Chaney & 
Sanchez, 2018; Czopp et al., 2006). Moreover, they show that confrontations in these settings 
often have surprisingly positive interpersonal benefits (e.g., increasing confrontees’ social 
compensatory behaviors, like apologizing to and smiling at confronters; Mallett & Wagner, 
2011). However, by exclusively assessing confrontation’s efficacy under these optimal social 
conditions, it may mean that backfiring effects have been underestimated. These methodological 
shortcomings mean that we know little about the social conditions that make backfiring effects 
more likely. 
 
1 When using the term ‘backfire,’ I refer to instances where an interpersonal confrontation fails to suppress prejudice 
expression and may actually increase prejudice expression. This may be related to, but should not be confused with, 
interpersonal backlash—wherein confronters are often perceived as complainers or troublemakers for speaking out 
against prejudice (Cadieux & Chasteen, 2015; Czopp et al., 2006; Shelton & Stewart, 2004). 
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Ultimately the reason to study prejudice reduction strategies, like interpersonal 
confrontation, is to apply effective interventions in real-world settings. Many confronters speak 
out against prejudice intending to change the confrontee’s behavior (Rattan, 2019; Rattan & 
Dweck, 2010, 2018). However, we currently do not know much about the effectiveness of 
interpersonal confrontation under non-optimal social conditions, like when norms in the local 
context are more permissive of prejudice expression—which, truth be told, seems to be an 
increasingly common social reality (Crandall et al., 2018). Vetting interpersonal confrontation’s 
robustness under non-optimal social conditions—that is, in situations where confrontees endorse 
(vs. reject) prejudiced beliefs and/or where social norms tolerate prejudice expression—is 
therefore necessary before we can be confident in confrontation’s external validity as a prejudice 
reduction approach (Paluck & Green, 2009, p. 351). Thus, the present research examines how 
confrontation fares as a prejudice reduction tool when egalitarian social norms are weak.  
Across three experiments, I systematically manipulate perceptions of social norms about 
prejudice expression, which I refer to as prejudice acceptability beliefs. Prejudice acceptability is 
considered high when most people in a setting agree that expressing prejudice toward a particular 
social group is common and appropriate; prejudice acceptability is considered low when most 
people in a setting agree that prejudice toward a particular social group is uncommon and 
inappropriate. To my knowledge, this work is among the first to consider how contextual factors, 
like prejudice acceptability, modulate the effectiveness of interpersonal confrontation. In Study 
1, I examine students’ forecasts about how they would feel and cognitively and behaviorally 
respond to a confrontation situation, while manipulating prejudice acceptability. In Studies 2 and 
3, I place students in an actual confrontation situation (or in a no-confrontation situation), again 
while experimentally manipulating prejudice acceptability. Then I measure their self-reported 
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feelings, cognitions, and behavioral intentions as well as their actual rates of stereotyping. In 
doing this work, I aim to extend interpersonal confrontation theory (Czopp et al., 2006; 
Monteith, 1993) so that it considers the contextual factors that may modulate confrontation’s 
ability to reduce prejudice expression. 
A (Brief) History of Interpersonal Confrontation as a Prejudice Reduction Approach 
We will begin with a brief historical overview of interpersonal confrontation as a 
prejudice reduction approach. The aim of this historical overview is to deepen readers 
understanding of and appreciation for the context that produced interpersonal confrontation.2 By 
contextualizing interpersonal confrontation—its precipitating context, theoretical lens, and 
proposed mechanism—I hope to convince readers that testing its efficacy under non-optimal 
social conditions is needed to assess its external validity and, perhaps, to establish its boundaries. 
Psychological investigations of intergroup phenomena during the earliest decades of the 
twentieth century largely operated under the (obviously racist and inaccurate) assumption that 
some social groups—like Black, Latinx, Asian, and Native populations—were inherently inferior 
to other social groups—like Whites (R. T. Carter & Goodwin, 1994; Haller, 1995; Samelson, 
1978). To psychological researchers of the period, prejudice expression was not seen as a 
problem, but instead an ‘inevitable’ reaction to the supposed ‘natural order’ (Duckitt, 1992). 
Psychological researchers only began to revise this view in response to high profile social events 
(e.g., the Black civil rights movement of the 1920s; challenges to European colonial rule) and 
demographic shifts among practicing psychologists (e.g., a growing number of Jewish 
 
2 This historical overview is not meant to be an exhaustive history of prejudice expression and prejudice reduction 
research. Instead, its purpose is to highlight the theories and social conditions that produced interpersonal 
confrontation. For more comprehensive historical overviews, interested readers should consult: Dovidio (2001), 
Duckitt (1992), and Samelson (1978). 
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psychological researchers who, grounded in their personal experiences with antisemitism, were 
primed to question the prevailing prejudiced belief systems; Duckitt, 1992; Samelson, 1978).  
Informed by these social changes, psychologists began to reverse course, classifying 
prejudice as an irrational attitude “…based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization…directed 
toward a group as a whole, or toward an individual because he is a member of that group,” 
(Allport, 1954, p. 9).3 As this new view of prejudice took hold, researchers began centering their 
theorizing and empirical work on explaining why prejudice occurs and how to reduce its 
expression (Dovidio, 2001; Duckitt, 1992). For instance, researchers of the 1930s and 1940s 
positioned prejudice as a psychological defense mechanism, as a way to rationalize the 
fundamentally unjust structures and behaviors of the era (e.g., segregation; McLean, 1946; 
Veltfort & Lee, 1943). To counter prejudice expression then, many psychologists suggested that 
changes to societal structures were needed to change an unwilling public’s social behaviors 
(Allport, 1954). This was because such structural changes could influence social norm beliefs, 
which were increasingly recognized as a powerful way to shape human behavior (e.g., Asch, 
1956; Sherif, 1936). This view ushered in an era of psychologist support for legal changes that 
reduce discrimination (e.g., laws mandating school integration; Benjamin et al., 2002)—a legacy 
that continues among psychologists today (e.g., laws mandating marriage equality; Kroeper et 
al., 2019; Tankard & Paluck, 2016, 2017).  
Although the predominant attitudes about racial and ethnic bias expression among 
psychologists had shifted during the early part of the twentieth century, the same period was 
 
3 The definition of prejudice has shifted quite a bit since the early days of psychological science. Most notably for 
the present research, the idea that prejudice is an “irrational” or “faulty” attitude has been dropped from many 
definitions, largely because what is considered “irrational” or “faulty” is in the eye of the beholder and is not an 
objectively measurable criterion (R. Brown, 2011). Further, some psychologists argue that “…the psychological 
processes that lead to prejudice and its expression are identical for ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ prejudices” (Crandall & 
Eshleman, 2005, p. 238). 
7 
 
characterized by high levels of prejudice acceptability among the general public. For example, 
blatant expressions of racial prejudice continued to be quite prevalent (Zinn, 2010) and the 
public was not shy or embarrassed about expressing these negative attitudes in psychological 
studies (Katz & Braly, 1935; MacCrone, 1937; Thurstone, 1928). In the wake of WWII and the 
exposed Nazi atrocities, however, members of the public increasingly began recognizing racial 
and ethnic prejudice as a serious social problem (Duckitt, 1992). It was around this time that 
psychologists began documenting steady declines in blatant prejudice expression (Bobo, 2001)—
people were less and less willing to report prejudiced attitudes. Although it was clear through the 
use of unobtrusive audit studies and implicit measures that prejudice lingered (F. Crosby et al., 
1980; Greenwald et al., 1998; Payne, 2001), the conventional wisdom of this period was that 
racial prejudice expressions were reliably shifting from explicit and blatant forms to evermore 
implicit and subtle ones (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003, 2005; Dixon et al., 2012; Dovidio, 2001; 
Monteith et al., 2001).  
Scholars puzzled over how to reconcile their research showing low explicit endorsement 
of racially prejudice attitudes (e.g., Bobo, 2001) with persistent racial discrimination in so many 
sectors of daily life (e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000; S. Gaertner & Bickman, 1971; S. L. 
Gaertner & Dovidio, 1977). Among the many theories proposed, some researchers attributed 
these discrepancies to social compliance pressures (e.g., the Justification-Suppression Model, or 
JSM; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003, 2005), believing that genuine prejudices were not changing so 
much as the normative contexts were changing. Proponents of the JSM and other normative 
theories argued that social pressure to appear non-prejudiced caused many people to suppress 
their genuine prejudices, so as to gain social acceptance. But, if the normative context were to 
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change (again becoming more permissive of prejudice), we would see a resurgence of prejudice 
expression. 
A second theoretical perspective, the one that would ultimately set the stage for 
interpersonal confrontation research, argued that inconsistencies between self-reported racial 
attitudes and actual behavior resulted—at least partially—from the tendency of low-prejudiced 
and well-intentioned people to slip up and say or do racially prejudiced things on occasion (the 
self-regulation of prejudiced responses model; Monteith, 1993). Scholars endorsing this view 
reasoned that prejudiced missteps largely occurred because negative racial stereotypes, acquired 
and reinforced through cultural learning experiences, are highly accessible knowledge structures 
that take intention and effort to exert cognitive control over (Devine, 1989; Fazio, 1990). As a 
result, there are often discrepancies between how people want to act and how they actually act. 
Low-prejudice people—with internalized egalitarian standards of behavior—want to act in non-
prejudiced ways and feel guilty and embarrassed when they become aware that their behavior 
falls short of these personal standards (Devine et al., 1991; Monteith & Voils, 1998; Zuwerink et 
al., 1996). Guilt is an action-oriented emotion associated with wanting to undo bad actions 
(Baumeister et al., 1994; Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Frijda et al., 1989). As a result, this negative 
self-directed affect prompts low-prejudice individuals to engage in self-reflection and correction 
(Monteith, 1993; Monteith et al., 2002). Often, this involves establishing ‘cues for cognitive 
control’ (Monteith et al., 1993, 2002; Monteith & Mark, 2005). When low-prejudice individuals 
recognize prejudice-related discrepancies, they are motivated to determine what went wrong. 
This motivation leads them to slow down and pay close attention to self- and discrepancy-
relevant cues in the context. Distinctive cues that are determined to be diagnostic become 
associated with their negative self-directed affect. Recognition of these diagnostic cues in 
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subsequent situations induces a careful and controlled posture that helps low-prejudice 
individuals override their prepotent biased responding.  
According to this self-regulation of prejudiced responses model (Monteith, 1993), low-
prejudice people must first become aware of their own prejudice-related discrepancies in order to 
successfully self-regulate prejudice expression. Unfortunately, even low-prejudiced people aren’t 
always able or willing to detect their own biases (Bell et al., 2018; Monteith & Mark, 2005; 
Monteith & Voils, 1998; Pronin et al., 2002). Thus, the primary role of interpersonal 
confrontation is to raise awareness of prejudice-related discrepancies. Confronters prompt low-
prejudice confrontees to recognize when they say or do something biased and, once recognized, 
confrontees should engage in the same regulatory processes that would otherwise occur if the 
confrontees had instead detected the prejudiced-related discrepancy on their own (Monteith & 
Mark, 2005). 
Unsurprisingly, the self-regulation of prejudiced responses model proposes drastically 
different predictions for high-prejudice people—those without internalized egalitarian standards 
for behavior (Monteith, 1993). For high-prejudice individuals, mere awareness of prejudice 
expression, in and of itself, is unlikely to prompt negative self-directed affect (Devine et al., 
1991). This is because prejudice expression is not a violation of high-prejudice individuals’ self-
standards. By definition, for high prejudice people there is no prejudice-related discrepancy 
between how they want to act and how they actually acted. Suppressing prejudiced responding 
then should only occur if there is sufficient external pressure to self-regulate (Monteith et al., 
2010). That is, there must be a discrepancy between how they acted and how they should have 
acted, according to prevailing social norms. But imposing external pressure is risky (Brehm, 
1966; Miron & Brehm, 2006). External pressure to comply with non-prejudiced norms, in the 
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absence of internal motivation to regulate prejudice, has sometimes been linked to behavioral 
backlash.  
In one set of studies, Plant and Devine (2001) devised scenarios that pressured people to 
act in pro-Black ways. For example, in one of their studies, people imagined working at a food 
franchise and (before interviewing anyone) being pressured by their boss to hire a Black cashier 
because the company was trying to increase its racial diversity. In the scenario, it was suggested 
that complying with the request would be linked to an upcoming pay raise. In another one of 
their studies, people were strongly urged by an experimenter to write a counterattitudinal essay 
supporting affirmative action at their university. Regardless of the experimental procedure, 
people who were high in external motivation to respond without racial prejudice (and thus felt a 
high degree of external pressure to comply with non-prejudiced norms) but were also low in 
internal motivation (and thus felt a low degree of internal pressure) reported feeling constrained 
by and resentful of the pro-Black pressure. Further, although these individuals displayed 
compliant behavior when under social pressure, these individuals responded with behavioral 
backlash when released from social pressure. In such situations, they were less likely to hire the 
Black applicant and more likely to fill out anti-affirmative action opinion cards (for similar 
findings, see Legault et al., 2011). Findings like these suggest that when people are not internally 
motivated to respond without prejudice, confrontations may induce (short-lived) compliance, but 
once relieved of social pressure, those confrontations may backfire. 
Indeed, in the early years of studying interpersonal confrontation, researchers theorized 
that encouraging high-prejudice people to reflect on so-called ‘prejudice-related discrepancies’ 
would backfire and “…escalate intolerance of the target group,” (Monteith et al., 1993, p. 209). 
In their own words, Monteith and Mark (2005, p. 132) explained: 
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“…low-prejudice individuals are internally motivated to respond without prejudice, and consequently they 
experience negative self-directed affect when they fail to do so. This affect is critical to the instigation of 
the self-regulatory mechanisms and outcomes in our model that facilitate the development of the ability to 
control the potential influence of automatically activated stereotypes. More prejudiced persons lack internal 
motivation to control prejudice, they do not experience much if any self-dissatisfaction when realising their 
responses are prejudiced, and self-regulatory efforts are not instigated. We are not arguing that high- 
prejudice individuals never self-regulate their prejudiced responses. For example, external motivation to 
control prejudice (e.g., Plant & Devine, 1998) can encourage them to do so. However, our theoretical 
framework was designed to apply to the experience of low-prejudice people who want to break their 
habitually biased patterns of responding to members of stereotyped groups.”  
Consistent with this view, the preliminary investigations of confrontation provided support for 
the idea that confrontations would only prompt self-regulation among low-prejudice individuals 
(and not among high-prejudice individuals). Some studies showed that while low-prejudiced 
people reported guilt at recognizing prejudice-related discrepancies, high-prejudiced people 
instead reported anger, frustration, and disgust (Devine et al., 1991; Monteith et al., 1993). 
Indeed, in one of the first studies assessing interpersonal confrontation, low-prejudice individuals 
who imagined being confronted expected to experience more negative self-directed affect, have 
more self- and discrepancy-focused thoughts, and engage in more self-corrective behaviors; but 
this was not the case for high-prejudice individuals (Czopp & Monteith, 2003). 4 Together, these 
results suggested to researchers that interpersonal confrontation might be a strategy best reserved 
for low-prejudice confrontees. 
 
4 Here, by “one of the first studies assessing interpersonal confrontation,” I am referring to research testing 
interpersonal confrontation through the lens of the self-regulation of prejudiced responses model. However, there 
exists prior work in psychological science that is quite similar to contemporary confrontation research and it 
deserves mention. For example, relevant values confrontation research can be traced all the way back to the mid-
twentieth century (Citron et al., 1950; Rokeach & Cochkane, 1972; Rokeach & McLellan, 1972). Additionally, some 
dissonance-reduction research is quite similar to contemporary confrontation approaches (e.g., Dutton & Lake, 
1973; Sherman & Gorkin, 1980; Steele, 1975).  
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But then something unexpected happened. Czopp, Monteith, and Mark (2006) invited 
college students to the laboratory to participate in studies ostensibly about people’s attitudes 
toward computers and computer usage. In actuality, their experiments examined high- and low-
prejudice people’s reactions to being confronted for expressing prejudice. Each person was 
paired with a confederate to complete a task that required them to make inferences about people 
based solely on a photograph and one-sentence description. In most trials, the photograph-
sentence pairs were benign, like a picture of a White woman alongside the sentence “This person 
is often found in a school.” But in several trials, the photograph-sentence pairs were designed to 
make anti-Black stereotypes salient. For example, there would be a photo of a Black man 
alongside the sentence “This person can be found behind bars,” which was intended to elicit the 
Black criminality stereotype (Donders et al., 2008; Johnson et al., 1997; Oliver & Fonash, 2002). 
For each trial, participants were asked to make an inference about the person pictured (e.g., “This 
person is a criminal”). At the end of the task, the confederate confronted participants for using 
anti-Black stereotypes. Then the researchers examined people’s reactions to being confronted. 
Despite expecting confrontations to result in self-regulation only among the low-prejudice 
people, this first test of confrontation as a prejudice reduction strategy found that both low- and 
high-prejudice people reported feeling negative self-directed affect and inhibited stereotypic 
responding after being confronted. In their general discussion, the authors speculated that this 
unexpected result was due to norm compliance motives. They suggested that, in response to the 
salience of egalitarian norms in the college campus context, high-prejudiced participants fell in 
line and suppressed their prejudice expression, likely to avoid the disapproval of others. They 
suspected these behavioral changes among high-prejudice individuals would be shorter-lived and 
more situation-specific than the changes among low-prejudice individuals. 
13 
 
Although early confrontation researchers advised caution and called for more empirical 
work to understand situational moderators of confrontation’s effectiveness (e.g., Monteith & 
Mark, 2005), it was hard to temper the optimism. The promise of confrontation as a prejudice 
reduction strategy, one that works regardless of a confrontee’s prejudice level, was very 
appealing. 
Explorations of Confrontation as a Prejudice Reduction Tactic  
 Over the last fifteen years, a handful of laboratory studies have replicated the results of 
Czopp and colleagues (2006), finding confrontation to be an effective method of reducing the 
expression of race and gender prejudices.5 These studies have shown that confronting can lead 
confrontees to report less prejudiced attitudes and engage in less stereotyping (Burns & 
Monteith, 2018; Chaney & Sanchez, 2018; Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Mallett & Wagner, 2011; 
Parker et al., 2018). For example, men who were confronted for using subtly sexist language 
(i.e., spontaneously using "she" to describe a nurse) detected and corrected more examples of 
sexist language in a follow-up task compared to men who were not confronted (Mallett & 
Wagner, 2011). These confrontees also engaged in interpersonal repair strategies after being 
confronted, like complimenting the confronter, making concessions, and apologizing (Hyers, 
2010; Mallett & Wagner, 2011). Other studies have even found the prejudice reducing effects of 
confrontation to linger beyond the immediate laboratory context, with individuals continuing to 
reduce their stereotyping up to a week after being confronted (Chaney & Sanchez, 2018).  
 
5 To date, all of the published papers on confrontation that show prejudice reduction effects among confrontees (i.e., 
resource-intensive laboratory studies that place people in actual confrontation situations, see Mallett & Monteith, 
2019) have only used (typically male) racial minority or (typically White) female targets of bias (Burns & Monteith, 
2018; Chaney & Sanchez, 2018; Czopp et al., 2006; Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Mallett & Wagner, 2011; Parker et 
al., 2018). For this reason, it is unclear whether confrontations will effectively reduce prejudice toward other 
stigmatized targets.  
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Moreover, the prejudice reducing effects of confronting are not limited to the confrontee. 
Simply witnessing a confrontation can lead observers to express less prejudiced attitudes and 
stereotype less. For instance, Hyers (2010) found that people who witnessed a confrontation of 
heterosexism subsequently made fewer antigay remarks than before the confrontation occurred. 
Seeing someone openly condemn prejudice communicates social norm information (Blanchard et 
al., 1991, 1994; Boysen, 2013; Monteith et al., 1996) 6 and these social norms of tolerance 
extend beyond the immediate confrontation situation, spreading throughout social networks 
(Paluck, 2011; Paluck & Shepherd, 2012). Likewise, seeing someone condone prejudice or 
remain silent in the face of prejudice encourages prejudice expression (Blanchard et al., 1994; 
Burkley et al., 2016; Jewell et al., 2015), perhaps especially when the would-be confronter is 
expected by others to speak out but ultimately decides not to do so (Czopp, 2013). And to the 
extent that confrontations increase the visibility of discriminatory incidents, they can help 
generate consensus that certain groups face real, consistent bias, lending more credibility to 
claimants of discrimination (E. R. Carter & Murphy, 2017). 
Contributing to interpersonal confrontation’s image as a flexible prejudice reduction 
strategy, researchers have found that confrontations can take many forms and still effectively 
reduce prejudice expression among confrontees (Burns & Monteith, 2018; Martinez et al., 2017; 
Parker et al., 2018). Confrontations can range in tone from friendly to rude to emotional to 
matter-of-fact (Citron et al., 1950; Mallett & Melchiori, 2019; Rattan & Dweck, 2018). For 
example, confronters might highlight moral principles and common humanity; or they might 
 
6 To the extent that confrontations convincingly signal that tolerance toward a particular group is normative, 
behavior change should result (Tankard & Paluck, 2016). Confrontations, however, may not always convey 
convincing social norm information. If the confrontee’s pre-existing knowledge suggests that a target group is 
widely despised, confronter’s outrage may seem more like an idiosyncratic belief than an accurate description of 
social norms. In such a situation, I would expect confrontations to be less effective at prompting self-regulation. 
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include highly personal emotional disclosures; or they could be framed as educational and 
knowledge promoting; or they could even be hostile, attacking transgressors as ‘ignorant’ and 
‘unintelligent’ (Hubbard et al., 2013). Although hostile confrontations may not win the 
confronter friends (Becker & Barreto, 2014; Czopp et al., 2006; Lewis & Yoshimura, 2017; 
Martinez et al., 2017), even hostile confrontations seem to decrease stereotyping behaviors as 
effectively as nonhostile confrontations (for review, see Monteith et al., 2019). 
Beyond reducing prejudice expression, confronting also confers intrapersonal benefits to 
confronters themselves. As an active-coping strategy, confronting is linked to positive mental 
and physical health benefits for people who experience discrimination (Chaney et al., 2015; 
Kaiser & Miller, 2004). Confronters tend to report greater autonomy, competence, and 
satisfaction compared to people who want to confront, but decide not to do it (C. S. Brown & 
Salomon, 2019; Dickter, 2012; Gervais et al., 2010; Hyers, 2007; LeMaire, 2017; Sanchez et al., 
2016). And failing to confront is linked to greater feelings of guilt, increased rumination on the 
prejudiced event, and heightened distress (Hyers, 2007; Krieger & Sidney, 1996; Noh & Kaspar, 
2003; Shelton et al., 2006). Although assertively confronting a confrontee (e.g., directly calling 
out their biased treatment as unfair and expressing anger) can cause some emotional distress in 
the moment of confrontation, over time, assertive confronters report better mood and greater life 
satisfaction than unassertive confronters (e.g., those who leave the situation, use sarcasm, or 
simply display negative non-verbal behaviors; Foster, 2013).  
So far, we have established that interpersonal confrontation can prompt confrontees to 
regulate their prejudice expression and it can also confer a number of intrapersonal benefits to 
confronters (e.g., increased autonomy, competence, and satisfaction; reduced guilt). However, 
there are also known drawbacks to confrontation—most notably in the form of interpersonal 
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backlash (Czopp, 2019). Even when people interpret an incident as biased and feel compelled to 
confront it, they tend to worry about the social costs of confronting (C. S. Brown & Salomon, 
2019; Herrera et al., 2018; Hill & Kearl, 2011; Sechrist et al., 2004) and show less intention to 
speak out against prejudice as the social stakes increase (Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2014; Ayres et 
al., 2009; Kroeper et al., 2014; Shelton & Stewart, 2004; Stangor et al., 2002). Findings like 
these have prompted researchers to dedicate energy and attention to understanding how to get 
more people to overcome these social barriers and confront prejudice (Ashburn-Nardo et al., 
2008; Ashburn-Nardo & Karim, 2019). 
As it turns out, these concerns about the social costs of confronting are justifiable. It is 
well documented that confronters regularly encounter social backlash. People who attribute 
negative outcomes to discrimination tend to be perceived less favorably than people who 
attribute the same outcomes to some other external cause (Diebels & Czopp, 2011; Garcia et al., 
2005; Kaiser et al., 2006; Kaiser & Miller, 2001, 2003). In fact, simply drawing attention to the 
existence of inequality can lead people to perceive communicators more negatively (Anisman-
Razin et al., 2018). It is perhaps unsurprising then that confronters, who are not only drawing 
attention to discrimination but are also actively pointing the finger at the particular person or 
entity responsible, tend to be perceived as complainers and troublemakers (Cadieux & Chasteen, 
2015; Czopp et al., 2006; Parker et al., 2018; Schultz & Maddox, 2013; Shelton & Stewart, 2004; 
Simon & O’Brien, 2015; Wang et al., 2015). Indeed, these negative perceptions of confronters 
occur even when people believe that confronting prejudice is something that should be done 
(Kawakami et al., 2019). 
Worse still, confronters who belong to targeted social groups may be especially likely to 
encounter social backlash. Black confronters of racism and female confronters of sexism are 
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routinely perceived more negatively than their White or male counterparts, respectively. This 
holds true even when target and non-target confronters make the exact same arguments (Becker 
& Barreto, 2019; Dickter et al., 2012; Eliezer & Major, 2012; Gervais & Hillard, 2014; Gulker et 
al., 2013; Rasinski & Czopp, 2010; Schultz & Maddox, 2013). Even fellow members of the 
targeted group express more dislike for target confronters, particularly if their confrontation 
appears too aggressive (Becker & Barreto, 2014) or if they believe the confrontation threatens 
their group’s reputation more than it helps (Garcia et al., 2005).7  
Even though social backlash is common, it is not inevitable. In certain cases, confronters 
are perceived more positively than non-confronters (Dickter et al., 2012; Dodd et al., 2002). Such 
perceptions appear related to the perceived offensiveness of the confrontees’ prejudiced behavior 
 
7 There are a couple of reasons for why target confronters pay an added penalty for speaking out. First, targets’ 
motives for confronting are seen as less pure than non-targets’ motives (Gervais & Hillard, 2014; Gulker et al., 
2013). In general, people assume that communicators are biased, such that communicators are likely to believe and 
report information that casts their ingroup in a positive light. As a result, people find information that disconfirms 
these expectancies more persuasive than information that confirms these expectancies (Eagly et al., 1978). Through 
this lens, perceivers view target confronters as having a ‘vested interest’ in the outcome of confrontation, compared 
to non-target confronters, which presumably compromises targets’ perceived integrity. Second, and relatedly, 
confrontations from non-targets are more surprising than confrontations coming from targets (Gulker et al., 2013). 
People expect targets to confront prejudice against the targeted group, but they do not expect non-targets to confront. 
Thus, when non-targets speak up on behalf of outgroup members they are seen as violating their own group interest. 
Violations of group interest induce surprise and increase cognitive elaboration (or thoughtful processing) of 
persuasive messages (Petty et al., 2001), which may in part explain why non-target confronters are perceived as 
more persuasive, even when peddling the exact same message as target confronters (Rasinski & Czopp, 2010). Is all 
of this to say that target confronters should step aside and let non-target confronters do all the confronting? Of 
course not. First, it is challenging to get non-targets to confront prejudice (Subašić et al., 2018). Certain perceptual 
barriers that prevent all people from confronting (e.g., bias detection, classifying bias as an emergency; Ashburn-
Nardo & Karim, 2019) may be especially likely to impede non-target confrontations. Second, target confronters are 
still effective confronters. Their confrontations have been shown to reduce prejudice expression, just like non-target 
confronters (e.g., Czopp et al., 2006), albeit with added social costs. Third, as reviewed above, people may have 
other incentives to speak out against injustice beyond prejudice reduction (e.g., autonomy promotion, respect goals; 
Chaney et al., 2015; Mallett & Melchiori, 2019; Shelton et al., 2006). Confrontation is linked to positive 
psychological and physical health outcomes (Chaney et al., 2015) and promotes broader virtues of justice and equity 
(Drury, 2013). For many target group members, these other incentives to confront may outweigh the potential social 
costs (Good et al., 2012; Kaiser & Miller, 2004). Finally, it is also important to remember that target group members 
do not always view non-target confronters as helping their situation (Martinez et al., 2017). In fact, sometimes the 
“help” offered by non-target confronters can disempower target group members, especially in situations where non-
target confronters are perceived as extrinsically (vs. intrinsically) motivated to confront (Chu, 2017). Non-target 
confronters must be mindful to wield their influence in ways that support (vs. trample over) the very people they are 
trying to help. 
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(Woodzicka et al., 2015; Zou & Dickter, 2013). Here, by offensiveness of prejudiced behavior, I 
refer to the perception that one’s biased statements or actions in some way cause harm. Many 
individual and situational factors likely influence the perceived offensiveness of prejudice 
expression—one such factor being the perceived social norms (or degree of prejudice 
acceptability) in the local context. To the extent people perceive confrontees’ actions to be 
egregiously inconsistent with social norms of egalitarianism (and thus more offensive), people 
are more apt to praise confronters as crusaders who are standing up for what is right (Garcia et 
al., 2010). Similarly, offensiveness construals may be a crucial mechanism dictating whether 
confrontations themselves will be successful—prompting confrontees to self-regulate—or will 
fail—prompting confrontees to react with dismissiveness and hostility. 
Considering Social Norm Perceptions as a Critical Moderator 
Despite the many lab experiments demonstrating the prejudice reducing effects and 
intrapersonal benefits of confrontation, this prejudice reduction strategy may not be optimal for 
all situations. As mentioned above, we currently know very little about how confrontees will 
react to confrontation when they lack strong self-standards for non-prejudiced behavior and are 
in laboratory contexts that lack strong social-standards for non-prejudiced behavior. This gap in 
knowledge can be traced to at least two methodological shortcomings of the extant confrontation 
research. First, all of the published, peer-reviewed articles examining the prejudice-reducing 
effects of confrontation have studied confrontees’ reactions to confrontations about two target 
groups: Black Americans and women (Burns & Monteith, 2018; Chaney & Sanchez, 2018; 
Czopp et al., 2006; Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Mallett & Wagner, 2011; Parker et al., 2018).8 
 
8 To be clear, this focus on female and Black targets does not pose a problem in and of itself. Given the long 
histories of stigmatization these two groups have endured (Allport, 1954; Friedan, 2010; Valenti, 2009), it makes 
sense that psychologists testing the efficacy of a prejudice reduction tool would focus their research on these groups 
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Second, the vast majority of confrontation studies have recruited confrontees from college 
samples that are typically steeped in campus cultures well-known for promoting strong 
egalitarian norms that explicitly support these two target groups (e.g., Crandall et al., 2002). This 
narrow research scope may mean that the field is overlooking an important contextual moderator 
of confrontation effectiveness, namely the perceived presence of egalitarian social norms. The 
research shows that when strong egalitarian norms are in place (or are perceived to be in place), 
confrontation can be an effective prejudice reduction tool—even when confrontees are high-
prejudice (e.g., Czopp et al., 2006).  By taking a step back and looking critically at this existing 
research, however, one is left wondering whether confrontation will remain an effective 
prejudice reduction tool in more hostile contexts—ones in which the communities’ social norms 
about prejudice expression toward the target group are not as harsh as a college campuses’ norms 
regarding Black and female targets of bias. 
To underscore this point, consider a thought experiment. Imagine for a moment that you 
are a college student in a dorm, and you overhear a peer make an anti-Black comment. You 
decide to speak up and say, “Listen, those kinds of views are prejudiced and inappropriate.” How 
do you think the confrontee will react? Well, the research suggests that this student is likely to 
feel badly about themselves (e.g., Czopp & Monteith, 2003) and try to make amends, possibly by 
apologizing or explaining away their comment as unintentional (e.g., Czopp et al., 2006). The 
student may not like you (the confronter) very much (e.g., Czopp et al., 2006; Schultz & 
Maddox, 2013), but the confrontation should at the very least result in compliance, leading the 
confrontee to think twice before making another anti-Black comment in the dorms. Now imagine 
the same situation, except you are no longer in a college dorm. Instead you’ve stumbled upon a 
 
(see also Crandall & Warner, 2005). And, even with these limitations, this type of confrontation research has been 
and continues to be very valuable. 
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Unite the Right Rally to protest the removal of Confederate monuments (e.g., Hendrix, 2018). As 
you are passing through, you overhear a protestor make an anti-Black comment. You decide to 
speak up. How do you think the confrontee will react in this scenario? If you’re anything like 
me, you might feel much less optimistic about the confrontation arousing guilt and halting the 
prejudiced behavior in this context. But why is that? 
It seems obvious, but our intuitions about how confrontees will react to confrontation 
likely depend on our construals about whether their behavior is offensive (harmful) or inoffensive  
(unharmful) in the local context (Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2008; Czopp, 2019; Czopp & Ashburn-
Nardo, 2012; Mallett & Melchiori, 2019; Woodzicka et al., 2015), and such offensiveness 
construals are likely tied to our personal values and perceptions of our communities’ values. 
People are highly sensitive to information that signals what most people actually do (descriptive 
norms) and what people should do (injunctive norms; Cialdini et al., 1990). We behave in 
socially normative ways—sometimes willingly, other times begrudgingly—because adherence 
helps us satisfy our core human motives of mastery, belongingness, and self-esteem (Cialdini & 
Goldstein, 2004; Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Conformity and compliance with prejudice norms is no 
exception (e.g., Crandall et al., 2002; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). The behavior of high-
prejudice people, who lack intrinsic motivation to suppress prejudice, depends heavily on their 
perception of local social norms (e.g., Devine et al., 1991). If their social circle is perceived to 
deeply value nonprejudiced responding toward a particular group, prejudice expression will 
mostly be suppressed. If not, then prejudice expression will mostly be expressed and justified 
(Crandall & Eshleman, 2003, 2005).  
As with other types of norms, prejudice norms are localized. That is, norms about the 
expression of prejudice vary by target group and shift over space and the passage of time 
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(Crandall et al., 2002; Crandall & Warner, 2005). Crandall and Warner (2005) broadly refer to 
this idea as the normative window theory. Given a particular context and time, all social groups 
fall somewhere along a continuum of prejudice acceptability. This ranges from complete and 
unquestioning social acceptance of a particular group (e.g., librarians, blind people, and firemen) 
to complete and unquestioning social rejection (e.g., child molesters, gang members, and drunk 
drivers). Pertaining to the thought experiment scenario above, even if the college student 
confrontee does not have internalized egalitarian values condemning anti-Black bias, this student 
is most certainly aware of the social norms in the college context—that expressing anti-Black 
comments is inappropriate and, therefore, offensive in their campus community. For the Unite 
the Right confrontee, however, the social pressure to comply with these egalitarian values—at 
least during the rally—is probably much weaker because this sort of behavior may not be viewed 
as inappropriate in that context. In consequence, we might expect that he views his expression of 
prejudice toward Black people as less offensive at the rally and, thus, expect his reaction to 
confrontation to be more dismissive, if not hostile. Rather than experience guilt, we might expect 
the Unite the Right confrontee to exhibit anger for being pressured to comply with pro-Black 
pressure (Plant & Devine, 2001) or perhaps even pride at his ability to withstand such pressures 
and amusement at ‘triggering the SJWs’ (or the ‘social justice warriors’; R. Cooper, 2018; 
Sonnad & Squirrell, 2017). Such emotions may feed into impulses to cognitively and 
behaviorally dismiss the confronter (e.g., refusing to apologize, derogating the confronter as a 
‘stupid jerk’, and continuing to express prejudice). And such hostile reactions to confrontation 
may not be limited to Unite the Right confrontees. We might expect similar responses from 
college students if, instead of Black or female targets, they’re confronted for expressing 
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prejudice toward targets that it appears socially acceptable to feel negatively toward on the 
college campus (e.g., drug users or gang members).  
Confrontation gained prominence in the social psychological literature as a prejudice 
reduction approach during a period where egalitarian social standards for behavior were perhaps 
at an all-time high in the United States (Bobo, 2001; Case & Greeley, 1990; Dovidio, 2001; 
Duckitt, 1992). Troublingly, these once restrictive norms for the public expression of prejudice 
appear to be weakening (Crandall et al., 2018; Giani & Méon, 2019; Valentino et al., 2018). 
Support for social justice reforms designed to address societal inequalities began to wane during 
the Obama presidency (Kaiser et al., 2009; Norton & Sommers, 2011; Valentino & Brader, 
2011) and these trends have accelerated in the Trump era. Increasingly, explicitly prejudiced 
rhetoric is socially tolerated—like falsely equating Mexican immigrants with criminals and 
rapists (Ye He Lee, 2015)—as is outright disdain for anti-prejudice movements (e.g., Black 
Lives Matter, #MeToo; see Gantt Shafer, 2017). These normative changes have not gone 
unnoticed by the American public. Compared to before the 2016 U.S. presidential election, 
Americans now perceive greater social tolerance of prejudice expression, particularly toward 
social groups targeted by the Trump campaign, like Muslims, immigrants, women, and people 
living with disabilities (Crandall et al., 2018). These normative shifts are particularly alarming to 
social scientists who recognize the power of social norm perceptions to license prejudiced 
attitudes and behavior (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003, 2005; Edwards & Rushin, 2018; Georgeac 
et al., 2018; Giani & Méon, 2019; Huang & Low, 2017; Schaffner, 2018). Indeed, in the years 
since the Trump election, we have seen a rise in hate crimes—particularly in U.S. counties that 
have hosted Trump rallies (Feinberg et al., 2019)—and in inhumane conditions for refugees and 
other immigrants illegally crossing the U.S.-Mexico border (Sacchetti, 2019; Southern Poverty 
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Law Center, 2019). Thus, at such a tense time in our nation’s history, it is especially important to 
understand whether the perceived presence or absence of egalitarian social norms moderate 
confrontation effectiveness. If confrontation requires perceived egalitarian social norms in order 
to be effective, then as social norm perceptions shift, we may find confrontation to be a less and 
less effective prejudice reduction tool. However, if confrontation does not require perceived 
egalitarian social norms in order to be effective, then confrontation may be a particularly useful 
way to combat the rise in prejudice expression at this moment in time. 
The Credible Cues Model for Responding to Prejudice Confrontations  
The idea that local prejudice norm perceptions moderate the effectiveness of 
confrontation is not entirely new. As reviewed above, confrontation researchers have long noted 
that social norms are probably very important in confrontation effectiveness (e.g., Czopp & 
Monteith, 2003). For instance, in the Czopp, Monteith, and Mark article described earlier (2006, 
p. 801), the authors remarked: 
“Confrontations may be less effective in situations that involve expressions of prejudice that can be easily 
justified or when there is relatively weak personal or social pressure to suppress such expressions. For 
example, confronting an individual who openly derogates child molesters (a relatively justifiable prejudice) 
or confronting a White supremacist at a Ku Klux Klan meeting (where suppression norms are weak) may 
be particularly ineffective.” 
Until now, however, this moderating role of perceived prejudice norms on reactions to 
confrontation has been understudied and, consequently, undertheorized. To address these 
empirical and theoretical gaps, in the present work I put forward and test a new model of 
confrontation, which I am calling the Credible Cues Model for Responding to Prejudice 
Confrontations (see Fig. 1). This new model highlights the role that confrontees’ construals of 
situational factors play in shaping their downstream emotional, cognitive, and behavioral 
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responses to confrontation. Extending earlier confrontation models (Monteith & Mark, 2005), the 
Credible Cues Model does not take for granted that confrontation will inevitably prompt 
confrontees to acknowledge prejudice-related discrepancies, experience guilt, and engage in self-
regulation. It explicitly addresses the possibility that confrontees will reject the confronter’s 
assertion that they acted in a problematic way. 
According to the model, after a confrontation occurs, confrontees will experience 
uncomfortable arousal—regardless of their personal prejudice endorsement. This occurs because 
people are motivated to view themselves in a positive light and want to see themselves as good 
and moral beings (Mezulis et al., 2004). People are strongly motivated by interpersonal goals 
related to being liked and respected by others (Bergsieker et al., 2010; Mallett & Melchiori, 
2019). Thus, being confronted for expressing prejudice poses a threat to one’s self-integrity 
(Stone et al., 2011; Wolsiefer & Stone, 2019), and thereby prompts an uncomfortable state of 
cognitive and physiological arousal (Steele, 1988; Stone & Cooper, 2001).9  
Motivated to reduce this uncomfortable tension, we expect the confrontee to reflect on 
the confrontation situation, scanning it for cues to ascertain whether the confrontation is 
credible—that is, the extent to which the confrontee perceives the confrontation as reasonable, 
warranted, or justifiable. If the confrontation is deemed not credible, the confrontee will evaluate 
their own behavior as inoffensive and, therefore, they can easily dismiss the confrontation and 
resolve their cognitive discomfort in ways that bypass self-regulation entirely (e.g., trivialization, 
shifting blame, justification; Festinger, 1962; Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). If the confrontation 
is deemed credible, however, the confrontee will evaluate their own behavior as offensive (i.e., 
 
9 This model assumes “good faith” actors. It is not designed to predict the confrontation responses of people who 
express prejudice simply to “get a rise” out of others (e.g., the internet trolls and devil’s advocates of the world). 
These sorts of bad faith actors want to be confronted. As a result, confrontation may not threaten their self-integrity 
or spur the uncomfortable arousal that good faith actors experience. 
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seeing their bias expression as harmful), resulting in a cascade of negative self-directed 
emotions. In such a case, the confrontee must find a non-dismissive way to resolve their 
cognitive discomfort, perhaps by apologizing to the confronter and/or by better regulating their 
prejudiced behavior going forward. 
I expect that many situational cues may inform these credibility judgments,10 but the 
focal cue in the present research is social norm perceptions. In earlier works, confrontation 
researchers have implied that when social norms condemning prejudice toward a group are 
perceived to be strong, confrontees will be more likely to construe their actions as offensive and, 
as a result, be more likely to conform to (or at least comply with) a confronter’s prejudice 
reduction request (e.g., Czopp et al., 2006). When social norms condemning prejudice are 
perceived to be weak, however, these same researchers theorize that confrontees will construe 
their actions as inoffensive and be less likely to conform to (or comply with) a prejudice 
reduction request. 
The Credible Cues Model extends this previous theorizing by explicitly incorporating a 
cue construal process into the model. In assessing the credibility of the confronter’s claim, 
confrontees may question whether their actions offended (or harmed) others in ways that violated 
their self-standards for behavior (e.g., “Do I think I acted in a way that was offensive, harmful, or 
undesirable?”) or the local context’s social-standards for behavior (e.g., “Do others here think I 
 
10 For example, cues that indicate whether the confrontee perceives themselves to be personally responsible for the 
biased action may also affect confrontation credibility construals. Without accepting personal responsibility—either 
because the confrontee deems their prejudice expression as unbiased, out of their control, and/or unintentional—the 
confrontee will likely resolve the uncomfortable tension spurred by confrontation by shifting blame to a cause 
outside of the self (Gosling et al., 2006). That is, the confrontee might blame the confronter for misinterpreting their 
actions or blame the situation for forcing their hand. With the blame shifted, the confrontee preserves their self-
integrity without necessarily feeling remorseful and/or changing their behavior. Across all three of the present 
studies we have devised scenarios that make it relatively challenging for confrontees to reject personal responsibility 
for prejudice expression (e.g., giving confrontees a great deal of free choice during the experiments). Future studies, 
however, should experimentally manipulate these (and other) situational constraints to examine how responsibility 
construals affect responses to confrontation. 
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acted in a way that was offensive, harmful, or undesirable?”).11 Thus, according to this model, 
for a confrontation to prompt guilt and behavioral self-regulation, confrontees must first accept 
that their bias expression is offensive. Without accepting that their behavior was offensive—
because the confrontee does not construe their behavior as a violation of self- and social-
standards (Stone & Cooper, 2001)—the confrontee will likely resolve the uncomfortable tension 
spurred by confrontation by trivializing the expression (e.g., “C’mon that was no big deal”; 
“Relax, this is political correctness run amok!”) or by justifying the expression as a rational 
behavior (“Screw you! I’m being completely reasonable here”). With the bias trivialized or 
justified, the confrontee preserves their self-integrity without necessarily feeling remorseful or 
changing their behavior. Further, confrontees confronted for prejudice expression they deem 
inoffensive (vs. offensive) may report less negative self-directed affect (e.g., guilt and 
embarrassment) and engage in fewer self-reflective and -corrective thoughts and behaviors (e.g., 
apology, desire to change) and instead report more negative other-directed affect (e.g., anger, 
disgust), more positive affect (e.g., amusement, pride), and greater dismissive and hostile 
thoughts and behaviors (e.g., trivialization or justification of prejudice; see Fig. 2). 
Confrontation Forecasters vs. Confrontation Experiencers 
Important to consider, intuitions about whether a confrontee will respond to confrontation 
with self-regulation or with dismissiveness may be misaligned with the reality. It is well-
documented that forecasters (i.e., people who imagine a scenario and forecast their feelings, 
thoughts, and behaviors) often misjudge how experiencers actually feel, think, and behave (e.g., 
Vallone et al., 1990; Wilson & Gilbert, 2005). For example, forecasters who imagine the sting of 
a romantic break-up expect to feel much sadder (and for much longer) than experiencers report 
 
11 The purpose of this model is to explain reactions to prejudice confrontation, but this model may be useful for 
explaining reactions to many sorts of confrontations—prejudice-related and otherwise. 
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actually feeling (Gilbert et al., 1998). Within the confrontation literature, much of the work on 
forecaster-experiencer discrepancies has been conducted on prospective confronters, generally 
finding that people forecast that they will confront prejudice at much higher rates than people 
actually confront prejudice (Brinkman et al., 2011; J. R. Crosby & Wilson, 2015; Hyers, 2007, 
2010; Karmali et al., 2017; Kawakami et al., 2009; Shelton & Stewart, 2004; Swim & Hyers, 
1999; Woodzicka & LaFrance, 2001).12 Much less work, however, has examined forecaster-
experiencer discrepancies for confrontees. The exception to this is the work of Czopp and 
colleagues already discussed above (Czopp et al., 2006; Czopp & Monteith, 2003). They found 
that although high-prejudice confrontees forecast that they would respond to confrontations with 
anger and dismissiveness (Czopp & Monteith, 2003), most actually responded with guilt and 
complied with the confronter’s request to stereotype less (Czopp et al., 2006). There is 
precedence then for the prediction that confrontee forecasters’ imagined reactions and confrontee 
experiencers’ actual reactions to confrontation will differ. 
Overall, I expect that prejudice acceptability beliefs will inform confrontee forecasters’ 
anticipated reactions to confrontation. As prejudice acceptability increases (that is, as prejudice 
expression is perceived to be more socially normative), I predict that forecasters who expect to 
be confronted will view prejudice expression as less offensive. To the extent that prejudice 
expression is deemed inoffensive, I expect forecasters will anticipate feeling less negative self-
directed affect and expect fewer self-corrective/reflective thoughts and behavioral intentions, 
while anticipating greater negative other-directed affect and expecting more dismissive/hostile 
thoughts and behavioral intentions. For experiencers, however, I propose competing hypotheses 
 
12 There are many explanations for why people anticipate confronting prejudice more than they actually confront, 
but it is beyond the scope of this article to review those explanations in depth. Interested readers should consult 
Leslie Ashburn-Nardo and colleagues’ Confronting Prejudiced Responses (2008; 2019) model. Their model 
systematically outlines a number of perceptual and intergroup-process barriers that discourage confronting behavior. 
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for how prejudice acceptability will affect confrontees’ responses to confrontation: (1) the 
forecaster-experiencer alignment hypothesis and (2) the forecaster-experiencer misalignment 
hypothesis.  
The Forecaster-Experiencer Alignment Hypothesis. First, it is possible that forecaster 
expectations will be aligned with what experiencers actually feel, think and do. Like forecasters, 
experiences may view prejudice acceptability as a credibility cue. That is, as prejudice 
acceptability increases, confrontees could view prejudice expression as less offensive which, in 
turn, would reduce negative self-directed affect and self-corrective/reflective thoughts and 
behaviors, while increasing negative other-directed affect, positive affect, and dismissive/hostile 
thoughts and behaviors. Such a finding would suggest that confronters think twice before 
confronting in situations where prejudice norms are more permissive, for fear of the 
confrontation backfiring. 
The Forecaster-Experiencer Misalignment Hypothesis. Second, and in direct 
opposition the first possibility, it is also quite plausible that forecaster expectations will be 
misaligned with what experiencers actually feel, think and do, such that, regardless of prejudice 
acceptability, confrontation will still encourage self-regulation. Offensiveness construals should 
still be important, but they may be less strongly tied to prejudice acceptability beliefs for 
experiencers than it is for forecasters. Whereas forecasters may focus on the prejudice 
acceptability cue to the exclusion of other cues (Wilson et al., 2000), experiencer reactions may 
be impacted by other sources of normative information that forecasters do not anticipate. For 
example, experiencers may interpret the confrontation itself as a countervailing social norm 
manipulation (Blanchard et al., 1991, 1994; Monteith et al., 1996). In a classic experiment, 
Blanchard and colleagues (1994) had experimenters approach naïve participants and a 
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confederate who was working with the experimenter. Experimenters asked confederates to 
complete an opinion survey about racism. The participant witnessed how the confederate 
answered the survey questions before filling the survey out for themselves. As it turned out, 
seeing the confederate openly condemn prejudice communicated descriptive social norm 
information to the participant and, thereby, strongly influenced participants’ own self-reported 
opinions—leading them to condemn racism themselves. It is possible then that confrontation will 
similarly communicate social norm information. Merely being confronted may suggest that 
prejudice expression is non-normative and, thus, offensive, which could increase negative self-
directed affect and self-corrective responding, even in situations where (in the absence of 
confrontation) prejudice acceptability would otherwise be high. Such a finding would suggest 
that confrontation may be an effective prejudice reduction strategy, even in contexts where 
prejudice norms are perceived to be more permissive. 
Overview of the Present Research 
Until now, researchers have not rigorously and systematically examined the influence of 
prejudice norm perceptions on confrontation effectiveness. Given the confrontation literature’s 
narrow focus on only a handful of target groups, coupled with its overreliance on data collected 
in contexts with strong egalitarian norms, it is unclear whether confrontations will reduce 
prejudice expression in situations where local social norm beliefs allow greater latitude for 
prejudice. Thus, the central focus of the present research is to examine the effectiveness of 
confrontation while systematically varying prejudice acceptability, or the extent to which it is 
perceived as socially permissible to feel negatively toward the target group. 
Across three experiments, I manipulate prejudice acceptability and examine how 
confrontees react to interpersonal confrontation—by measuring how offensive they perceive 
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prejudice expression to be as well as how they feel, what they think, and how they behave. In 
Study 1, students imagine being confronted for expressing prejudice toward a target group that is 
either low, moderate, or high in prejudice acceptability (according to pilot tested campus norms) 
and then forecast their emotional, cognitive, and behavioral reactions to being confronted. In 
Studies 2 and 3, students are brought into the lab (alongside a confederate) and are actually 
confronted for stereotyping a target group member that is either low or high in prejudice 
acceptability. Together, these experiments shed light on the role of prejudice norms in responses 
to interpersonal confrontation, either increasing faith in confrontation as a prejudice reduction 
tool or highlighting important situational constraints to when confrontation prompts self-
regulation and when it backfires.  
Social Norm Beliefs Pilot Study 
Prior to Study 1, I conducted a pilot study to assess students’ injunctive norm beliefs 
about prejudice expression on Indiana University’s campus (N = 4,594 students).13 As part of a 
larger survey administered by the psychology department, students were asked to indicate how 
socially acceptable it is for Indiana University students to feel negatively toward over 170 social 
groups (1 = “Definitely not OK to have negative feelings about this group,” 2 = “Maybe it’s OK 
to have negative feelings about this group,” 3 = “Definitely OK to have negative feelings about 
this group”; for a similar method, see Crandall et al., 2002).  
Based on these data, I selected 30 target groups that roughly fell into three categories: 
low prejudice acceptability, moderate prejudice acceptability, and high prejudice acceptability 
(see Table 1). The low prejudice acceptability condition included 10 target groups clustered 
together because students, on average, believed it is definitely not socially acceptable to express 
 
13 See Appendix 1 for Social Norm Beliefs Pilot Study materials and average prejudice norm ratings. 
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prejudice toward those groups (i.e., blind people, mentally retarded people, elderly people, Black 
people, Jewish people, people living with depression, gay men, poor people, Muslims, and 
transgender people); the moderate prejudice acceptability condition included 10 target groups 
clustered together because students were unsure about how socially acceptable it is to express 
prejudice toward them (i.e., fat people, wealthy people, homeless people, Scientologists, 
hoarders, illegal immigrants, gamblers, cigarette smokers, ex-convicts, and alcoholics); the high 
prejudice acceptability condition included 10 target groups that were clustered together because 
college students believed it is definitely socially acceptable to express prejudice toward them 
(i.e., men who visit prostitutes, homophobes, gang members, careless drivers, sexists, adulterers, 
Nazis, KKK members, child abusers, and rapists).14 
Study 1 
 The purpose of Study 1 is to examine how prejudice acceptability beliefs influence 
forecasters’ offensiveness construals, affect, thoughts, and behavior after imagining being 





14 Readers may have noted similarities among the target groups within each of the three prejudice acceptability 
clusters—for example, target groups in the “low prejudice acceptability” cluster appear to be groups where people 
have very little control or choice in their group membership and are often considered vulnerable members of society. 
By contrast, in the “high prejudice acceptability” cluster, we see target groups that may have more control/choice in 
their group membership. It seems likely that the college students surveyed use controllability to inform which 
prejudices are acceptable. If we examined another context, the social rules may be very different (e.g., Crandall et 
al., 2002; Crandall & Warner, 2005). It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore why certain norms are in place 
in a given setting. While controllability may be conflated with prejudice acceptability, in Study 2 I selected a 
different set of social groups for the low and high prejudice acceptability conditions that were matched on several 
stigma-related dimensions—including controllability, concealability, contact likelihood, and entitativity—in order to 
minimize this potential confound. Further, in Study 3, I manipulated prejudice acceptability while keeping target 





This study employed a single factor experimental design. I manipulated prejudice 
acceptability by randomly assigning students to read a vignette that asked them to imagine being 
confronted for expressing prejudice toward either a low, moderate, or high prejudice 
acceptability group. Then they forecast their emotional, cognitive, and behavioral responses to 
the imagined confrontation. 
The bulk of previous confrontation studies have focused on two target groups of bias—
women and Black Americans, groups for whom prejudice expression is largely perceived as non-
normative and illegitimate. As some scholars have argued, limiting research to only targets like 
these may obscure important features of the phenomena under study (Crandall & Warner, 2005; 
Jetten et al., 2013). That is, we may learn new things about reactions to confrontation by 
expanding the focal target groups under investigation. Thus, to avoid conflating reactions to 
confrontation with the idiosyncrasies associated with any one target group, college students 
imagined being confronted for expressing prejudice toward one target group out of 30 total target 
groups (10 target groups in each of the three prejudice acceptability levels).15 
Sensitivity Analysis 
A priori, I planned to recruit as many students as possible in a single semester for this 
experiment. Roughly I expected to recruit between 1,500 and 2,000 students to participate (level-
one sample size).16 Each student would be randomly assigned to read a vignette pertaining to one 
of 30 target groups (level-two sample size), meaning there would be about 500 to 650 students 
 
15 Some multilevel modeling experts suggest collecting data for at least 30 clusters with at least 30 observations in 
each cluster (e.g., Hox, 1997). 
16 Prior information about past semesters of data collection indicated that I could reasonably obtain data from 1,500 
to 2,000 students in a single semester (via an online experiment). 
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per prejudice acceptability level (low, moderate, and high) and about 50 to 65 students per target 
group (e.g., blind people, Muslims, rapists, etc.) 
To account for the nested structure of these data, the data were analyzed using multilevel 
modeling (e.g., Brauer & Curtin, 2018; Judd et al., 2012, 2017), with target group as the level-
two random factor. To ensure that I would collect enough data to adequately estimate the 
proposed multilevel models, I used the PowerUp! tool (Bulus & Dong, 2018; Dong & Maynard, 
2013), a program created to calculate the minimum detectable effect size (MDES) for various 
types of multilevel models.17 The present design is considered a simple cluster random 
assignment (CRA) design, because random assignment to condition occurs at the cluster level 
(vs. the individual level). To calculate the MDES, I used the following inputs: α = 0.05, 1 – β = 
0.80, two-tailed, ICCs ranging between 0.01 (very little level-two variance) and 0.20 (substantial 
level-two variance), P = .33, no covariates, 30 clusters, and 50 subjects per cluster. The MDES 
for the present study ranged between 0.20, 95% CI [0.06, 0.33] (when the ICC is small) and 0.52, 
95% CI [0.15, 0.89] (when the ICC is large). This indicates that we have sufficient power to 
detect a small-sized effect in the case of very little level-two variance and sufficient power to 
detect a medium-sized effect in the case of a great deal of level-two variance—which I predicted, 
given that the groups varied on prejudice acceptability. 
Participants 
 Introductory psychology students at Indiana University (N = 1,591, 70.3% White, 62.2% 
female, see Table 2 for complete demographic information) were recruited for participation in 
 
17 To calculate the MDES for this CRA design (Model 3.1), PowerUp! needs to know the desired alpha level (α), 
desired statistical power (1 – β), whether the test is one-tailed or two-tailed, Rho (also called the ICC, which refers 
to the proportion of variance in the outcome that is between clusters), P (the proportion of level-two units 
randomized to a particular condition), the number of covariates, the number of clusters, and the average number of 
level-one units per level-two cluster. It was difficult to anticipate the average ICC in advance, so I conducted 
sensitivity analyses for a range of ICCs from very small (0.01) to much larger (0.20). 
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this online study.18 Random assignment to target group was successful, such that each target 
group had between 51 and 55 respondents, with 532 students randomly assigned to the low 
prejudice acceptability condition, 526 students to the moderate prejudice acceptability condition, 
and 533 students to the high prejudice acceptability condition.  
Procedure 
 The materials for the present study appeared within a larger psychology department 
survey. After consenting and completing demographic measures, students completed a variety of 
questionnaires. The ordering of my survey within the larger set of surveys was randomized. By 
completing this larger survey, students earned credit toward a class requirement and became 
eligible for more psychology studies offered by the department.  
For the present study, students first read a short vignette describing a social conflict 
situation. They were asked to imagine that they were talking with some acquaintances after class. 
During the imagined conversation they decided to make a joke implying something negative 
about a particular target group (e.g., blind people, gamblers, Nazis, etc.). Afterward, students 
were asked to imagine that one of their acquaintances was upset by their joke and ended up 
calling them prejudiced. Example vignettes are depicted below: 
Example Low Prejudice Acceptability condition: 
Imagine you are talking with a few acquaintances after class. During the conversation, you make 
a joke that implies something negative about blind people. 
An acquaintance of yours interjects, saying they were upset by your joke and that you seem to 
be a little prejudiced. 
Example Moderate Prejudice Acceptability condition: 
 
18 Sixteen-hundred and thirty-five students originally entered the survey, but 44 of these students (2.7% of the full 
sample) were excluded for missing 75% (or more) of their data on key outcome variables. 
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Imagine you are talking with a few acquaintances after class. During the conversation, you make 
a joke that implies something negative about homeless people. 
An acquaintance of yours interjects, saying they were upset by your joke and that you seem to 
be a little prejudiced. 
Example High Prejudice Acceptability condition:  
Imagine you are talking with a few acquaintances after class. During the conversation, you make 
a joke that implies something negative about child abusers. 
An acquaintance of yours interjects, saying they were upset by your joke and that you seem to 
be a little prejudiced. 
After reading the vignette, students were asked to report how they would feel and what 
they would think and do in this social conflict situation. Of primary interest, I measured whether 
students believed prejudice expression toward this target group was offensive, their anticipated 
negative self-directed affect, negative other-directed affect, and positive affect, as well as 
anticipated self-corrective thoughts and behaviors and hostile-dismissive thoughts and behaviors. 
Students then reported their injunctive norm beliefs regarding how socially acceptable it is to feel 
negatively toward all of the selected target groups at Indiana University (30-items, 1 “It is 
definitely not OK to have negative feelings about this group” to 3 “It is definitely OK to have 
negative feelings about this group”; Crandall et al., 2002), which would serve as the 
manipulation check. Finally, students reported their own personal prejudices toward the target 
group. 
 At the very end of the survey, students were asked the following memory check question: 
“Earlier in the survey, you were asked to imagine making a joke that implied something negative 
about a particular group of people. Which of the following groups did you supposedly make a 
joke about?” Students could select any of the 30 target groups or say that they did not remember. 
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Analyses of this question revealed that the majority of students correctly identified their 
randomly assigned target group (71.3%). 
Measures 
 Outcome measures included participants’ offensiveness construals, anticipated affect, 
thoughts, and behaviors. 19 
Offensiveness. The purpose of the offensiveness measure was to assess the extent to 
whether participants believed that prejudice expression toward the target group is harmful. Two 
items demonstrated strong internal consistency reliability and were averaged together to form a 
composite score (𝛼 = .89; 9-point Likert scale, 1 “Not at all” to 7 “Very”; i.e., “How offensive is 
it to make negative comments disparaging people from this group?” and “How harmful is it to 
make negative comments disparaging people from this group?”). Items were presented in a 
randomized order. Higher scores indicate that participants view prejudice expression toward the 
target group to be more offensive. 
Anticipated Affect. To measure anticipated affective responses to confrontation, we 
asked participants to review a list of emotion words and indicate how much they expected each 
emotion to apply in the imagined social situation, using a 7-point Likert scale (1 “Does not apply 
at all” to 7 “Applies very much”; Czopp & Monteith, 2003). First, the negative self-directed 
affect subscale assessed negative feelings toward themselves (𝛼 = .93, 3-items, i.e., 
“disappointed with myself,” “embarrassed,” and “guilty”). Second, the negative other-directed 
affect subscale assessed negative feelings toward the confronter (𝛼 = .87, 3-items, i.e., “annoyed 
with the other person,” “angry with the other person,” and “disgusted with the other person”). 
Third, the positive affect subscale measured the anticipated presence of smug emotions in 
 
19 For full Study 1 measures, see Appendix 2. 
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response to confrontation (𝛼 = .85, 3-items, i.e., “amused”, “entertained”, “proud”). Items were 
presented in a randomized order. Higher scores indicate stronger endorsement of the particular 
emotional response. 
Anticipated Thoughts and Behaviors. To measure anticipated thoughts and behaviors 
in response to confrontation, we asked participants to review a list of cognitions and behaviors 
and indicate how much they believed they would endorse each one, again using a 7-point Likert 
scale (1 “Not at all” to 7 “Very much”; Czopp & Monteith, 2003). The self-corrective thoughts 
and behaviors subscale assessed the extent to which self-regulatory thoughts and behaviors were 
endorsed (𝛼 = .92, 9-items, e.g., “I would think I was wrong,” “I would apologize,” and “I would 
try to avoid such behavior in the future”), while the dismissive/hostile thoughts and behaviors 
subscale assessed the extent to which trivializing and prejudice-justifying thoughts and behaviors 
were endorsed (𝛼 = .85, 6-items, e.g., “I would think there’s nothing wrong with what I had 
said,” “I would think this person is being a jerk,” and “I would tell the person they’re being 
stupid”). Items were presented in a randomized order. Higher scores indicate stronger 
endorsement of the particular cognitive/behavioral response style. 
Personal Prejudice. As a covariate, we assessed participants’ explicit prejudice 
endorsement. Participants were asked to think about the target group depicted in the imagined 
scenario and rate the group along several dimensions (𝛼 = .96, 3-items; i.e., 1 “Negative” to 9 
“Positive”; 1 “Bad” to 9 “Good”; 1 “Unfavorable” to 9 “Favorable”). All items were reverse-
scored and then averaged together. Higher scores indicate stronger endorsement of personal 






Data Screening and Preliminary Analyses 
 Outcome variable composites were created to assess (a) offensiveness beliefs, (b) 
negative self-directed affect, (c) negative other-directed affect, (d) positive affect, (e) self-
corrective thoughts and behaviors, and (f) dismissive/hostile thoughts and behaviors. Scales 
demonstrated adequate internal consistency reliability (𝛼	 ≥  .85). Composite variables satisfied 
assumptions of normality and linearity required by general linear models. As expected, at the 
student level (without accounting for clustering), prejudice acceptability condition (-1 = Low, 0 
= Moderate, 1 = High) was negatively correlated with offensiveness perceptions (r = -.49, p < 
.001), such that the more socially acceptable it was to express a type of prejudice, the less 
offensive expressions of that prejudice seemed. Likewise, the more socially acceptable it was to 
express a given prejudice, the less negative self-directed affect (r = -.32, p < .001) and self-
corrective thoughts and actions were reported (r = -.30, p < .001). Conversely, the more socially 
acceptable it was to express a given prejudice, the more negative-other directed affect (r = .27, p 
< .001), positive affect (r = .16, p < .001), and hostile-dismissive thoughts and actions were 
reported (r = .26, p < .001). 
Table 3 provides the psychometric properties of all variables. Table 4 provides zero-order 
correlations. 
Manipulation Check  
To confirm that the prejudice acceptability experimental manipulation was perceived by 
students as intended, I conducted a repeated measures ANOVA. Each student reported how 
socially acceptable it was to feel negatively toward all 30 target groups. These injunctive norm 
beliefs were averaged together according to their prejudice acceptability level, resulting in three 
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injunctive norm composites for each student (one for each prejudice acceptability level: low, 
moderate, and high).  
As predicted, a repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant and large main effect 
of prejudice acceptability, F(2, 3138) = 3504.66, p < .001, 𝜂p2 = .69. Simple effects tests 
indicated that students rated prejudice toward low prejudice acceptability target groups as less 
normative (M = 1.42, SD = 0.45) than prejudice toward moderate (M = 1.89, SD = 0.41, p < .001, 
dz = 1.20) and high prejudice acceptability target groups (M = 2.51, SD = 0.43, p < .001, dz = 
1.63). Additionally, students rated prejudice toward moderate prejudice acceptability target 
groups as less normative than prejudice toward high prejudice acceptability target groups (p < 
.001, dz = 1.36). These findings indicate that students perceived the prejudice acceptability 
manipulation as intended (see Fig. 3).  
Multilevel Models 
 Data Analytic Strategy. Multilevel modeling (MLM), with restricted maximum 
likelihood estimation (ReML), was used to examine the fixed effect of prejudice acceptability on 
all outcome variables, while accounting for the random intercept for each target group (Level 2). 
20, 21 We required complete data on all key variables, resulting in a final sample size of 1,568 
students.  
To run the multi-level models, I used the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015) for R version 
3.6.1 (R Core Team, 2019). Additionally, I used the lmerTest package to obtain t-tests and p-
 
20 All data across Studies 1-3 were analyzed using a combination of SPSS (v. 26) and R (v.3.6.1), including the 
lme4, lmerTest, and lavaan packages (Bates et al., 2015; IBM Corp, 2019; Kuznetsova et al., 2017; R Core Team, 
2019; Rosseel, 2012). 
21 All multilevel models were run with and without personal prejudice as a covariate. Personal prejudice was a 
significant covariate in all analyses (all ps ≤ .003), negatively predicting offensiveness beliefs (b = -0.37), negative 
self-directed affect (b = -0.18), and self-corrective intentions (b = -0.16), while positively predicting negative other-
directed affect (b = 0.13), positive affect (b = 0.01), and dismissive/hostile intentions (b = 0.10). Any changes to the 
interpretations of results (dependent on the inclusion of personal prejudice as a covariate) are footnoted alongside 
the relevant analysis. 
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values for fixed effects (Kuznetsova et al., 2017). For each outcome variable, I estimated 
unconditional models at Level 1 and Level 2 to calculate intraclass correlation coefficients 
(ICC), which estimate the proportion of unexplained variance at the target group level (Level 2) 
relative to the student level (Level 1).22 To do this, I used the following model equations: 
Unconditional Model (Level 1 Only):     𝑌! =	𝛽" +	𝜀! 
Unconditional Model (Levels 1 and 2): 𝑌!# =	𝛽" + 𝛼#$ +	𝜀!# 
The first model specification equation indicates that for a student (i) the predicted outcome score 
(𝑌!) will be a function of the overall intercept (𝛽") and residual random error variation (𝜀!). The 
second model specification equation indicates that the intercept is now permitted to vary by 
target group. For a student (i) within a target group (j), the predicted outcome score (𝑌!#) will be 
a function of the overall intercept (𝛽"), a random component for the target group (𝛼#$), and 
residual random error variation (𝜀!#). The ICCs were calculated by dividing the group-level error 
variance by the total error variance (Hox, 2010), such that higher values indicate greater variance 
between clusters. As ICCs grow larger, the more strongly the assumption of independent 
observations is violated and, therefore, the more necessary it is to account for clustering. That 
said, even small ICCs—e.g., ICC = .01—can dramatically inflate type 1 error rates, particularly 
in larger samples (Kreft & Leeuw, 1998), so multilevel modeling is recommended whenever data 
are nested.   
The random intercept models follow the same format, except that these models also 
include the predictor variable to help explain outcome scores: 
Primary Model: 𝑌!# =	𝛽" + 𝛽%!# + 𝛼#$ +	𝜀!# 
 
22 See Table 5 for a complete listing of multilevel model coefficients. 
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The only additional component to this model is the fixed effect of prejudice acceptability 
condition (𝛽%). For a student (i) within a target group (j), the predicted outcome score (𝑌!#) will 
be a function of the overall intercept (𝛽"), the fixed component of condition differences (𝛽%!#), a 
random component for the target group (𝛼#$), and residual random error variation (𝜀!#). Prejudice 
acceptability has three levels (low, moderate, and high). As a result, the prejudice acceptability 
predictor was dummy coded. 
 Offensiveness. As expected, a large amount of unexplained variance in offensiveness 
perceptions was accounted for by the target group to which students were randomly assigned 
(ICC = .29). Consistent with predictions, as prejudice acceptability increased, students perceived 
expressing prejudice as less offensive. Relative to students in the low prejudice acceptability 
condition, students in the moderate prejudice acceptability, t(27.02) = -5.10, b = -1.43, p < .001, 
and high prejudice acceptability conditions, t(26.94) = -10.05, b = -2.81, p < .001, rated prejudice 
expression as significantly less offensive. Likewise, students in the high prejudice acceptability 
condition rated prejudice expression as significantly less offensive than students in the moderate 
prejudice acceptability condition, t(27.00) = -4.94, b = -1.38, p < .001 (see Fig. 4). 
Anticipated Affect. Across all three affective outcomes, a non-negligible amount of the 
unexplained variance was accounted for by the target group to which students were randomly 
assigned (Negative Self-Directed Affect ICC = .14; Negative Other-Directed Affect ICC = .10; 
Positive Affect ICC = .04). 
Negative Self-Directed Affect. In line with predictions, as prejudice acceptability 
increased, students anticipated less negative self-directed affect (e.g., guilt, embarrassment) in 
response to being confronted. Students in the moderate prejudice acceptability, t(27.00) = -3.12, 
b = -0.69, p = .004, and high prejudice acceptability conditions t(26.89) = -7.02, b = -1.55, p < 
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.001, anticipated significantly less negative self-directed affect than students in the low prejudice 
acceptability condition. Similarly, students in the high prejudice acceptability condition, t(26.97) 
= -3.89, b = -0.86, p < .001, anticipated significantly less negative self-directed affect than 
students in the moderate prejudice acceptability condition (see Fig. 5).23 
Negative Other-Directed Affect. For the most part, as prejudice acceptability increased, 
students anticipated greater negative other-directed affect (e.g., anger, frustration) in response to 
being confronted. Students in the low prejudice acceptability, t(27.08) = -7.50, b = -1.01, p < 
.001, and moderate prejudice acceptability conditions, t(27.22) = -5.64, b = -0.76, p < .001, 
anticipated experiencing significantly less negative other-directed affect than students in the high 
prejudice acceptability group. However, students’ anticipated negative other-directed affect did 
not significantly differ between the low and moderate prejudice acceptability conditions, t(27.27) 
= 1.85, b = 0.25, p = .08 (see Fig. 6). 
Positive Affect. Consistent with hypotheses, as prejudice acceptability increased, students 
anticipated greater positive affect (e.g., pride, amusement) in response to being confronted. 
Students in the moderate prejudice acceptability, t(27.16) = 2.26, b = 0.25, p = .03, and the high 
prejudice acceptability conditions, t(26.92) = 4.98, b = 0.55, p < .001, anticipated experiencing 
significantly greater positive affect than students in the low prejudice acceptability condition. 
Similarly, students in the high prejudice acceptability condition, t(27.10) = 2.71, b = 0.30, p = 
.01, anticipated experiencing significantly greater positive affect than students in the moderate 
prejudice acceptability condition (see Fig. 7).24 
 
23 For negative self-directed affect, when personal prejudice was added into the model as a covariate, the difference 
between the low and moderate prejudice acceptability conditions was in the same direction, but no longer 
statistically significant (b = -0.39, p = .07). All other comparisons remained significant. 
24 For positive affect, when personal prejudice was added into the model as a covariate, only the difference between 
the low and high prejudice acceptability conditions remained statistically significant (b = 0.03, p = .03). All other 
comparisons were reduced to non-significance. 
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Anticipated Thoughts & Behavior. Across the cognitive and behavioral outcomes, a 
non-negligible amount of the unexplained variance was accounted for by the target group to 
which students were randomly assigned (Self-Corrective Thoughts and Behaviors ICC = .12; 
Dismissive/Hostile Thoughts and Behaviors ICC = .09). 
Self-Corrective Thoughts and Behaviors. Consistent with predictions, as prejudice 
acceptability increased, students expected to engage in fewer self-corrective thoughts and 
behaviors. Students in the moderate prejudice acceptability, t(27.08) = -3.82, b = -0.58, p < .001, 
and high prejudice acceptability conditions, t(26.94) = -7.04, b = -1.07, p < .001, anticipated 
engaging in significantly fewer self-corrective thoughts and behaviors than students in the low 
prejudice acceptability condition. Likewise, students in the high prejudice acceptability condition 
anticipated engaging in significantly fewer self-corrective thoughts and behaviors than students 
in the moderate prejudice acceptability condition, t(27.04) = -3.21, b = -0.49, p = .003 (see Fig. 
8).25 
Dismissive/Hostile Thoughts and Behaviors. As predicted, as prejudice acceptability 
increased, students expected to engage in greater dismissive and hostile thoughts and behaviors. 
Students in the moderate prejudice acceptability, t(27.15) = 3.24, b = 0.34, p = .003, and high 
prejudice acceptability conditions, t(26.94) = 7.87, b = 0.83, p < .001, anticipated engaging in 
significantly greater dismissive and hostile thoughts and behaviors than students in the low 
prejudice acceptability condition. Similarly, students in the high prejudice acceptability condition 
anticipated engaging in significantly greater dismissive and hostile thoughts and behaviors than 
 
25 For self-corrective thoughts and behaviors, when personal prejudice was added into the model as a covariate, the 
difference between the moderate and high prejudice acceptability conditions was no longer statistically significant (b 
= -0.13, p = .39). All other comparisons remained significant. 
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students in the moderate prejudice acceptability condition, t(27.10) = 4.62, b = 0.49, p < .001 
(see Fig. 9).26 
Multilevel Confirmatory Factor Analysis (ML-CFA) and Structural Equation Modeling 
(ML-SEM) 
The above multilevel analyses provided support for the prediction that prejudice 
acceptability directly affects all of the proposed outcome variables (i.e., offensiveness, negative 
self-directed affect, negative other-directed affect, positive affect, self-corrective thoughts and 
behaviors, and dismissive/hostile thoughts and behaviors), even when accounting for the nested 
data structure. Beyond examining the direct effects of prejudice acceptability on these outcomes, 
I also hypothesized indirect effects linking prejudice acceptability to affect through offensiveness 
(simple mediation); additionally, I predicted indirect effects linking prejudice acceptability to 
thoughts and behavioral intentions through offensiveness and affect (serial mediation).  
To test whether the data support these mediational predictions, I evaluated the fit of a 
multilevel structural equation model (see Fig. 10). By combining SEM with MLM, we can 
simultaneously assess whether the proposed system of regression equations adequately describes 
the relationships among latent variables at the student-level (Level 1), while accounting for the 
clustering at the target group-level (Level 2; Bauer, 2003; Krull & MacKinnon, 2001). This 
analysis involves two main parts: a measurement component and a structural component 
(Nachtigall et al., 2003). First, I tested whether the relationships between the hypothesized latent 
factors and observed variables were supported by the data via confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA). Second, I tested whether the proposed structural relationships between the latent 
 
26 For dismissive/hostile thoughts and behaviors, when personal prejudice was added into the model as a covariate, 
the difference between the low and moderate prejudice acceptability conditions was no longer significant (b = 0.17, 
p = .14). All other comparisons remained significant. 
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variables were supported by the data.27 Both the measurement model and structural model were 
conducted, using maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors. Missing data was 
handled such that only complete cases were included (i.e., listwise deletion). 
Measurement Model. The ML-CFA yielded adequate model fit: 𝜒2 (594) = 2447.04, p < 
.001, Robust CFI = .93, Robust RMSEA = .05, 90% CI [.04, 0.05], SRMR (within covariance 
matrix) = 0.06, SRMR (between covariance matrix) = 0.13. 28 Observed indicators loaded onto 
latent factors as predicted. For unstandardized and standardized factor loadings, see Table 6. 
Structural Model. The ML-SEM yielded adequate model fit. Again, the chi square for 
the model was statistically significant, 𝜒2 (627) = 2,429.81, p < .001, which is usually considered 
to be an indicator of poor model fit; however, significant chi square tests are common when 
working with large sample sizes and, in such cases, are generally disregarded (Kline, 2016). 
According to several alternative indices of model fit, the structure model was supported by the 
data, Robust CFI = .92, Robust RMSEA = .05, 90% CI [.04, .05], SRMR (within covariance 
matrix) = 0.07, SRMR (between covariance matrix) = 0.24.  
Consistent with predictions, this analysis revealed that prejudice acceptability negatively 
predicted offensiveness perceptions (b = -0.74, p < .001), such that the more acceptable a 
particular type of prejudice was at IU, the less offensive its expression seemed to IU students. As 
offensiveness perceptions increased, students anticipated experiencing greater negative self-
directed emotions (e.g., guilt, embarrassment; b = 0.64, p < .001), fewer negative other-directed 
 
27 A priori, sufficient model fit was defined as Comparative Fix Index (CFI) scores ≥ .90, Root Mean Square Error 
of Approximation (RMSEA) < .08, and Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) < .08 (Schreiber et al., 
2006). Chi squares are reported for transparency, but are not evaluated due to the test’s sensitivity to large sample 
sizes (Kline, 2016). 
28 The SRMR at the between-level is related to the number of clusters in the dataset—in this case, there are 30 
clusters. In cases with fewer than 200 clusters, the traditional 0.08 cutoff for SRMR may be too strict and does not 
necessarily indicate poor model fit (Asparouhov & Muthén, 2018, p. 13).  
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emotions (e.g., anger, frustration; b = -0.16, p < .001), and fewer positive emotions (e.g., pride, 
amusement; b = -0.09, p = .02). Moreover, these imagined emotional responses to confrontation 
predicted students’ intended cognitive and behavioral responses. Students who anticipated 
greater negative self-directed affect intended to self-reflect and self-correct more (e.g., thinking 
they’re wrong, wanting to apologize; b = 1.66, p < .001) and react hostilely and reject 
responsibility less (e.g., thinking the confronter is a jerk, telling the confronter he/she is stupid; b 
= -0.18, p < .001). By contrast, students who anticipated greater negative other-directed affect 
intended to self-reflect and self-correct less (b = -0.40, p < .001) and react hostilely and reject 
responsibility more (b = 0.90, p < .001). Similarly, students who anticipated greater positive 
affect intended to react hostilely and reject responsibility more (b = 0.67, p < .001); contrary to 
predictions, however, positive affect did not significantly predict intentions to self-reflect and 
self-correct (b = 0.10, p = .23). Indeed, all but one of the indirect paths linking prejudice 
acceptability to emotional and cognitive-behavioral responses through offensiveness perceptions 
were statistically significant 29, 30 For the full listing of standardized and unstandardized direct 
and indirect path coefficients, see Table 7. 
Discussion 
The goal of Study 1 was to examine how prejudice acceptability beliefs influence 
forecasted responses to being confronted. To test this, we asked would-be confrontees to imagine 
how they would react to being confronted for expressing prejudice toward either a low, 
moderate, or high prejudice acceptability target group. I expected that as prejudice was viewed to 
 
29 Contrary to predictions, the indirect path linking prejudice acceptability to self-correction through offensiveness 
and positive affect was not statistically significant (b = 0.01, p = .294). All other hypothesized indirect effects were 
statistically significant. 
30 These direct and indirect pathways remained significant (and in the predicted direction) even when personal 
prejudice was added into the model as a covariate. 
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be more acceptable, people would perceive prejudice expression as less offensive, which would 
in turn decrease anticipated negative self-directed affect (e.g., guilt, embarrassment) while 
increasing anticipated negative other-directed affect (e.g., anger, frustration) and positive affect 
(e.g., pride, amusement). Moreover, we expected this increased negative other-directed and 
positive affect to escalate dismissive and hostile intentions, while decreasing self-corrective and 
self-reflective intentions. Indeed, this is largely what we found.  
Students who imagined being confronted for expressing prejudice toward high prejudice 
acceptability target groups—like gang members, adulterers, and Nazis—rated prejudice 
expression toward these groups as relatively inoffensive. This construal had downstream 
consequences for students’ forecasted emotional response. These students anticipated low levels 
of negative self-directed affect and (relative to the other conditions) high levels of negative 
other-directed affect and positive affect. In consequence, students in the high prejudice 
acceptability condition expected having fewer self-corrective and reflective thoughts and 
behaviors and having greater dismissive and hostile thoughts and behaviors.  
By contrast, students who imagined being confronted for expressing prejudice toward low 
prejudice acceptability target groups—like blind people, Jewish people, and financially poor 
people—rated prejudice expression toward these groups as highly offensive. This construal 
shaped their forecasted emotional responses, such that these students anticipated high levels of 
negative self-directed affect and low levels of negative other-directed affect and positive affect. 
Accordingly, students in the low prejudice acceptability condition expected having greater self-
corrective and reflective thoughts and behaviors and having fewer dismissive and hostile 
thoughts and behaviors.  
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Finally, students who imagined being confronted for expressing prejudice toward 
moderate prejudice acceptability target groups—like fat people, gamblers, and homeless 
people—forecasted emotional, cognitive, and behavioral responses fell in between these two 
extremes.  
Taken together, these results support my model, outlined above. Prejudice acceptability 
shaped students’ forecasted offensiveness construals, which influenced responses to being 
confronted. When imagining being confronted after expressing prejudice toward low prejudice 
acceptability groups, forecasters expected to view their prejudice expression as offensive and to 
conform to (or at least comply with) the confronter’s wishes—by apologizing and regulating 
their responses better in the future. By contrast, when imagining being confronted after 
expressing prejudice toward high prejudice acceptability groups, forecasters expected to view 
their prejudice expression as inoffensive and to experience less guilt, more anger, and greater 
hostility and defensiveness. 
Although these findings are consistent with predictions, the implications of Study 1 for 
understanding real-world responses to confrontation are somewhat limited. These findings 
suggest that confronting prejudice in situations where the prejudice acceptability beliefs are not 
on the confronter’s side is expected to be riskier, but we do not yet know if these situations are 
actually riskier. It is quite possible that how confrontees imagine they would act after being 
confronted differs from how confrontees will actually act. Indeed, a discrepancy between 
forecasted and actual responses to confrontation is exactly the surprising result that spurred the 
explosion of confrontation research nearly two decades ago. When people were asked to imagine 
how they would respond to being confronted for expressing racism and sexism, Czopp and 
colleagues found that high prejudice people expected to feel less guilt and greater irritation as 
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well as behave with less compunction and greater antagonism (Czopp & Monteith, 2003); 
however, in a follow-up study where high-prejudice people were actually confronted for 
expressing racism and sexism, the researchers found that high-prejudice people reported guilt 
and regulated their stereotyping behavior, just like low-prejudice people (Czopp et al., 2006). For 
these reasons, it is important to examine how people actually react to confrontation, not just how 
they imagine they will react. Thus, the purpose of Study 2 is to systematically vary prejudice 
acceptability and examine how these variations affect people’s actual reactions to being 
confronted.  
Study 2 
The primary goal of Study 2 was to examine whether people’s forecasted responses to 
confrontation accord with their actual responses to confrontation. Thus, we brought students into 
the laboratory and placed them in a confrontation situation. We aimed to see how students would 
emotionally, cognitively, and behaviorally react to being confronted for expressing prejudice 
toward either a low or high prejudice acceptability target group, as compared to not being 
confronted at all. 
Method 
Design 
The present study employed a 2 (Confrontation: Absent, Present) × 2 (Prejudice 
Acceptability: Low, High) mixed-model, experimental design.  
To increase generalizability beyond one target group, five different target groups were 
nested under each of the two prejudice acceptability conditions. 31 That is, students were 
 
31 In Study 1, target groups were selected based on a pilot survey assessing over 4,500 IU students’ prejudice 
acceptability beliefs. I selected target groups that ranged across the prejudice acceptability spectrum, from social 
groups where most IU students agreed prejudice expression definitely was not acceptable (e.g., blind people, the 
elderly) to social groups where most IU students agreed prejudice expression definitely was acceptable (e.g., rapists, 
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randomly assigned to consider one of ten possible target groups. For the low prejudice 
acceptability condition, students considered one of the following target groups: military veterans, 
Muslim people, financially poor people, domestic violence victims, or people living with anxiety 
disorders. For the high prejudice acceptability condition, students considered one of these target 
groups: communists, drug users, alcoholics, gang members, or hoarders. To account for this 
nested data structure, data was analyzed using multilevel modeling with target group treated as a 
random factor (Brauer & Curtin, 2018; Judd et al., 2012, 2017). 
Power Analysis 
A priori, I used G*Power v. 3.1 to compute the minimum acceptable sample size for the 
present study (Faul et al., 2009). I calculated the sample size I would need to achieve 80% power 
to detect a medium-sized interaction effect for a 2 × 2 between-subjects design. This analysis 
indicated that a minimum sample size of 128 people was needed, using the following parameters: 
test family = F-test, ANOVA (main effects and interactions); f = .25 (medium-sized effect); α = 
0.05, 1-β = 0.80; numerator df = 1; number of groups = 4. With this minimum in mind, I planned 
 
child abusers). According to theory, I expected that prejudice acceptability beliefs would be positively related to the 
perceived threat the target group poses and, thus, negatively related to warmth and competence beliefs about the 
target group (Cuddy et al., 2008; Fiske et al., 2002). After conducting Study 1, however, I wondered if the selected 
target groups also varied systematically on other stigma-related dimensions according to their prejudice acceptability 
level. For example, was membership in one of the high prejudice acceptability target groups, on average, perceived 
as more controllable than membership in one of the low prejudice acceptability target groups? Similarly, was 
membership in a high prejudice acceptability target group, on average, more concealable than membership in a low 
prejudice acceptability group? To answer these questions, I conducted another pilot study (N = 361 students) with a 
planned missing data design (Graham et al., 2006). All students saw a list of over 170 target groups (from Pilot 
Study 1, with some additions) and rated their prejudice acceptability beliefs for each target group. Then students 
were randomly assigned to rate each target group on two of the following seven stigma components: threat, warmth, 
competence, controllability, concealability, contact, and entitativity. As predicted, in examining ratings for the thirty 
target groups selected for Study 1, we found that prejudice acceptability beliefs were strongly correlated with threat 
beliefs (r = .90, p < .001), warmth perceptions (r = -.97, p < .001), and competence perceptions (r = -.87, p < .001); 
but prejudice acceptability was also moderately to strongly correlated with controllability perceptions (r = .89, p < 
.001), concealability perceptions (r = .68, p < .001), and previous contact (r = -.50, p = .005). Prejudice acceptability 
beliefs were not correlated with entitativity perceptions among the Study 1 target groups (r = -.05, p = .80). In Study 
2, target groups were selected to address these limitations. We specifically chose target groups for the low and high 
prejudice acceptability conditions that were matched on controllability, concealability, contact, and entitativity. See 
Appendix 3 for Stigma-related Dimensions Pilot Study materials. 
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to oversample to account for attrition and exclusions. I aimed to recruit at least 320 participants 
in total (or approximately 80 participants per cell, 32 participants per target group).32 
Participants 
We recruited 393 introductory psychology students at Indiana University (MAge = 18.94 
years, 79.8% White, 72.3% female, see Table 8 for full demographic information).33 Random 
assignment to condition was successful (each cell had between 91 and 105 respondents). In 
exchange for their participation in a sixty-minute laboratory study ostensibly about creative 
writing, students earned credit toward a course requirement or were paid $10. 
Procedure 
 Each participant arrived at the lab individually. An experimenter greeted the participant 
and ushered them to a testing room where they were asked to wait until the other scheduled 
participant arrived. In actuality, the “other participant” was a confederate working with the 
experimenter. When the confederate arrived, he or she took a seat next to the participant and the 
 
32 Late in the research process, I realized that a more appropriate power analysis would be one that factored in the 
nested structure of these data. Using PANGEA (v. 0.2) software (see Westfall, 2016), I learned too late that my 
study design prevented me from achieving 80% power. To explain, there are at least three sources that may explain 
variance in my outcome measures: target group effects, confrontation condition effects, and prejudice acceptability 
condition effects. As such, the following parameters were used to calculate power for the current design: prejudice 
acceptability condition was entered as a fixed factor, with two levels (high, low); target group was entered as 
random factor, nested within prejudice acceptability (5 groups per Prejudice Acceptability level); confrontation 
condition was entered as a fixed factor with two levels (absent, present), crossed with both prejudice acceptability 
and target group. Because each participant was measure only once (i.e., no repeated measures), participants were 
entered into the design as replicates, rather than as a random factor. This power analysis specification revealed that 
with only 10 target groups, it would be essentially impossible to detect a medium-sized interaction effect (d = .45), 
whether I had 80 participants per cell (power = 31.2%), 800 participants per cell (power = 33.3%), or even 8000 
participants per cell (power = 33.5%). The problem is that I have too few target groups. If I were to redesign the 
study, based on these new insights, I would use at least 30 target groups (in accordance with recommendations from 
experts in multilevel modeling, e.g., Hox, 1997). By doing so, I could achieve nearly 80% power (power = 77.5%) 
to detect a medium-sized interaction effect, with only 150 participants per cell (or 600 participants total). 
33 Four-hundred and thirty-three students originally visited the lab. One student declined to consent (0.2% of the full 
sample), 5 of students (1.2%) were excluded for missing 75% (or more) of their data on the key outcome variables. 
Another 7 students (1.6%) were excluded for failing to correctly answer the attention check question (i.e., “This is 
an Attention Check. Please select ‘Very much’ to show that you are paying attention.”). Another 2 students (0.4%) 
were excluded for failing to correctly answer the memory check questions. Finally, 25 students (5.8%) were 
excluded because, in the demographics portion of the study, they identified as a member of the target group they 
were randomly assigned to write about. 
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study session began. The experimenter described that the ostensible purpose of the study was to 
understand factors influencing the writing and evaluation of creative works.   
 After reading and signing informed consent documents, the experimenter asked the 
participant and confederate to introduce themselves to each other. Specifically, the experimenter 
said, “Since you’ll both be working together today, I’d like you to get to know each other a little 
bit. Introduce yourselves—say your name, major, and since this study is about creative writing, 
let’s do something fun. Share your favorite author.” The experimenter turned to the participant 
and asked them to go first.34 After the participant answered, the confederate stated their name, 
that they were a psychology major, and said, “My favorite author is J.M. Rucker, but it sounds 
like we have similar tastes because I also really like the author you mentioned,” gesturing to the 
participant.35 This personal disclosure would be brought up again later to bolster the realism of 
scripted feedback delivered to the participant. 
 After introductions, the experimenter explained that one person would be randomly 
chosen to write creatively (the writer) and the other would evaluate the written products (the 
evaluator). The experimenter then grabbed a small bucket filled with strips of paper and asked 
the participant to close their eyes and select one of the paper strips at random. In reality, this 
selection was rigged because all of the paper strips said “writer” on them—but the participant 
was told that half of the strips said “writer” and the other half said “evaluator.” The participant 
 
34 In rare instances where participants struggled to name their favorite author, the experimenter said, “It doesn’t need 
to be your favorite author—just pick any writer whose work you admire.” This usually worked to encourage 
participants to speak. But in the few cases where the participant could not come up with something, the 
experimenter asked the participant to name a genre of books that they enjoyed, like biographies or science-fiction 
stories (rather than naming a specific author). 
35 J.M. Rucker is a made-up author name. We chose a made-up author name (vs. a real one) so that all participants 
were in the identical position of not knowing the author the confederate mentioned, regardless of their literary 
background knowledge. In the rare cases where participants asked for more information about the author, 
confederates said, “He’s a newish fiction writer, specializing in short stories.” 
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then selected a strip of paper and revealed that they selected the writer role. The experimenter 
reiterated to the confederate that this meant they would take on the evaluator role. 
 At this point, the experimenter ushered the participant to another testing room and seated 
him or her at a computer. The experimenter told the participant that they would be presented 
with three creative writing tasks that would be strictly timed by the computer. After five minutes, 
the writing sample would automatically be sent to their partner for evaluation. The experimenter 
explained that at some points during the study session, the participant would have the 
opportunity to read and reflect upon their task partner’s evaluations of their written work. After 
giving these instructions, the experimenter toggled “some settings” to “sync” the participant’s 
computer with the confederate’s computer. In reality, no syncing occurred—these “syncing” and 
“connection” screens were included merely to bolster the experimental cover story. Then the 
experimenter left the testing room. From this point forward, the participant worked alone, 
receiving scripted feedback from the computer. 
 For the first creative writing task, participants were asked to write a “day in the life” 
story,36 wherein they composed a one-to-two paragraph story about someone based solely on a 
 
36 Variations of the “day in the life” writing task have been used in previous research to examine stereotyping 
processes (e.g., Wyer et al., 1998). The purpose of this task in the present study is to give participants an opportunity 
to stereotype about the target group. An especially appealing feature of this writing task is that it provides the 
perception of free choice, relative to the “Photograph-Sentence Pairs” task used in previous confronting research 
(e.g., Burns & Monteith, 2018; Czopp et al., 2006). In the Photograph-Sentence Pairs task, participants often realize 
the feedback is false and/or reject personal responsibility for using stereotypes, blaming the task for not-so-subtly 
forcing them to stereotype (e.g., a picture of a black man paired with the sentence “This person uses needles for 
recreation” is quite obviously intending to elicit the “drug user” stereotype). I also favored the “day in the life” 
writing task over the Photograph-Sentence Pairs task because it would be difficult to use the Photograph-Sentence 
Pairs task to elicit stereotypes about target groups that varied on dimensions that cannot be easily identified based on 
phenotypical differences (e.g., people living with anxiety disorders, alcoholics). To my knowledge, this is the first 
time that an experimenter is using the “day in the life” task to elicit stereotypes from people with the intention to 
confront them about it. Using this task (and any stereotyping task) may seem a bit risky because it relies on 
participants to generate common stereotypes about the target group and employ those stereotypes in their writing. 
However, previous research suggests that participants very often write stereotypical stories when given the “day in 
the life” task instructions (at least when it comes to race; see Wyer et al., 1998). To ensure that stereotyping in this 
task would occur beyond racial minority target groups, I conducted two pilot studies. In the first pilot study, I asked 
students (N = 728) to list the most common stereotypes (positive or negative) about the ten target groups selected for 
Study 2. Examination of these pilot data revealed that most people could generate positive and negative stereotypes 
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short “person profile.” Participants received one of ten possible person profiles (at random) that 
contained a fictional person’s age, gender (matched to the participant’s gender), and target group 
membership. Half of the participants were tasked with writing a story about a person from a low 
prejudice acceptability target group (i.e., a military veteran, a Muslim, a financially poor person, 
a domestic violence victim, or a person living with an anxiety disorder), while the other half 
were tasked with writing about a person from a high prejudice acceptability target group (i.e., a 
communist, a drug user, an alcoholic, a gang member, or a hoarder). Aside from target group 
membership, all other features of the profile were held constant. Example profiles are displayed 
below: 
Example Low Prejudice Acceptability Profile: 
Age: 30 
Gender: Male | Female [gender-matched to participant] 
Fact about this person: This person is a practicing Muslim. 
 
Example High Prejudice Acceptability Profile:  
Age: 30 
Gender: Male | Female [gender-matched to participant] 
Fact about this person: This person is a gang member. 
 
Participants were told that these profiles were intentionally minimal in order for the researchers 
to test how well they could craft a story based on very little information; however, the real reason 
the profiles were brief was to ensure that target group membership was the most salient piece of 
information presented. By orienting participants to the target group and putting them under time 
 
about all ten of the target groups. Based on those data, research assistants and I compiled the most common 
stereotypes for each target group and created Linguistic Inquiry Word Count (LIWC) dictionaries. In a second pilot 
study, I asked a separate group of students (N = 95) to complete the “day in the life” writing task about one of the 
ten target groups selected for Study 2. Then I ran their stories through LIWC software. Analyses revealed that 94 of 
the 95 participants used at least some stereotype-relevant language in their stories. On average, about 5.40% of the 
words that students used in their stories were stereotype-relevant (ranging from 0.6% to 12.2% of all words used). 
These findings suggest that the “day in the life” task is an adequate way to elicit stereotyping among students. See 
Appendix 4 and Appendix 5 for the pilot study materials. See Appendix 6 for a full list of stereotype themes. 
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pressure,37 we expected them to write stories that drew upon common stereotypes about the 
target group. Later on, half would be confronted by their task partner for relying on these 
stereotypes in their stories, whereas the other half would be provided other negative feedback 
unrelated to confrontation or stereotyping (that is, they were told that their writing was 
uncreative).38 
 While their ‘day in the life’ story was ostensibly being evaluated by their task partner, 
participants completed a second creative writing task. The two main reasons for including this 
second writing task were (1) to bolster the cover story that the researchers are interested in 
creative writing broadly and (2) to allow a reasonable amount of time to pass so that the 
upcoming partner feedback seemed realistic. If the situation were real, their task partner would 
need some time to evaluate the ‘day in the life’ story and write a short response—the feedback 
would not be immediate. For the second creative writing task, participants were asked to write a 
two to four-line poem about the positive and negative aspects of being an Indiana University 
student. They were told explicitly that the poem could be any style and did not need to rhyme 
(but could!). The purpose of this exercise was to make their IU student identity more salient 
 
37 In a pilot study designed to assess how students felt while writing their ‘day in the life story’ (N = 84), participants 
reported feeling under time pressure. Indeed, 61.9% said that 5 minutes was “too short” to write a story, including 
comments like, “Because the time was limited, I felt the need to rush through my response and create a very 
simplistic representation of the character.” Another 32.1% said that 5 minutes for writing the story was “just right.” 
Only 6.0% said that 5 minutes was “too long.” Even though they felt time pressured, pilot study participants, on 
average, found the task to be moderately easy (N = 84, M = 2.93, SD = 1.60; scale went from 1 “Extremely Easy” to 
7 “Extremely Difficult”), moderately interesting (N = 84, M = 3.13, SD = 1.03; scale went from 1 “Not interesting at 
all” to 5 “Extremely Interesting”), and reported being moderately likely to recommend that their peers participate in 
a similar study (N = 84, M = 5.57, SD = 1.25; scale went from 1 “Extremely Unlikely” to 7 “Extremely Likely”). As 
expected, no one expressed feeling upset or uncomfortable with the writing task. 
38 It was important that participants in the confrontation absent condition still be given negatively valanced feedback 
from their partner. Being called uncreative is in many ways similar to being reprimanded for using common 
stereotypes—both pieces of feedback are critical of the writer and both suggest they were being ‘overly simplistic’; 




before being confronted. If their student identity is salient, then perceptions of campus prejudice 
norms may also become more salient (Hogg & Reid, 2006).  
 Once their poem was submitted, participants learned that their computer was “retrieving” 
their partner’s evaluation of the first writing sample. The feedback was broken into four sections 
“General Feedback,” “Grammatical Structure,” “Flow/Cohesion,” and “Creative Content.” 39 The 
purpose of the “General Feedback” section was to convince participants that the feedback was 
indeed from the partner they met in-person earlier. It read:  
“I was excited to read your story because we have similar taste in authors. Overall I thought you did a nice 
job, but I do have some specific feedback for you, which I'll explain in the other sections.”  
The statement called back to their earlier face-to-face interaction and supposed “common taste in 
authors” in order to bolster the realism of the feedback. For the “Grammatical Structure” and 
“Flow/Cohesion” sections, each participant received identical, lukewarm feedback. In the 
“Creative Content” section, each participant received a variant of the following partner feedback 
statements, depending on the target group they wrote about in the first task and whether they 
were randomly assigned to the confrontation present or confrontation absent condition: 
Example Feedback for the Confrontation Present condition: 
Low Prejudice Acceptability condition: 
This is the area I thought could use more work. It bothered me used how much you used pretty 
common stereotypes about [muslims] and, at the end of the day, [muslims] are people too, just like 
you and me. I felt the story was kind of prejudiced to people from that group.. 
High Prejudice Acceptability condition: 
 
39 Grammatical and spelling errors were included in the confrontations to make the partner feedback seem more 
believable. It was supposedly written in only five-minutes, after all.  
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This is the area I thought could use more work. It bothered me used how much you used pretty 
common stereotypes about [gang members] and, at the end of the day, [people in gangs] are 
people too, just like you and me. I felt the story was kind of prejudiced to people from that group.. 
Example Feedback for the Confrontation Absent condition: 
Low & High Prejudice Acceptability: 
This is the area I thought could use more work. It bothered me used how much you used pretty 
common characters and plot lines and, at the end of the day, this project is supposed to be about 
creative writing, emphasis on the creative part. I felt the story was kind of bland and uncreative.. 
Immediately after reading their partner’s feedback, participants reported how they were 
feeling, what they were thinking, and what they wanted to do next. Participants were told that 
their answers to these questions would be strictly confidential and would not be shared with their 
partner.  
Consistent with Study 1, I measured the extent to which students thought their writing 
sample was offensive, their negative self-directed affect, negative other-directed affect, and 
positive affect,40 as well as task-relevant self-corrective thoughts and behaviors and hostile-
dismissive thoughts and behaviors. 
After answering these questions, participants were instructed to complete the third 
creative writing task. For this task, participants were given an opportunity to revise and resubmit 
their ‘day in the life’ story from earlier. The survey piped forward their original essay so that 
participants could revise it directly in the text box (or erase it and start from scratch). They were 
told that whether or not they decide to incorporate any of their partner’s feedback was 
completely up to them. 
 
40 In addition to these three positive affect items, I also asked students to respond to other items typically categorized 
under the positive affect umbrella (i.e., “excited,” “enthusiastic,” “creative”). In the present study, these items were 
not included in the positive affect composite because the specific flavor of positive affect we expect participants to 




Once the third writing task was submitted participants were asked to answer more survey 
questions. To bolster the cover story, participants were asked filler questions about how much 
they enjoy creative writing. Then participants were asked to report their prejudice norm beliefs 
(as a manipulation check) and their personal prejudice toward the target group they wrote their 
story about.  
Toward the end of the survey, participants answered demographic questions, were probed 
for suspicion, and answered several memory-check questions to ensure that they remembered 
which group they wrote about and that they recognized whether their partner accused them of 
prejudice. Lastly, a debriefing message revealing the true purpose of the study appeared on their 
screen. The experimenter thanked participants for their time and assigned them research credit or 
gave them their payment. 
Measures 
 To assess whether the prejudice acceptability manipulation was successful, we measured 
prejudice norm beliefs. Like the previous study, outcome measures included participants’ 
offensiveness construals. In this study, we measured participants’ actual (vs. anticipated) affect, 
thoughts, and behaviors in response to confrontation. 41, 42 We also measured their subsequent 
stereotyping behaviors. 
Prejudice Norm Beliefs. As a manipulation check, we asked participants to indicate the 
extent to which they believed prejudice expression toward the target group was descriptively 
(i.e., “How common is it for people in your community to feel negatively toward people from 
 
41 For full Study 2 and Study 3 measures, see Appendix 2. 
42 For exploratory purposes, I also measured participants’ perceptions of their partner (22-items; Kaiser & Miller, 
2001), discrepancies between how participants think they should act toward the target group and how they would 
actually act toward the target group (16-items adapted from the Should-Would Discrepancies Questionnaire; 
Monteith & Voils, 1998), internal and external motivations to suppress prejudice toward the target group (10-items 
adapted from the IMS/EMS Scale; Plant & Devine, 1998), and personal beliefs about political correctness (3-items; 
Plant & Devine, 2001). Results pertaining to these measures can be found in Appendix 7. 
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this social group?”) and injunctively normative (i.e., “How socially acceptable is it for people in 
your community to feel negatively toward people from this social group?”). These two items 
were presented in a randomized order and averaged together to form a composite score (𝛼 = .81). 
Higher values indicate that participants believe prejudice expression toward the target group is 
more normative.  
Offensiveness. Again, the purpose of the offensiveness measure was to assess the extent 
to whether participants believed that prejudice expression toward the target group is harmful. 
Two items demonstrated strong internal consistency reliability and were averaged together to 
form a composite score (𝛼 = .85; 9-point Likert scale, 1 “Not at all” to 7 “Very much”; i.e., “I am 
thinking that my writing was offensive.” and “I am thinking that my writing was harmful to 
others”). Items were presented in a randomized order. Higher scores indicate that participants 
viewed their own writing about the target group to be more offensive. 
Affect. To measure affective responses to confrontation, we asked participants to review 
a list of emotion words and indicate how much they currently felt each one, using a 7-point 
Likert scale (1 “Does not apply at all” to 7 “Applies very much”; Czopp & Monteith, 2003). 
First, the negative self-directed affect subscale assessed negative feelings toward themselves (𝛼 
= .87; 5-items, i.e., “disappointed with myself,” “embarrassed,” “guilty,” “self-critical,” and 
“shameful”). Second, the negative other-directed affect subscale assessed negative feelings 
toward the confronter (𝛼 = .79; 5-items, i.e., “annoyed with my task partner,” “angry with my 
task partner,” “disgusted my task partner,” “irritated,” and “bothered”). Third, the positive affect 
subscale measured the anticipated presence of smug emotions in response to confrontation (𝛼 = 
.74; 3-items, i.e., “amused,” “entertained,” “proud of myself”). Items were presented in a 
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randomized order. Higher scores indicate stronger endorsement of the particular emotional 
response. 
Thoughts and Behaviors. To measure thoughts and behaviors in response to 
confrontation, we asked participants to review a list of cognitions and behaviors and indicate 
how much they currently endorsed each one, again using a 7-point Likert scale (1 “Not at all” to 
7 “Very much”; Czopp & Monteith, 2003). The self-corrective thoughts and behaviors subscale 
assessed the extent to which self-regulatory thoughts and behaviors were endorsed (𝛼 = .92, 9-
items, e.g., 𝛼 = .78; 11-items, e.g., “I think I was wrong to write some of the things that I wrote,” 
“I want to apologize to my task partner,” “I want to thank my task partner,” and “I want to avoid 
writing things like this in the future”), while the dismissive/hostile thoughts and behaviors 
subscale assessed the extent to which trivializing and prejudice-justifying thoughts and behaviors 
were endorsed ( = .72; 9-items, e.g., “I am thinking that my task partner is confused and doesn't 
really know what he/she is doing,” “I want to tell my task partner to lighten up,” and “I want to 
tell my task partner that they’re being stupid”). Items were presented in a randomized order. 
Higher scores indicate stronger endorsement of the particular cognitive/behavioral response 
style. 
Personal Prejudice. As a covariate, we assessed participants’ explicit prejudice 
endorsement. Participants were asked to think about the target group depicted in the imagined 
scenario and rate the group along several dimensions (𝛼 = .93, 3-items; i.e., 1 “Negative” to 9 
“Positive”; 1 “Bad” to 9 “Good”; 1 “Unfavorable” to 9 “Favorable”). All items were reverse-
scored and then averaged together. Higher scores indicate stronger endorsement of personal 
prejudice toward the target group. 
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Behavioral Stereotyping. As readers will recall, prior to receiving partner feedback 
students wrote “day in the life” stories about a target group member. Then, after receiving 
partner feedback, they had the opportunity to revise their stories. This set-up provided an 
opportunity to assess how the experimental manipulations influenced subsequent behavioral 
stereotyping in students’ revised stories written after they have been confronted (or not).  
To assess whether the prejudice acceptability and confrontation manipulations affected 
students’ level of subsequent stereotyping, I used Linguistic Inquiry Word Count software 
(LIWC; Pennebaker et al., 2015). LIWC reads text data and compares those samples to built-in 
or user-generated dictionaries associated with psychological constructs of interest. Of interest 
here, I measured stereotype usage (or the proportion of stereotype-relevant words and phrases) 
and emotional tone (or the relative positive to negative affect) across students’ original and 
revised creative stories.  
Stereotype Usage. I generated stereotype dictionaries to assess the change in stereotyping 
between students’ original creative stories pre-confrontation (or not) and their revised drafts 
post-confrontation (or not). Preparing these stereotype dictionaries involved several steps. First, I 
needed to determine the common stereotypes associated with the ten target groups (e.g., military 
veterans, gang members). In a pilot study, 728 college students were asked to list as many 
stereotypes as they could (positive or negative) about a subset of the ten possible target groups 
(e.g., military veterans, gang members). Importantly, students were told that they did not need to 
personally agree with the stereotypes they listed (see Appendix 4 for these pilot study materials). 
They were encouraged to display their stereotype knowledge, not necessarily their stereotype 
endorsement (Devine & Elliot, 1995).  
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Once these qualitative data were compiled, a team of research assistants helped me code 
these data for stereotype themes. In total, 67 unique stereotype themes were uncovered (e.g., 
alone/isolated, rude/vulgar, judgmental, etc.). Each target group was associated with some (but 
not all) of these stereotype themes. For example, alcoholics, communists, gang members, 
military veterans, and poor people were associated with rudeness and vulgarity stereotypes, 
whereas anxious people, domestic violence victims, drug users, hoarders, and Muslim people 
were not. Each target group mapped onto between 20 to 33 of these stereotype themes. A full 
stereotype map, linking each target group to their associated stereotypes, can be found in 
Appendix 6.  
After generating these stereotype themes, we created LIWC dictionaries to detect these 
themes in students’ written stories. Research assistants used online thesauruses to find direct 
synonyms as well as related words and phrases pertaining to each stereotype theme. Finalized 
stereotype dictionaries ranged from 85 (minimum) to 2,141 (maximum) words and phrases. 
Some words and phrases appeared in multiple stereotype dictionaries, but we ensured that a 
particular word/phrase was not associated with any single target group more than once. In total, 
the master dictionary included 13,723 stereotype-related words and phrases (without duplicates). 
We offer a few words of caution as readers interpret the stereotype usage findings. It is 
important to note that the actual stereotype content differed from one target group to the next, as 
did the exact number of stereotype words and phrases included in the stereotype dictionaries. For 
example, there were 8,136 stereotype words and phrases associated with alcoholics, but only 
3,664 stereotype words and phrases associated with people living with anxiety disorders.43 For 
 
43 Each target group and its associated number of stereotype-related words and phrases is listed below: military 
veterans (6,223 words/phrases); Muslim people (4,259 words/phrases); financially poor people (6,822 
words/phrases); domestic violence victims (6,728 words/phrases); people living with anxiety disorders (3,664 
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this reason, the focus of the stereotype usage analyses should be placed on the relative change in 
stereotype usage between the Time 1 original stories and the Time 2 revised stories (vs. the raw 
number of stereotype words/phrases used). 
Emotional Tone. To compare behavioral stereotyping more easily across the target 
groups, we also analyzed the change in emotional tone between students’ Time 1 and Time 2 
creative stories. LIWC has a number of built-in dictionaries. One of these dictionaries, emotional 
tone, assesses the relative amount positive to negative affect words. Higher values indicate a 
more positive (vs. negative) emotional tone (Cohn et al., 2004). This is useful because, unlike the 
stereotype dictionaries, the emotional tone dictionary is held constant across all target groups. As 
a result, the cross-group comparisons for this outcome are more straight-forward. 
Results 
Data Screening and Preliminary Analyses 
 Outcome variable composites were created to assess (a) offensiveness beliefs, (b) 
negative self- directed affect, (c) negative other-directed affect, (d) positive affect, (e) self-
corrective thoughts and behaviors, and (f) dismissive/hostile thoughts and behaviors. Scales 
demonstrated adequate internal consistency reliability (𝛼	 ≥  .72). Composite variables satisfied 
assumptions of normality and linearity required by general linear models. 
Table 9 provides the psychometric properties of all variables. Table 10 provides zero-
order correlations. 
Prejudice Acceptability Condition. Unexpectedly (and inconsistent with Study 1), zero 
order correlational analyses revealed that prejudice acceptability condition (-1 = Low, 1 = High) 
positively predicted offensiveness perceptions (r = .10, p = .04), albeit weakly. That is, students 
 
words/phrases); communists (5,577 words/phrases); drug users (7,770 words/phrases); alcoholics (8,136 
words/phrases); gang members (6,736 words/phrases); hoarders (6,162 words/phrases).   
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in the low prejudice acceptability condition perceived their ‘day in the life’ stories as less 
offensive than students in the high prejudice acceptability condition. By contrast, in Study 1 this 
same correlational relationship was negative (vs. positive). Perhaps this reflects forecaster-
experiencer differences between the two studies. When people imagine making a prejudiced joke 
about a target group, they may take for granted that the joke will indeed be offensive. In real life, 
however, experiencers may disagree that their actions were offensive, perhaps especially for low 
(vs. high) prejudice acceptability target groups. This may be for a couple of reasons: (1) students 
in the low (vs. high) prejudice acceptability condition may actually being using fewer stereotypes 
(or, at least, they may being using fewer overtly negative and harsh stereotypes), (2) students in 
the low (vs. high) prejudice acceptability condition may simply be less willing to admit that their 
stereotype usage is offensive because such an admission would pose a threat their egalitarian 
sense of self, or (3) perhaps it’s some combination of both.  
Although I cannot directly assess the hypothesis that people are less willing to admit their 
writing was offensive with these data, I can shed some light on whether actual stereotype usage 
was more negative (and, for that reason, less offensive) in the low (vs. high) prejudice 
acceptability condition. Using Linguistic Inquiry Word Count (LIWC) software, I analyzed the 
emotional tone of students’ stories by their prejudice acceptability condition. When looking 
exclusively at the original stories students wrote (i.e., the stories written before students received 
‘feedback’ from their partner), I find that students assigned to the low prejudice acceptability 
condition indeed wrote stories that were more positive in emotional tone (M = 55.14, SD = 
33.47) than students assigned to the high prejudice acceptability condition (M = 46.37, SD = 
32.84, t(391) = 2.62, p = .01, d = .27). Such findings suggest that the unexpectedly positive 
relationship between prejudice acceptability condition and offensiveness perceptions may be, at 
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least partly, due to the fact that students assigned to the high (vs. low) prejudice acceptability 
condition wrote stories that were simply more negative in tone. 
Regarding the other correlations, prejudice acceptability condition did not significantly 
predict any of the measured affective, cognitive, or behavioral outcomes, which again differed 
from the previous study: negative self-directed affect (r = .03, p = .56); negative other-directed 
affect (r = -.02, p = .65); positive affect (r = -.04, p = .43); self-corrective thoughts and actions (r 
= .05, p = .31); and hostile-dismissive thoughts and actions (r = -.08, p = .13). It should also be 
noted that, as expected, personal prejudice endorsement was strongly positively correlated with 
prejudice acceptability condition (r = .63, p < .001) and that personal prejudice endorsement was 
also non-significantly related to all affective, cognitive, or behavioral outcomes (all ps > .05). 
Confrontation Condition. Zero order correlational analyses revealed that confrontation 
condition (-1 = Absent, 1 = Present) positively predicted offensiveness perceptions (r = .54, p < 
.001). People who were confronted rated their ‘day in the life’ stories as more offensive than 
people who were not confronted. Confrontation was also significantly positively correlated with 
negative other-directed affect (r = .20, p < .001), self-corrective thoughts and actions (r = .20, p 
< .001), and hostile-dismissive thoughts and actions (r = .20, p < .001). Its relationship with 
negative self-directed affect (r = .08, p = .12) and positive affect (r = -.04, p = .43) were not 
statistically significant. 
Multi-level Models 
 Data Analytic Strategy. Multilevel modeling (MLM), with restricted maximum 
likelihood estimation (ReML), was used to examine the fixed effects of prejudice acceptability 
condition, confrontation condition, and their interaction on all psychological outcome variables, 
while accounting for the random effect of target group (Level 2).  
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The random intercept models follow the same format as the previous study, except that 
the models also include confrontation condition and the prejudice acceptability × confrontation 
condition interaction term as predictor variables to help explain outcome scores: 
𝑌!# =	𝛽" + 𝛽%!# + 𝛽&!# + 𝛽% ∗ 	𝛽&!# +	𝛼#$ +	𝜀!# 
For a student (i) within a target group (j), the predicted outcome score (𝑌!#) will be a function of 
the overall intercept (𝛽"), the fixed component of prejudice acceptability condition differences 
(𝛽%!#), the fixed component of confrontation condition differences (𝛽&!#), the interaction term 
(𝛽% ∗ 	𝛽&!#), a random component for the target group (𝛼#$), and residual random error variation 
(𝜀!#). For the full multilevel modeling results, see Table 11.44 
Manipulation Check 
To confirm that participants perceived the normative manipulation as intended, I ran a 
multilevel model examining the fixed effects of prejudice acceptability and confrontation on 
prejudice norm beliefs, with target group included as a random effect. As intended by the 
prejudice acceptability manipulation, a large amount of unexplained variance in prejudice norm 
beliefs was accounted for by the target group to which students were randomly assigned (ICC = 
.51). Consistent with predictions, prejudice acceptability condition significantly predicted 
prejudice norm beliefs, t(8.08) = 8.82, b = 1.54, p < .001, indicating that people randomly 
assigned to the low prejudice acceptability group believed prejudice expression to be less 
 
44 All multilevel models were run with and without personal prejudice as a covariate. Personal prejudice was not a 
significant covariate for the following outcomes: offensiveness beliefs (b = -0.05, p = .19), negative self-directed 
affect (b = -0.09, p = .07), positive affect (b = 0.07, p = .12), and self-corrective intentions (b = -0.06, p = .10). 
However, personal prejudice was a significant covariate in the following analyses: negative other-directed affect (b 
= 0.08, p = .01) and dismissive/hostile intentions (b = 0.07, p = .004). Any changes to the interpretations of results 
(dependent on the inclusion of personal prejudice as a covariate) are footnoted alongside the relevant analysis. 
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normative than people assigned to the high prejudice acceptability group. This suggests that the 
experimental manipulation was successful (see Fig. 11).  
Interestingly, this effect was qualified by a significant prejudice acceptability × 
confrontation interaction, t(381.87) = -2.280, b = -0.19, p = .02. To decompose this interaction, I 
analyzed the simple slopes. These analyses revealed that within the high prejudice acceptability 
condition, students who were confronted rated prejudice as less normative than students who 
were not confronted, b = -0.25, t(381) = -2.17, p = .03); however, in the low prejudice 
acceptability condition, people rated prejudice as fairly non-normative regardless of whether they 
were confronted, b = 0.13, t(381) = 1.08, p = .28. This provides preliminary support for the idea 
that confrontations may regulate prejudice expression, at least partly, because they shift people’s 
prejudice norm beliefs. In this way, confrontation itself may be construed as a prejudice 
acceptability manipulation. 
The fixed effect of Confrontation condition on prejudice norm beliefs was not statistically 
significant, t(381.87) = -0.72, b = -0.06, p = .47. 
Primary Analyses 
Offensiveness. Unlike the previous study, only a small amount of unexplained variance 
in offensiveness perceptions was accounted for by the target group to which students were 
randomly assigned (ICC = .005). Still, in accordance with recommendations, I proceeded with 
multilevel analyses to account for the nested data structure (Kreft & Leeuw, 1998). This 
multilevel analysis revealed a significant effect of confrontation condition, t(389) = 12.67, b = 
0.77, p < .001, such that students confronted for expressing prejudice rated their original written 
stories as more offensive than students who were not confronted (see Fig. 12).  
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Additionally, this analysis revealed a significant effect of prejudice acceptability 
condition, t(389) = 2.44, b = 0.15, p = .02. Students assigned to the high prejudice acceptability 
condition rated their stories as more offensive, on average, than students assigned to the low 
prejudice acceptability condition. The interaction between prejudice acceptability condition and 
confrontation condition was not statistically significant, t(389) = 0.82, b = 0.05, p = .41.  
As we stated above, this is inconsistent with Study 1, where students in the low prejudice 
acceptability condition imagined their jokes as more offensive than students in the high prejudice 
acceptability condition. Again, this may reflect forecaster-experiencer differences. People who 
imagine being confronted for making prejudiced comments may take for granted that their 
imagined comments are offensive, whereas people who are really confronted may disagree about 
their actual comments’ offensiveness, perhaps especially for low (vs. high) prejudice 
acceptability target groups. And, at least in the present study, these experiencer perceptions may 
be grounded in some truth. As mentioned above, the original drafts of students’ stories were 
more negative in emotional tone among those assigned to the high (vs. low) prejudice 
acceptability condition. To explore this possibility, I included the emotional tone scores for 
students’ original stories in the model as a covariate. In doing this, the effect of confrontation on 
offensiveness remained significant, t(382.43) = 12.69, b = 0.77, p < .001, but the effect of 
prejudice acceptability was no longer significant, t(7.89) = 2.16, b = 0.13, p = .06. That is, when 
the emotional tone of students’ written stories is held constant, prejudice acceptability had no 
effect on offensiveness perceptions. 
Affect. Across all three affective outcomes, only a small amount of unexplained variance 
was accounted for by the target group to which students were randomly assigned (Negative Self-
Directed Affect ICC < .001; Negative Other-Directed Affect ICC = .01; Positive Affect ICC = 
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.003). In accordance with recommendations, I used multilevel modeling to analyze these data 
(Kreft & Leeuw, 1998). 
Negative Self-Directed Affect. The effects of confrontation condition, t(389) = 1.61, b = 
0.12, p = .11, prejudice acceptability condition, t(389) = 0.61, b = 0.04, p = .55, and their 
interaction on negative self-directed affect were not statistically significant, t(389) = -0.64, b = -
0.05, p = .52 (see Fig. 13). 
Negative Other-Directed Affect. For the negative other-directed affect outcome, a 
multilevel analysis revealed a significant effect of confrontation condition, t(382.44) = 4.06, b = 
0.18, p < .001, such that students who were confronted reported experiencing greater negative 
other-directed affect than students who were not confronted. Importantly, even though 
confrontation increased negative other-directed affect relative to no-confrontation, average 
negative-other directed affect scores remained relatively low across all conditions (all condition 
Ms < 2.5 on a 7-point scale, where 1 indicates the emotion “does not apply at all” and 7 indicates 
the emotion “applies very much”). Neither the effect of prejudice acceptability, t(7.46) = -0.28, b 
= -0.02, p = .79, nor the interaction effect were statistically significant, t(382.44) = -1.99, b = 
0.09, p = .05 (see Fig. 14). 
Positive Affect. Neither the effect of confrontation condition, t(383.35) = -0.74, b = -0.05, 
p = .46, nor the effect of prejudice acceptability condition were statistically significant, t(8.02) = 
-0.70, b = -0.05, p = .50. The confrontation × prejudice acceptability interaction on positive 
affect was also not statistically significant, t(383.35) = -1.44, b = -0.10, p = .15 (see Fig. 15). 
Thoughts & Behavior. Across the cognitive and behavioral outcomes, a small amount of 
the unexplained variance was accounted for by the target group to which participants were 
randomly assigned (Self-Corrective Thoughts and Behaviors ICC < .001; Dismissive/Hostile 
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Thoughts and Behaviors ICC = .007). Again, I used multilevel modeling to analyze these data 
(Kreft & Leeuw, 1998). 
Self-Corrective Thoughts and Behaviors. This multilevel analysis revealed a significant 
effect of confrontation condition, t(383.20) = 4.07, b = 0.21, p < .001, such that students who 
were confronted reported more self-corrective intentions than students who were not confronted. 
Neither the effect of prejudice acceptability, t(7.51) = 1.02, b = 0.05, p = .34, nor the interaction 
effect were statistically significant, t(383.20) = 0.09, b = 0.005, p = .93 (see Fig. 16). 
Dismissive/Hostile Thoughts and Behaviors. Again, the multilevel analysis revealed a 
significant effect of confrontation condition, t(382.25) = 4.28, b = 0.22, p < .001, such that 
students who were confronted reported more dismissive and hostile intentions than students who 
were not confronted. However, this effect was qualified by a prejudice acceptability × 
confrontation interaction, t(382.25) = -2.15, b = -0.07, p = .03.45 Surprisingly, students in the low 
prejudice acceptability condition who were confronted (vs. not confronted) reported more 
dismissive and hostile intentions, b = 0.23, t(381) = 4.44, p < .001; however, students in the high 
prejudice acceptability condition reported similarly low levels of dismissive and hostile 
intentions, regardless of confrontation condition, b = 0.08, t(381) = 1.54, p = .12 (see Fig. 17). 
Again, this may have something to do with the fact that students in the low prejudice 
acceptability condition wrote stories that were less negative in tone than students in the high 
prejudice acceptability condition. Students may be rejecting the confrontation more in the low 
prejudice acceptability simply because they disagree that their comments were offensive. 
 
45 When personal prejudice is added into the model as a covariate, t(374.59) = 2.84, b = 0.07, p = .01), only the main 
effect of confrontation on dismissive and hostile thoughts and behaviors remains significant t(382.68) = 4.78, b = 
0.17, p < .001. 
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The main effect of prejudice acceptability on dismissive/hostile thoughts and behavioral 
intentions was not significant, t(7.60) = -0.99, b = -0.05, p = .35.  
Moderated Mediation Model 
As with the previous study, I hypothesized indirect effects linking prejudice acceptability 
and confrontation to affective responses through offensiveness (simple mediation). Additionally, 
I predicted indirect effects linking prejudice acceptability and confrontation to thoughts and 
behavior through offensiveness and affect (serial mediation). To test whether the data support 
these mediational predictions, I evaluated the fit of a moderated mediation model (see Fig. 18).46 
Missing data was handled using listwise deletion. 
As expected, confrontation positively predicted offensiveness perceptions (b = 0.77, p < 
.001), such that people who were confronted rated their stories as more offensive than people 
who were not confronted. Unexpectedly, prejudice acceptability also positively predicted 
offensiveness perceptions (b = 0.15, p = .01), such that the more acceptable a particular type of 
prejudice was at IU, the more offensive students rated their stories to be. Again, this may be 
because the original story drafts were more positive in tone among those assigned to the low (vs. 
high) prejudice acceptability condition. When the emotional tone of students’ original stories is 
held constant, the relationship between prejudice acceptability and offensiveness is reduced to 
non-significance. 
As offensiveness perceptions increased, students reported experiencing greater negative 
self-directed emotions (e.g., guilt, embarrassment; b = 0.52, p < .001). Inconsistent with the 
previous study, students also reported experiencing greater (vs. fewer) negative other-directed 
 
46 Unlike the previous study, there was not enough variability at Level 2 for a multilevel structural equation model to 
reliably converge. Instead, I evaluated indirect effects using a single-level mediation model. 
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emotions (e.g., anger, frustration; b = 0.12, p = .001). Offensiveness perceptions did not 
significantly predict positive emotions (e.g., pride, amusement; b = -0.06, p = .32).  
Emotional responses indeed predicted students’ cognitions and behavioral intentions. 
Students who experienced greater negative self-directed affect reported self-correcting more 
(e.g., thinking they’re wrong, wanting to apologize; b = 0.32, p < .001) and reacting less hostilely 
and dismissively (e.g., thinking the confronter is a jerk, telling the confronter he/she is stupid; b 
= -0.10, p < .001). By contrast, students who experienced greater negative other-directed affect 
reported self-correcting less (b = -0.20, p < .001) and reacting more hostilely and dismissively (b 
= 0.55, p < .001). Oddly, students who experienced greater positive affect reported significant 
increases in self-correction (b = 0.11, p < .001) and hostile and dismissive reactions (b = 0.12, p 
< .001).  
Although there is no evidence of moderated mediation—because the interaction between 
prejudice acceptability and confrontation did not influence downstream responding—there is 
evidence of mediation and serial mediation linking confrontation to the downstream affective, 
cognitive, and behavioral outcomes through offensiveness. For the full listing of standardized 
direct and indirect path coefficients, see Table 12 and Table 13. 
Behavioral Stereotyping 
Data Analytic Strategy. Multilevel modeling (MLM), with restricted maximum 
likelihood estimation (ReML), was used to examine the fixed effects of prejudice acceptability 
condition, confrontation condition, and their interaction on the change between Time 1 and Time 
2 stereotyping behaviors, while accounting for the random effects of target group and within-
person factors. 
The random intercept models are specified as follows: 
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𝑌!#' =	𝛽" + 𝛽%!#' + 𝛽&!#' + 𝛽% ∗ 	𝛽&!#' +	𝛼#$ +	𝛼'( +	𝜀!#' 
For an observation (i) within a target group (j) and within a particular student (k), the predicted 
outcome score (𝑌!#') will be a function of the overall intercept (𝛽"), the fixed component of 
prejudice acceptability condition differences (𝛽%!#'), the fixed component of confrontation 
condition differences (𝛽&!#'), the interaction term (𝛽% ∗ 	𝛽&!#'), a random component for the 
target group (𝛼#$), a random component for the participant (𝛼'(), and residual random error 
variation (𝜀!#'). 
Stereotype Usage. Large amounts of the unexplained variance in stereotype usage were 
accounted for by target group (ICC = .13) and within-person factors (ICC = .54). The multilevel 
analysis revealed significant effects of time point, t(388.96) = -5.71, b = -0.64, p < .001, and 
confrontation, t(637.57) = 4.49, b = 0.89, p < .001. These effects, however, were qualified by the 
predicted time × confrontation interaction, t(388.96) = -4.94, b = -0.56, p < .001. Simple slopes 
analyses were used to decompose this interaction. As predicted, among students who were not 
confronted, stereotype usage did not change between their original stories (Time 1) and their 
revised stories (Time 2), t(391) = -0.55, b = -0.09, p = .58. By contrast, students who were 
confronted revised their essays to include significantly fewer stereotypes, t(391) = -7.70, b = -
1.20, p < .001 (see Fig. 19A and Fig. 19B). All other effects and interactions were non-
significant (all ps ≥ .14).  
Emotional Tone. To compare behavioral stereotyping more easily across the target 
groups, we also analyzed the change in emotional tone between students’ Time 1 and Time 2 
creative stories. Again, large amounts of the unexplained variance in stereotype usage were 
accounted for by target group (ICC = .07) and within-person factors (ICC = .54). This multilevel 
analysis revealed a significant effect of confrontation, t(631.28) = -2.69, b = -7.30, p = .007, 
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which was qualified by a significant time × confrontation interaction, t(389.00) = 4.54, b = 7.06, 
p < .001. Simple slopes analyses revealed that among students who were not confronted, the 
emotional tone of their stories did not change between their original (Time 1) and revised drafts 
(Time 2), t(391) = -1.89, b = -4.21, p = .06. Students who were confronted, however, revised 
their stories to be significantly more positive in emotional tone, t(391) = 4.50, b = 9.76, p < .001 
(see Fig. 20A and Fig. 20B). 
All other effects and interactions were non-significant (all ps ≥ .06). However, as noted 
above, exploratory simple effects tests revealed that the emotional tone of student stories was 
more negative at Time 1 among students assigned to the high (vs. low) prejudice acceptability 
condition, t(391) = -2.67, b = -4.38, p = .01. This same pattern persisted into Time 2, t(391) = -
2.68, b = -4.41, p = .01, where the emotional tone remained more negative for students assigned 
to the high (vs. low) prejudice acceptability condition. 
Discussion 
Building on the findings of Study 1, the goal of Study 2 was to examine how prejudice 
acceptability beliefs influence actual (vs. forecasted) responses to being confronted. I had 
competing hypotheses going into the present study. On the one hand, it was possible that when 
prejudice was perceived to be more (vs. less) acceptable, confrontations would backfire. Indeed, 
this is what forecasters expected. In Study 1, when prejudice was perceived to be more 
acceptable, student forecasters viewed prejudice expression as less offensive and, thus, 
anticipated less negative self-directed affect and self-correction after being confronted, while 
also anticipating greater negative other-directed affect, positive affect, and hostility. On the other 
hand, it was possible that confrontation would prove to be an effective prejudice reduction tactic, 
regardless of prejudice acceptability level. That is, if confrontation is itself a cue to prejudice 
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acceptability, people who are confronted (vs. not confronted) may rate their behavior as more 
offensive, which would increase negative self-directed affect and self-correction, perhaps even in 
situations where prejudice acceptability is high. 
Methodologically, I found that the “day in the life” story writing paradigm that I used 
resulted in extensive stereotyping. Indeed, most students used common stereotype words in their 
initial draft of their stories, across all target groups. In fact, only 1.5% of the entire sample used 
no stereotype-related words and phrases at all.  
Regarding my results, I found that confrontation encouraged self-regulatory responding, 
even when prejudice acceptability was high. Confronted students rated their original stories as 
more offensive than non-confronted students. As expected, offensiveness perceptions predicted 
greater negative self-directed affect, which predicted more self-corrective thoughts and 
behavioral intentions. Further, confronted students revised their creative stories using fewer 
stereotypes and a more positive emotional tone as compared to non-confronted students, 
regardless of prejudice acceptability condition. 
Additionally, students who were confronted (vs. not) rated prejudice expression toward 
the target group as less normative, regardless of prejudice acceptability level. This supports the 
hypothesis that confrontation acts as a social norm manipulation by shifting prejudice 
acceptability beliefs downward. To the extent that prejudice expression is viewed to be 
offensive, students show greater negative self-directed affect and self-corrective intentions. It 
should be noted that even though confrontation positively predicted greater negative other-
directed affect and dismissive and hostile responding as well, confronted students reported 
greater negative self-directed affect and self-corrective responding overall. Taken together, these 
findings show great promise for confrontation as a prejudice reduction strategy. Confrontation, 
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even in situations where prejudice acceptability is high, appears to encourage self-regulatory 
responding. 
With regard to prejudice acceptability, however, the takeaways are less straightforward. 
We see clear discrepancies between how forecasters believe prejudice acceptability will affect 
their responses to confrontation (Study 1) and how it actually affects experiencers responses to 
confrontation (Study 2). Whereas forecasters expected increases in prejudice acceptability to 
lower the perceived offensiveness of bias, we found the opposite pattern among experiencers. 
Experiencers rated their creative stories as more offensive when writing about high (vs. low) 
prejudice acceptability groups. Though this was not expected, this pattern may reflect the fact 
that original story drafts of those assigned to the high (vs. low) prejudice acceptability condition 
were more negative in tone. As a result of this potential confound, we cannot confidently 
conclude much regarding prejudice acceptability from this study. To address this confound, in 
Study 3 I decided to hold target group constant and manipulate prejudice acceptability by 
varying the local social norm information presented to students, which is a common approach in 
many social norm studies (e.g., Goldstein et al., 2007).  
Study 3 
 In the previous studies, we manipulated prejudice acceptability perceptions by randomly 
assigning participants to imagine expressing prejudice (Study 1) or actually express prejudice 
(Study 2) toward target groups that varied in prejudice acceptability within the college context. 
However, without holding target group constant and directly manipulating local social norm 
information, the argument positing causal links between prejudice norms, offensiveness beliefs, 
and reactions to confrontation is relatively weak. To remedy this, the purpose of Study 3 was to 
hold the target group (i.e., cigarette smokers) constant and experimentally manipulate local 
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prejudice norm information. From there, I tested whether these manipulations influenced 
offensiveness perceptions and, in turn, how people emotionally, cognitively, and behaviorally 
reacted to being confronted. 
Method 
Design 
I employed a 2 (Prejudice Acceptability: Low and High) × 2 (Confrontation: Absent, 
Present) between-subjects, experimental design. 
Power Analysis 
I used G*Power v. 3.1 software to compute the a priori minimum acceptable sample size 
for this study (Faul et al., 2007). I sought to detect a medium-sized effect for a two factor, 
between-subjects experimental design at the standard .05 alpha error probability, with 80% 
power. This power analysis revealed a minimum sample size of 128 people was needed, using 
the following parameters: test family = F-test, ANOVA (main effects and interactions); f = .25 
(medium-sized effect); α = 0.05, 1-β = 0.80; numerator df = 1; number of groups = 4. With this 
minimum in mind, I planned to oversample to account for attrition and exclusions. I aimed to 
recruit 320 participants in total (or approximately 80 participants per cell). 
Participants 
I recruited 318 non-smoking, introductory psychology students at Indiana University 
(MAge = 20.0 years, 68.6% White, 65.4% female, see Table 14 for complete demographic 
information).47 Random assignment to condition was successful (each cell had between 76 and 
 
47 Three-hundred and sixty-eight students originally entered the survey, but 9 of these students (2.4% of the full 
sample) were excluded for missing 75% (or more) of their data on the key outcome variables. Another 12 students 
(3.2%) were excluded for failing to correctly answer the attention check question (i.e., “This is an Attention Check. 
Please select ‘Very much’ to show that you are paying attention.”). Another 22 students (6.0%) were excluded for 
failing to correctly answer one (n = 20) or both (n = 2) of the memory check questions assessing students’ memory 
of the experimental manipulations. Finally, 7 students (1.9%) were excluded because they identified as cigarette 
smokers in the demographics portion of the study. 
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82 respondents). In exchange for their participation, students earned credit toward a course 
requirement or were paid $10. 
Procedure 
The procedure for Study 3 was almost identical to the procedure for Study 2, with two 
notable differences. The first difference is that I held target group constant. In the present study, 
all students wrote “day in the life” stories about cigarette smokers. Cigarette smokers were 
selected as the focal target group because pilot data revealed that Indiana University students’ (N 
= 4,586) expressed uncertainty about prejudice norms toward smokers—that is, there was little 
social norm clarity. On a 3-point scale where “1” meant it definitely was not okay to feel 
negatively toward smokers and “3” meant it definitely was okay to feel negatively, the average 
rating was 1.87 with a standard deviation of 0.67. Examining the frequencies, 52.8% of students 
selected “2” on the scale, and the remainder of students were pretty split (30.2% selected “1” and 
17.0% selected “3” on the scale). Consistent with previous research suggesting that people’s 
normative beliefs about target groups may be more suggestible when social norm clarity is low 
(Zitek & Hebl, 2007), I reasoned that it would be easier to shift students’ social norm beliefs 
about cigarette smokers compared to other target groups, for whom social norm clarity may be 
higher.48 
The second difference between this study and the previous one is that in this study 
participants were randomly assigned to receive descriptive norm information about campus 
attitudes toward cigarette smokers. Before writing their original “day in the life” story, half of 
the students learned that it was descriptively normal on campus to have negative feelings toward 
smokers (high prejudice acceptability), while the other half learned that it was descriptively 
 
48 Presently, tobacco use is banned on Indiana University property. 
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normal to have neutral feelings toward smokers (low prejudice acceptability).49 These norm 
manipulations are printed below: 
High Prejudice Acceptability 
You have been randomly assigned to write a story about a day in the life of a cigarette smoker. 
 
Before writing your story, you may be interested to know that Indiana University administrators recently 
conducted a high-profile survey to understand students’ attitudes toward smoking on campus. They hope 
that the results of this survey will inform campus policy decisions. 
 
Results of this survey revealed that Indiana University students have overwhelmingly negative opinions of 
smoking on campus. Almost 75% of IU students reported having negative feelings toward smokers. In fact, 
when asked whether the university should continue to ban cigarette smoking on all parts of campus, most 
students supported the ban. 
 
Low Prejudice Acceptability 
You have been randomly assigned to write a story about a day in the life of a cigarette smoker. 
 
Before writing your story, you may be interested to know that Indiana University administrators recently 
conducted a high-profile survey to understand students’ attitudes toward smoking on campus. They hope 
that the results of this survey will inform campus policy decisions. 
 
Results of this survey revealed that Indiana University students lack strong opinions about smoking on 
campus. Almost 75% of IU students reported having neutral feelings toward smokers. In fact, when asked 
whether the university should continue to ban cigarette smoking on all parts of campus, most students 
opposed the ban.  
 
Then the remainder of Study 3 proceeded in the exact same fashion as Study 2.  
Measures 
 The measures used in Study 3 were identical to the measures used in Study 2. As a 
manipulation check, participants were asked to report their prejudice norm beliefs about cigarette 
smokers (𝛼 = .74; 2-items). For outcomes, I again measured negative self-directed affect (𝛼 = 
.84; 5-items, i.e., “disappointed with myself,” “embarrassed,” “guilty,” “self-critical,” and 
“shameful”), negative other-directed affect (𝛼 = .83; 5-items, i.e., “annoyed with my task 
partner,” “angry with my task partner,” “disgusted my task partner,” “irritated,” and “bothered”), 
and positive affect (𝛼 = .75; 3-items, i.e., “amused,” “entertained,” “proud of myself”), as well as 
 
49 I chose to contrast “negative feelings” toward smokers with “neutral feelings” because it seemed odd and 
unbelievable that the majority of Indiana University students would have “positive feelings” toward smokers, given 
the widely known negative health consequences of smoking and second-hand smoking (U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services, 2014).  
80 
 
task-relevant self-corrective thoughts and behaviors (𝛼 = .79; 11-items, e.g., “I think I was wrong 
to write some of the things that I wrote,” “I want to apologize to my task partner,” “I want to 
thank my task partner,” and “I want to avoid writing things like this in the future”) and hostile-
dismissive thoughts and behaviors (𝛼 = .73; 9-items, e.g., “I think there’s nothing wrong with 
what I wrote”, “I am thinking that my task partner is confused and doesn't really know what 
he/she is doing,” “I want to tell my task partner to lighten up,” and “I want to tell my task partner 
that they’re being stupid”). I also measured the extent to which they thought their writing sample 
was offensive (𝛼 = .87; 2-items, i.e., “I am thinking that my writing was offensive” and “I am 
thinking that my writing was harmful to others”). Then participants were asked to report their 
personal prejudice toward cigarette smokers (𝛼 = .82; 3-items). 
 
Results 
Data Screening and Preliminary Analyses 
 As with the previous studies, outcome variable composites were created to assess (a) 
offensiveness beliefs, (b) negative self- directed affect, (c) negative other-directed affect, (d) 
positive affect, (e) self-corrective thoughts and behaviors, and (f) dismissive/hostile thoughts and 
behaviors. Scales demonstrated adequate internal consistency reliability (𝛼	 ≥  .73). Composite 
variables satisfied assumptions of normality and linearity required by general linear models. 
Table 15 provides the psychometric properties of all variables. Table 16 provides zero-
order correlations. 
Prejudice Acceptability Condition. Inconsistent with Study 1 (where prejudice 
acceptability condition significantly negatively predicted offensiveness perceptions) and Study 2 
(where it significantly positively predicted offensiveness perceptions), zero order correlational 
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analyses revealed that prejudice acceptability condition (-1 = Low, 1 = High) did not 
significantly predict offensiveness perceptions (r = .01, p = .83). In fact, of the measured 
affective, cognitive, or behavioral outcomes, prejudice acceptability condition only significantly 
predicted negative other-directed affect (r = -.12, p = .03), such that as prejudice acceptability 
increased, negative other-directed affect decreased. 
Confrontation Condition. Consistent with Study 2, zero order correlational analyses 
revealed that confrontation condition (-1 = Absent, 1 = Present) positively predicted 
offensiveness perceptions (r = .53, p < .001). People who were confronted rated their ‘day in the 
life’ stories as more offensive than people who were not confronted. Also like the previous 
study, confrontation positively predicted self-corrective thoughts and actions (r = .18, p = .001) 
and hostile-dismissive thoughts and actions (r = .14, p = .01). Its direct correlational relationship 
with negative self-directed affect (r = .04, p = .44), negative other-directed affect (r = -.02, p = 
.76), and positive affect (r = -.04, p = .52) were not statistically significant. 
Manipulation Check 
To confirm that students perceived the normative manipulation as intended, we 
conducted a 2 (prejudice acceptability) × 2 (confrontation) ANOVA that revealed a significant 
main effect of prejudice acceptability, F(1, 314) = 169.20, p < .001, ηp2 = .35. As expected, 
students assigned to the high prejudice acceptability condition perceived prejudice toward 
cigarette smokers to be significantly more normative (M = 7.26, SD = 1.33) than students 
assigned to the low prejudice acceptability condition (M = 4.97, SD = 1.79, p < .001, d = 1.45). 
Moreover, consistent with the view that interpersonal confrontations communicate social norm 
information (specifically, that prejudice expression is not socially acceptable), there was a 
significant main effect of confrontation condition, F(1, 314) = 6.79, p = .01, ηp2 = .02. Students 
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who were confronted for expressing prejudice about smokers perceived prejudice toward 
cigarette smokers to be less socially normative (M = 5.89, SD = 1.99) than students who were not 
confronted (M = 6.33, SD = 1.89, p = .01, d = 0.23; see Fig. 21). The interaction effect was not 
statistically significant, F(1, 314) = 0.26, p = .61, ηp2 = .001.50 
Offensiveness 
An ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of confrontation, F(1, 314) = 119.64, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .28, such that students who were confronted for expressing prejudice rated their own 
creative stories about smokers as more offensive (M = 2.79, SD = 1.66) than students who were 
not confronted (M = 1.22, SD = 0.66, p < .001, d = 1.23). It is important to note that the average 
offensiveness ratings were below the midpoint of the scale, even when students were confronted. 
This suggests that students may largely rate prejudice expression toward smokers as inoffensive 
(see Fig. 22). Unlike Study 2 (where target groups varied), when target group was held constant 
the main effect of prejudice acceptability on offensiveness was not statistically significant, F(1, 
314) = 0.12, p = .73, ηp2 < .001. People assigned to the high and low prejudice acceptability 
conditions rated prejudice expression toward smokers to be similarly inoffensive. The interaction 
effect was not statistically significant, F(1, 314) = 0.18, p = .67, ηp2 = .001 
Affect 
Negative self-directed affect. There were no significant main effects of confrontation, 
F(1, 314) = 0.61, p = .44, ηp2 = .002, or prejudice acceptability condition on negative self-
 
50 All two-way ANOVAs were run with and without personal prejudice as a covariate. Personal prejudice was not a 
significant covariate for the following outcomes: offensiveness beliefs (b = 0.01, p = .86), negative self-directed 
affect (b = 0.02, p = .79), and dismissive/hostile intentions (b = 0.02, p = .60). However, personal prejudice was a 
significant covariate in the following analyses: negative other-directed affect (b = 0.11, p = .03), positive affect (b = 
-0.24, p < .001), self-corrective intentions (b = -0.13, p = .01). There were no changes to the interpretations of results 
dependent on the inclusion of personal prejudice as a covariate. 
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directed affect, F(1, 314) < 0.001, p = .99, ηp2 < .001. The interaction was also not significant, 
F(1, 314) = 0.38, p = .54, ηp2 = .001 (see Fig. 23, Panel A). 
Negative other-directed affect. An ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of 
prejudice acceptability, F(1, 314) = 4.73, p = .03, ηp2 = .02, such that students assigned to the 
low prejudice acceptability condition reported greater negative-other directed affect (M = 2.04, 
SD = 1.11) than students assigned to the high prejudice acceptability condition (M = 1.78, SD = 
0.97, p = .03, d = 0.24; see Fig. 23, Panel B). Neither the main effect of confrontation, F(1, 314) 
= 0.08, p = .78, ηp2 = .001, nor the interaction effect were statistically significant, F(1, 314) = 
0.94, p = .33, ηp2 = .003. 
Positive affect. There were no significant main effects of confrontation, F(1, 314) = 0.40, 
p = .53, ηp2 = .001, or prejudice acceptability condition on positive affect, F(1, 314) = 0.01, p = 
.94, ηp2 = .001. The interaction was also not significant, F(1, 314) = 2.22, p = .14, ηp2 = .01 (see 
Fig. 23, Panel C). 
Thoughts & Behavior 
Self-corrective. An ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of confrontation, F(1, 
314) = 10.67, p = .001, ηp2 = .03, such that students who were confronted for expressing 
prejudice about smokers expressed more self-corrective thoughts and behavioral intentions (M = 
3.41, SD = 1.19) than students who were not confronted (M = 3.03, SD = 0.82, p = .001, d = 
0.37; see Fig. 24, Panel A). Neither the main effect of prejudice acceptability, F(1, 314) = 0.04, p 
= .84, ηp2 < .001, nor the interaction effect were statistically significant, F(1, 314) = 0.004, p = 
.95, ηp2 < .001. 
Dismissive and hostile. An ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of confrontation, 
F(1, 314) = 6.75, p = .01, ηp2 = .02, such that students who were confronted for expressing 
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prejudice about smokers expressed more hostile and dismissive thoughts and behavioral 
intentions (M = 2.42, SD = 0.73) than students who were not confronted (M = 2.20, SD = 0.76, p 
= .01, d = 0.30; see Fig. 24, Panel B). Neither the main effect of prejudice acceptability, F(1, 
314) = 1.30, p = .26, ηp2 = .004, nor the interaction effect were statistically significant, F(1, 314) 
= 3.58, p = .06, ηp2 = .01. 
Moderated Mediation 
Consistent with the previous studies, I hypothesized indirect effects linking prejudice 
acceptability and confrontation to affective responses through offensiveness (simple mediation) 
and indirect effects linking prejudice acceptability and confrontation to thoughts and behavior 
through offensiveness and affect (serial mediation). To test whether the data support these 
mediational predictions, I evaluated the fit of a moderated mediation model (see Fig. 25). 
Missing data was handled such that only complete cases were included (i.e., listwise deletion). 
As with the previous study, confrontation positively predicted offensiveness perceptions 
(b = 0.79, p < .001), such that people who were confronted rated their stories about a cigarette 
smoker as more offensive than people who were not confronted. In this study, prejudice 
acceptability did not significantly predict offensiveness perceptions (b = -0.03, p = .72), nor did 
the interaction between prejudice acceptability and confrontation (b = 0.03, p = .66). 
As offensiveness perceptions increased, students reported experiencing greater negative 
self-directed emotions (e.g., guilt, embarrassment; b = 0.50, p < .001). However, offensiveness 
perceptions did not predict negative other-directed emotions (e.g., anger, frustration; b = 0.06, p 
= .15) or positive emotions (e.g., pride, amusement; b = -0.01, p = .89).  
Emotional responses again predicted students’ cognitions and behavioral intentions. 
Students who experienced greater negative self-directed affect reported self-correcting more 
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(e.g., thinking they’re wrong, wanting to apologize; b = 0.37, p < .001) and reacting less hostilely 
and dismissively (e.g., thinking the confronter is a jerk, telling the confronter he/she is stupid; b 
= -0.11, p = .001). By contrast, students who experienced greater negative other-directed affect 
reported self-reflecting and self-correcting less (b = -0.22, p < .001) and reacting more hostilely 
and dismissively (b = 0.47, p < .001). Students who experienced greater positive affect reported 
significant increases in self-reflecting and self-correcting (b = 0.11, p < .001) and reacting more 
hostilely and dismissively (b = 0.09, p < .001), like in Study 2.  
Like the previous study, there is no evidence of moderated mediation. The interaction 
between prejudice acceptability and confrontation did not influence downstream responding. 
Confrontation predicted offensiveness perceptions, which had downstream implications for 
affective reactions, cognitions, and behavioral intentions. For the full listing of standardized 
direct and indirect path coefficients, see Table 17 and Table 18. 
Behavioral Stereotyping 
 As with the previous study, we examined whether our predictors influenced stereotype 
usage (i.e., the proportion of stereotype-relevant words/phrases used) and emotional tone (i.e., 
the relative proportion of positive to negative words, with higher scores indicating a more 
positive tone) within participants’ original and revised creative stories, as assessed by LIWC 
software (Pennebaker et al., 2015). 
Data Analytic Strategy. To examine whether prejudice acceptability and confrontation 
influenced behavioral stereotyping, I conducted two repeated measures ANOVAs, with prejudice 




Stereotype Usage. In this study, target group was held constant and, therefore, so were 
the stereotype dictionaries. In total, 26 stereotype themes related to cigarette smokers were 
detected, including “addicted,” “angry,” and “anxious” (see Appendix 6 for the full list of 
stereotype themes).51 This analysis revealed a significant main effect of confrontation, F(1, 314) 
= 4.63, p = .03, 𝜂p2 = .02, and a significant main effect of time point, F(1, 314) = 24.67, p < .001 
, 𝜂p2 = .07, which were both qualified by the predicted confrontation × time point interaction, 
F(1, 314) = 9.66, p = .002, 𝜂p2 = .03. As expected, before receiving partner feedback (Time Point 
1), stereotype usage in students’ original creative story drafts did not differ by confrontation 
condition (MAbsent = 5.34, SDAbsent = 2.11; MPresent = 5.21, SDPresent = 2.56; p = .64, d =  0.05). 
However, after receiving partner feedback (Time Point 2), students who were confronted used 
significantly fewer stereotype-relevant words in their revised stories (MPresent = 4.31, SDPresent = 
2.15) than students who were merely given critical feedback but were not confronted (MAbsent = 
5.13, SDAbsent = 1.88, p < .001, d =  0.41; see Fig. 26A and Fig. 26B). Neither the main effect of 
prejudice acceptability, nor the remaining two-way and three-way interactions were statistically 
significant (all ps ≥ .14). 
Emotional Tone. When evaluating the emotional tone of students’ creative stories, no 
significant main effects emerged (all ps ≥ .05); however, the confrontation × time point 
interaction, F(1, 314) = 28.92, p < .001 , 𝜂p2 = .08, and prejudice acceptability × time point 
interaction emerged as significant, F(1, 314) = 9.07, p = .003 , 𝜂p2 = .03. The three-way 
interaction was not statistically significant, F(1, 314) = 0.004, p = .95, 𝜂p2 < .001).  
Starting with the confrontation × time point interaction, simple effects tests revealed that 
before receiving partner feedback (Time Point 1), the emotional tone of students’ original 
 
51 The master LIWC stereotype dictionary linked cigarette smokers with 5,306 stereotype-related words and phrases. 
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creative stories did not differ by confrontation condition (MAbsent = 46.05, SDAbsent = 30.46; 
MPresent = 43.29, SDPresent = 29.17; p = .41, d = 0.09). After receiving partner feedback (Time 
Point 2), however, confronted students’ revised stories had a significantly more positive 
emotional tone (MPresent = 54.08, SDPresent = 27.85) than non-confronted students’ revised stories 
(MAbsent = 40.15, SDAbsent = 29.79, p < .001, d = 0.49). Interestingly, as students who were 
confronted revised their stories to be significantly more positive in tone (MDifference = 10.78, SE = 
2.17, p < .001, dz = 0.38), students who were not confronted revised their stories to be 
significantly more negative in tone, perhaps in an effort to make their story more “creative” 
(MDifference = -5.96, SE = 2.24, p = .01, dz = 0.21; Fig. 27A and Fig. 27B). 
Turning next to the prejudice acceptability × time point interaction, simple effects tests 
revealed that positive emotional tone did not differ between students assigned to the low and 
high prejudice acceptability conditions at Time 1 (MLow = 44.34, SDLow = 30.36; MHigh = 44.92, 
SDHigh = 29.29;  p = .84, d = 0.02). At Time 2, however, students assigned to the low prejudice 
acceptability condition wrote stories that were significantly more positive in emotional tone 
(MLow = 51.64, SDLow = 28.98) than students assigned to the high prejudice acceptability 
condition (MHigh = 42.96, SDHigh = 29.65;  p = .01, dz = 0.30). 
Discussion 
Much like Study 2, the goal of Study 3 was to examine whether forecasted responses to 
confrontation accorded with actual responses to confrontation. However, in this study we held 
target group constant and manipulated prejudice acceptability by presenting students with 
ostensible local norm information. Overall, we again found evidence that confrontation led to 
self-regulation, regardless of prejudice acceptability condition. Consistent with Study 2, students 
who were confronted (vs. not) rated their original creative stories as more offensive. These 
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offensiveness perceptions positively predicted negative self-directed affect, which, in turn, 
positively predicted self-corrective thoughts and behaviors. Although confrontation (vs. no 
confrontation) again predicted greater dismissive and hostile thoughts and behavioral intentions, 
overall, greater self-corrective responses to confrontation were reported. Additionally, students 
who were confronted for expressing prejudice toward smokers (vs. not confronted) revised their 
stories to use fewer stereotypes and to have a more positive emotional tone. This behavioral self-
correction was somewhat stronger for students in the low (vs. high) prejudice acceptability 
condition.   
Further, this study provides further evidence that forecasters expect prejudice 
acceptability to elicit different emotional, cognitive, and behavioral responses to confrontation 
than experiencers actually exhibit. When prejudice acceptability is high (vs. low), Forecasters 
expect that they will perceive prejudice expression as less offensive and, consequently, respond 
with less self-regulation after being confronted. However, experiencers appear to perceive 
prejudice expression as similarly offensive and engage in largely the same amount of self-
regulation, regardless of whether prejudice acceptability is high or low. That is, confrontation 
reduced prejudiced responding, even in situations where prejudice expression was depicted as 
normative. Simply put, confrontations appear robust to a fair degree of perceived social norm 
variability. 
General Discussion 
Interpersonal confrontation has been heralded as a successful prejudice reduction 
strategy, one that is flexible, personally empowering, and surprisingly effective (Czopp & 
Ashburn-Nardo, 2012). At its core, the process of confronting is simple. A confronter witnesses 
prejudice expression and then makes their disapproval of such expression directly known to the 
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confrontee, through some sort of verbal or non-verbal behavior (Czopp, 2019; Shelton et al., 
2006). According to earlier models, confrontations were theorized to curb prejudice expression 
along two pathways (Czopp et al., 2006), one self-regulatory path and another norm compliance 
path. Along the former path, confrontations are thought to induce a self-regulatory cycle, 
whereby confrontation makes confrontees aware of prejudice-related discrepancies (or 
discrepancies between their own behavior and their non-prejudiced self-standards for behavior). 
This recognition prompts guilt and self-corrective action, ultimately reducing prejudice 
expression going forward. Along the norm compliance path, by contrast, confrontation is thought 
to make salient local non-prejudiced norms. Upon being confronted then, confrontees are forced 
to recognize a discrepancy between their own behavior and the non-prejudiced social-standards 
for behavior that are prevalent in their local context, inducing behavioral compliance with those 
non-prejudiced norms. 
Although confrontation researchers have long speculated that perceiving egalitarian 
norms in the local context is critical for inducing compliance with confrontation, particularly 
when confrontees lack strong self-standards for non-prejudiced behavior (e.g., Czopp et al., 
2006), until now this assumption has not been empirically tested. Prior to the present studies, the 
published research assessing the prejudice-reducing effects of interpersonal confrontation had 
been conducted under seemingly optimal social conditions, like contexts with strong social-
standards for non-prejudiced behavior and where prejudice acceptability is uniformly low. Due 
to these situational constraints, confrontees may have been predisposed to accept the notion that 
their prejudice expression is offensive (Burns & Monteith, 2018; Chaney & Sanchez, 2018; 
Czopp et al., 2006; Mallett & Wagner, 2011; Parker et al., 2018), which has been theorized as a 
critical situational construal for prompting prejudice suppression (Czopp & Ashburn-Nardo, 
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2012). A central question left unanswered by the current literature concerned whether 
confrontation would continue to be an effective prejudice reduction strategy in the perceived 
absence of egalitarian social norms. The present research program is among the first to test 
confrontation effectiveness in situations where local prejudice norms are more permissive of bias 
expression. In doing so, I investigated two major research questions. First, I assessed whether the 
effectiveness of confrontation varied depending on prejudice acceptability. Second, I examined 
whether the intuitions of forecasters aligned (or, as we’ll see in this case, misaligned) with the 
realities of experiencers.  
So, does prejudice acceptability influence confrontation effectiveness? Well, it depends 
who you ask. For forecasters, increases in prejudice acceptability predicted decreases in 
offensiveness perceptions, which ultimately meant lowered negative self-directed affect and 
fewer self-corrective intentions. It also meant increases in negative other-directed affect, positive 
affect, and dismissive/hostile intentions. Put simply, forecasters expected confrontations to be at 
increased risk of backfiring when prejudice acceptability was high (vs. low or moderate). These 
forecaster findings are quite consistent with the intuitions of scholars who warned that 
confrontations might be less effective when social pressure to suppress prejudice expression is 
weak (Czopp et al., 2006). 
Among experiencers, however, prejudice acceptability did not exhibit consistent effects 
on reactions to being confronted. In Study 2, increases in prejudice acceptability unexpectedly 
predicted increases in offensiveness perceptions (though, as described above, this may have been 
due to a methodological confound) 52 and in Study 3, prejudice acceptability did not predict 
 
52 Unexpectedly, Study 2 participants in the high prejudice acceptability condition rated their own behavior as 
significantly more offensive than participants in the low prejudice acceptability condition. As discussed earlier, this 
is likely due to the fact that their stories, on average, were more negative in tone. This main effect of prejudice 
acceptability was not found in Study 3, where target group was held constant. 
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offensiveness perceptions at all. There were almost no direct effects of prejudice acceptability on 
emotional, cognitive, or behavioral outcomes among experiencers (see Table 19 for a high-level 
summary of these results). 
Even though prejudice acceptability did not consistently impact offensiveness construals, 
I found across all three studies that offensiveness construals were a key predictor of self-
regulation. Perceiving one’s own actions as more offensive (vs. less) prompted increased 
negative self-directed affect (e.g., guilt, embarrassment), which, in turn, promoted self-corrective 
and reflective responding (e.g., apologizing, wanting to avoid bias expression in the future). Such 
a finding is an important proof of concept for the Credible Cues Model for Responding to 
Prejudice Confrontations, which posits that offensiveness construals (along with other construals 
that signal confronter credibility) are important in determining whether confrontations will be 
deemed credible (and, in turn, foster self-regulation) or deemed not credible (and backfire). 
Taken together, these findings suggest that although prejudice acceptability may be an 
important cue that forecasters use to determine their anticipated affective, cognitive, and 
behavioral responses to confrontation, prejudice acceptability is a less important cue for 
experiencers. Instead, among experiencers it appears that confrontation itself signals to 
confrontees that their behavior is offensive, and, in turn, it encourages self-regulatory responding 
and stereotype suppression. This occurred even when the confrontation was on behalf of a high 
prejudice acceptability group (e.g., gang members, hoarders, and alcoholics) and when students 
were explicitly told that prejudice toward a group was common at their university (i.e., telling 
students that 75% of other students feel negatively towards cigarette smokers and smoking). 
Why might confrontation positively predict offensiveness beliefs, above and beyond prejudice 
acceptability? Well, I provide some evidence that confrontation itself may be acting as a social 
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norm manipulation, influencing students’ beliefs about whether prejudice expression is socially 
permissible in the campus context. Merely being confronted for prejudice expression (vs. not) 
suggests that such behavior is non-normative. Much research shows that prejudice norms are 
quite malleable (Crandall & Warner, 2005). Indeed, prejudice expressions that at one point in 
time were considered socially acceptable (e.g., women in the workplace, transgender people, 
interracial couples), nowadays seems unreasonable and obviously offensive. Confrontation may 
be one method of communicating these prejudice norms. And perhaps this feature of 
confrontation is underappreciated, as evidenced by the fact that forecasters do not seem to 
anticipate this norm-signaling function. 
Theoretical Implications  
Expanding upon earlier confrontation models, in this dissertation I proposed and began 
testing components of the Credible Cues Model for Responding to Prejudice Confrontations. 
This model serves as a framework for understanding how situational cues can influence 
confrontees’ affective, cognitive, and behavioral responses to confrontation. In short, the model 
assumes that being confronted prompts a state of uncomfortable psychological arousal within the 
confrontee, because it poses a threat to their self-integrity (Stone & Cooper, 2001). Motivated to 
reduce the uncomfortable tension brought about by confrontation, the model proposes that 
confrontees scan the local environment for cues signaling whether the confrontation is credible, 
that is, whether it is justified, warranted, and reasonable. During this scanning phase, confrontees 
will assess the offensiveness of their so-called ‘prejudice expression’ by questioning whether 
their behavior violated their self-standards (e.g., “Do I think I acted in a way that was offensive, 
harmful, or undesirable?”) or the local context’s social-standards (e.g., “Do reasonable others 
here think I acted in a way that was offensive, harmful, or undesirable?”). As I mentioned above, 
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the present studies support the notion that offensiveness construals shape downstream affective, 
cognitive, and behavioral responding to confrontation. Indeed, when students anticipated 
perceiving or actually perceived their prejudice expression to be offensive, they tended to report 
increased negative self-directed emotions, self-corrective intentions, and engage in more 
stereotype suppression. One of the theoretical innovations of this work is it recognizes the role of 
credibility construals, operationalized through the perceived offensiveness of one’s own 
behavior, which moderates whether an individual recognizes that a prejudice-related discrepancy 
indeed occurred (fostering self-regulation processes) or not (instigating confrontation backfiring 
effects).  
Importantly, the situational cues that shaped these offensiveness construals differed for 
forecasters and experiencers. Forecasters were sensitive to the cue of prejudice acceptability and 
this influenced their offensiveness perceptions; however, this was not the case for experiencers. 
This finding fits within a broader social psychological literature showing that there are often 
wide gaps between how forecasters believe they will respond to events and how experiencers 
actually respond (e.g., Gilbert et al., 1998). Pertaining to confrontation, such work has mostly 
focused on forecaster-experiencer discrepancies among confronters. Generally, researchers find 
that experiencers are much less likely to confront prejudice than forecasters expect (Brinkman et 
al., 2011; J. R. Crosby & Wilson, 2015; Hyers, 2007, 2010; Karmali et al., 2017; Kawakami et 
al., 2009; Shelton & Stewart, 2004; Swim & Hyers, 1999; Woodzicka & LaFrance, 2001). 
Research investigating forecaster-experiencer discrepancies among confrontees has been much 
sparser. Prior to the present research, only two studies addressing this topic have been published. 
In that work, although high-prejudice confrontees forecast that they would respond to 
confrontations with anger and dismissiveness (Czopp & Monteith, 2003), most actually 
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responded with guilt and complied with the confronter’s request to stereotype less (Czopp et al., 
2006). Thus, the present research adds to this growing literature and also serves as a cautionary 
tale for those who may believe that cues that influence forecasters responses to confrontation 
(e.g., prejudice acceptability) are the same cues that impact experiencers’ reactions. 
Overall, the results of these studies are quite promising for the Credible Cues Model. 
Still, many components of the model remain to be tested. For instance, the model hinges on the 
idea that confrontees are ultimately interested in assessing the credibility of a confrontation—that 
is, they intend to determine whether the confrontation is warranted. The present studies infer 
credibility beliefs based on the offensiveness outcome, and do not measure credibility directly. 
Thus, measuring credibility beliefs directly seems to be an obvious direction for future research.  
Additionally, although the present research highlighted offensiveness construals as one 
key factor that confrontees use to assess a confrontation’s credibility, many other factors may 
shape confrontees’ credibility assessments. For example, confrontees may scan for cues that 
signal whether they are indeed responsible for the bad behavior for which they were accused 
(i.e., responsibility construals). For instance, they might question whether they had any control 
over their own behavior or whether it was forced. Rejecting responsibility for one’s actions is 
one of the easiest ways to alleviate the uncomfortable psychological tension brought about by 
cognitive dissonance (Gosling et al., 2006). If confrontees do not assume responsibility for 
engaging in biased behavior—and instead assign blame elsewhere—they may feel little 
motivation to self-regulate (J. Cooper & Fazio, 1984). In the present studies, I provided students 
with a great deal of free choice in their written responses. This was by design, because I wanted 
to make it difficult for students to reject responsibility for their bias expression. Future research, 
however, should examine the role of responsibility construals in their own right, determining 
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whether accepting responsibility is a necessary condition for confrontation to effectively 
suppress prejudice expression. 
Practical Implications  
The present work offers some practical takeaways for people interested in confronting 
prejudice. First, these findings suggest that people’s intuitions about whether a confrontation will 
succeed or backfire, at least in some instances, may be more pessimistic than the reality. 
Forecasters anticipated that being confronted when prejudice acceptability was high would result 
in backfiring effects, but this was not the case for experiencers. Although experiencers who were 
confronted (vs. not) did report greater negative other-directed affect and dismissive/hostile 
behavioral intentions, confrontation also led to greater negative self-directed affect, self-
corrective thoughts and behavioral intentions, and reduced stereotyping. To the extent that 
people use their own forecasted feelings, thoughts, and behavior as a gauge for how they expect 
others to feel, think, and behave (e.g., Ramnani & Miall, 2004), then potential confronters may 
be more fearful of their own confrontations backfiring when prejudice acceptability is high (and, 
therefore, be more hesitant to confront prejudice) than is warranted. My data shows that even in 
these cases, confronting can effectively instigate self-regulation and self-corrective behaviors. 
Second, if offensiveness construals are indeed an important factor in determining whether 
confrontations will succeed or backfire (as the present data suggest), then practitioners may want 
to consider how they can construct confrontations to maximize offensiveness construals. Perhaps 
appeals to the offensiveness of biased behavior can be incorporated into the confrontation 
message itself, explicitly or implicitly. The present research cannot say one way or the other 




Limitations and Future Directions  
All studies have limitations, but such limitations often provide exciting avenues for future 
research. For example, one limitation of the present research involves the extremity (or lack 
thereof) of the confrontation situation. Earlier I asked readers to imagine an extreme prejudice 
confrontation scenario occurring at the epicenter of a Unite the Right rally, where prejudice 
expression toward racial and religious minoritized groups is prevalent. In light of the present 
findings, should we expect confrontation to effectively reduce prejudice expression in the Unite 
the Right setting? Even in my more optimistic moments, I have doubts. My data suggest that 
confrontation effectively reduces prejudice expression, regardless of prejudice acceptability. 
However, there may be extreme normative circumstances beyond the purview of the present 
research that render confrontation ineffective (e.g., at a Unite the Right rally where confrontees 
are surrounded by and prodded on by likeminded others). For these reasons, it will be important 
to conduct similar research in the field where there are extreme normative circumstances that test 
the boundaries of confrontation effectiveness. 
In future work it will also be important to rule out plausible alternative explanations for 
the present findings. For example, another possible explanation for the observed forecaster-
experiencer discrepancies is more methodological than theoretical. In Study 1, forecasters 
imagined being confronted for expressing prejudice toward one of thirty target groups that 
ranged in prejudice acceptability. Blind and elderly people were at the low end of this prejudice 
acceptability continuum and Nazis and child abusers were at the high end. These groups varied 
in terms of their prejudice acceptability among college students, but also in terms of other 
stigma-related dimensions, like their concealability and controllability. To address this issue, I 
used a different set of low and high prejudice acceptability target groups in Study 2—
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specifically, groups that were matched for controllability, concealability, likelihood of contact, 
and entitativity. Then, in Study 3, target group was held constant while descriptive norm 
information was explicitly manipulated, completely removing this potential confound. Although 
changing the focal target groups between Study 1 and Studies 2 and 3 was useful for isolating the 
role of prejudice acceptability, this methodological choice leaves open the possibility that the 
observed forecaster-experiencer discrepancies were stimulus-driven. If the proposed stigma 
dimensions (i.e., controllability, concealability, likelihood of contact, and entitativity) explain the 
findings of Study 1 and not prejudice acceptability, it is possible that the described forecaster-
experiencer discrepancy is merely a methodological artifact. To address this issue, I have begun 
collecting data for two follow-up forecaster studies. In one of these upcoming studies, students 
are exposed to the same imaginary social conflict scenario shown to participants in Study 1, 
except now I am using the same target groups selected for Study 2, which eliminate this 
confound because the groups are matched along stigma-related dimensions (Study 1B).53 In 
another forecaster study, I am employing the same method but holding target group constant 
while explicitly manipulating local norm information, again removing this confound from the 
study design (Study 1C). Additionally, these upcoming studies have a no-confrontation control 
condition, improving upon the design of the original forecaster study. Data collection is ongoing, 
but preliminary findings suggest that, even when target groups are matched on the above-
mentioned stigma-related dimensions, forecasters still expect prejudice acceptability to shape 
their reactions to confrontation in much the same way as I described in Study 1. 
 
53 This new study was designed with statistical power limitations of Study 2 in mind. I plan to employ a 3 
(Confrontation: No Confrontation, ‘You’re Stupid’ Confrontation, ‘You’re Prejudiced’ Confrontation) x 2 
(Prejudice Acceptability: Low, High) mixed design, with prejudice acceptability condition as a within-subjects 
factor, confrontation condition as a between-subjects factor, and participant as a random factor. There will still only 
be 10 target groups, but because the design is partially within-subjects I am able to achieve high power with a 
relatively small sample size. My power analyses (PANGEA v. 0.2) indicate that to detect a small interaction effect, I 
need at least 258 participants (resulting in 2,580 observations).  
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Concluding Remarks  
The results of the present research are quite optimistic for confrontation. These findings 
suggest that, despite forecaster intuitions, confrontation can be an effective prejudice reduction 
tool, even in situations where prejudice expression is widely considered socially acceptable. 
There are of course many possible future directions and lingering questions about the endurance 
of these effects and the normative boundary conditions, but such findings may mean that the 
optimal social conditions for confrontation to remain effective are less rigid than previously 
theorized (Czopp et al., 2006). Ultimately the goal of studying prejudice reduction strategies, like 
interpersonal confrontation, is to apply effective interventions in the real-world. The Credible 
Cues Model for Responding to Prejudice Confrontations extends theorizing in the confrontation 
domain by providing a framework for when we can expect confrontation to result in self-
regulation and when we can expect it to backfire. By using this model, we have identified 
offensiveness perceptions as a key situational construal that prompts self-regulation and 
stereotype suppression. However, the present work only scratches the surface of what is possible 
using this model. My hope is that the present work will encourage other researchers to more 
thoughtfully consider the range of possible reactions to confrontation and to creatively study the 
psychological processes underlying confrontation effectiveness. This may involve additional 
laboratory studies, but it must also involve research in field settings where normative conditions 
meaningfully differ. By doing so, we will increase our understanding of the situational 
complexities involved in the social cognition of confrontation and move closer to applying 
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Figure 1. The Credible Cues Model for Responding to Prejudice Confrontations 
 
















































































Figure 3. Study 1: Manipulation Check 
 











































































































































































































Figure 4. Study 1: Offensiveness 
 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note. Difference scores in stereotype usage across the two time points are depicted on the y-axis. Higher scores 

























































Figure 19B. Study 2: Stereotype Usage (Raw Scores) 
 
 
Note. Raw stereotype usage scores are depicted on the y-axis. Dotted lines represent Time 1 stereotype usage 
counts. Solid lines represent Time 2 stereotype usage counts. Black lines (dotted and solid) represent the High 
Prejudice Acceptability Condition. Gray lines (dotted and solid) represent the Low Prejudice Acceptability 
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Note. Difference scores in emotional tone across the two time points are depicted on the y-axis. Higher scores 


























































Figure 20B. Study 2: Emotional Tone (Raw Scores) 
 
 
Note. Raw emotional tone scores are depicted on the y-axis. Dotted lines represent Time 1 emotional tone. 
Solid lines represent Time 2 stereotype emotional tone. Black lines (dotted and solid) represent the High 
Prejudice Acceptability Condition. Gray lines (dotted and solid) represent the Low Prejudice Acceptability 
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Figure 26A. Study 3: Stereotype Usage (Difference Scores) 
 
 
Note. Difference scores in stereotype usage across the two time points are depicted on the y-axis. Higher scores 























Figure 26B. Study 3: Stereotype Usage (Raw Scores) 
 
 
Note. Raw stereotype usage scores are depicted on the y-axis. Dotted lines represent Time 1 stereotype usage 
counts. Solid lines represent Time 2 stereotype usage counts. Black lines (dotted and solid) represent the High 
Prejudice Acceptability Condition. Gray lines (dotted and solid) represent the Low Prejudice Acceptability 
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Figure 27A. Study 3: Emotional Tone (Difference Scores) 
 
 
Note. Difference scores in emotional tone across the two time points are depicted on the y-axis. Higher scores 
























Figure 27B. Study 3: Emotional Tone (Raw Scores) 
 
 
Note. Raw emotional tone scores are depicted on the y-axis. Dotted lines represent Time 1 emotional tone. 
Solid lines represent Time 2 stereotype emotional tone. Black lines (dotted and solid) represent the High 
Prejudice Acceptability Condition. Gray lines (dotted and solid) represent the Low Prejudice Acceptability 
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Table 1. Aggregated prejudice norm beliefs of Indiana University students 
Target Group N M (SE) Variance 
1. Firemen       613 1.17 (0.017) 0.187 
2. Blind people      4581 1.18 (0.007) 0.203 
3. Deaf people      4591 1.19 (0.007) 0.211 
4. Mentally retarded people     4588 1.21 (0.007) 0.236 
5. People with learning disabilities    4589 1.22 (0.007) 0.235 
6. People who give to charity   4589 1.23 (0.007) 0.236 
7. Babies       613 1.23 (0.019) 0.215 
8. Women in STEM careers     4584 1.23 (0.007) 0.241 
9. Olympians       613 1.23 (0.018) 0.208 
10. Women       2652  1.24 (0.010) 0.243 
11. Female soldiers      4579 1.24 (0.008) 0.258 
12. Native Americans      4586 1.25 (0.007) 0.242 
13. Single fathers      4590 1.25 (0.007) 0.250 
14. People with physical disabilities       614 1.25 (0.021) 0.264 
15. Interracial couples      4583 1.25 (0.007) 0.255 
16. Single mothers      4583 1.25 (0.007) 0.257 
17. Dog owners      4586 1.26 (0.007) 0.257 
18. Business women      4583 1.26 (0.008) 0.258 
19. Family men      4585 1.26 (0.008) 0.259 
20. Elderly people      4581 1.27 (0.008) 0.262 
21. Male nurses      4591 1.27 (0.008) 0.264 
22. Black Americans      4587 1.27 (0.008) 0.279 
23. People with mental illnesses    4586 1.27 (0.008) 0.273 
24. Jews       4578 1.27 (0.008) 0.274 
25. Women who stay home to raise kids 4589 1.28 (0.008) 0.264 
26. Domestic violence victims       3150  1.28 (0.010) 0.328 
27. Scientists       611 1.29 (0.020) 0.244 
28. Doctors       4579 1.29 (0.008) 0.273 
29. Hispanics       4589 1.29 (0.008) 0.290 
30. Young Adults       614 1.30 (0.021) 0.268 
31. Librarians       4581 1.30 (0.008) 0.284 
32. Spelling bee champions     4592 1.30 (0.008) 0.292 
33. Stay at home dads    4589 1.30 (0.008) 0.290 
34. Heterosexual couples      613 1.31 (0.022) 0.301 
35. Asian Americans      4589 1.31 (0.008) 0.307 
36. Canadians       4578 1.31 (0.008) 0.295 
37. Muslim women who wear hijabs   4585 1.31 (0.008) 0.316 
38. Farmers       4586 1.31 (0.008) 0.294 
39. Anxious people       612 1.32 (0.020) 0.256 
40. Gay soldiers      4591 1.32 (0.008) 0.312 
41. Auto mechanics      4582 1.32 (0.008) 0.295 
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Target Group N M (SE) Variance 
42. Manual laborers      4579 1.32 (0.008) 0.305 
43. Gay people who raise children   4583 1.33 (0.008) 0.328 
44. Women who frequently play videogames   4589 1.33 (0.008) 0.295 
45. People living with depression       614 1.33 (0.021) 0.276 
46. Members of a bowling league   4581 1.33 (0.008) 0.299 
47. People who put their kids in daycare 4591 1.33 (0.008) 0.286 
48. Accountants       4577 1.33 (0.008) 0.297 
49. Lesbians       4586 1.34 (0.008) 0.331 
50. Middle aged people       613 1.34 (0.021) 0.282 
51. Gay Men      4585 1.35 (0.009) 0.344 
52. Trash collectors      4586 1.35 (0.008) 0.318 
53. People from big cities    4590 1.35 (0.008) 0.302 
54. Same-sex couples      4024 1.35 (0.009) 0.342 
55. Poor people      4583 1.35 (0.008) 0.328 
56. Bisexual People      4588 1.35 (0.009) 0.332 
57. Students who attend community college   4584 1.36 (0.008) 0.330 
58. Cat owners      4591 1.37 (0.009) 0.336 
59. Muslims       4584 1.37 (0.009) 0.358 
60. Environmentalists       4588 1.37 (0.008) 0.320 
61. Rap music fans     4587 1.37 (0.008) 0.323 
62. People on Medicare     4582 1.38 (0.008) 0.330 
63. Ugly people      4584 1.40 (0.009) 0.377 
64. Whites       4581 1.40 (0.009) 0.371 
65. Catholics       4587 1.40 (0.009) 0.351 
66. Local residents of Bloomington    3972 1.41 (0.010) 0.368 
67. Christians       3261 1.41 (0.010) 0.354 
68. High school cheerleaders     4589 1.41 (0.009) 0.341 
69. Transgender People      4581 1.42 (0.009) 0.397 
70. Men       2655 1.42 (0.012) 0.378 
71. FBI agents      4576 1.43 (0.009) 0.348 
72. Lawyers       4579 1.43 (0.009) 0.343 
73. Syrian refugees      4585 1.44 (0.009) 0.369 
74. People who never went to college  4580 1.44 (0.009) 0.367 
75. Mentally unstable people     4584 1.44 (0.009) 0.355 
76. Entertainers       613 1.44 (0.024) 0.339 
77. People with AIDS     4584 1.45 (0.009) 0.393 
78. Traveling salesmen      4581 1.45 (0.009) 0.361 
79. Beauty contestants      4577 1.47 (0.009) 0.369 
80. Fat people      4583 1.48 (0.009) 0.409 
81. People who are illiterate    4585 1.48 (0.009) 0.389 
82. Welfare recipients      4581 1.49 (0.009) 0.381 
83. Hipsters       4578 1.50 (0.009) 0.385 





Target Group N M (SE) Variance 
85. Women who breastfeed in public   4584 1.50 (0.009) 0.390 
86. People who call the Psychic Hotline  4583 1.51 (0.009) 0.377 
87. People who got a job due to Affirmative Action 4575 1.52 (0.009) 0.387 
88. Women who wear revealing clothing   4586 1.52 (0.009) 0.381 
89. People who drive fancy cars   4584 1.52 (0.009) 0.395 
90. Country music fans     4582 1.52 (0.010) 0.448 
91. Waif fashion models     1320 1.52 (0.017) 0.383 
92. Drag Queens      4586 1.54 (0.010) 0.439 
93. Wealthy people      4584 1.54 (0.009) 0.406 
94. Homeless people      4584 1.54 (0.009) 0.399 
95. Democrats       4588 1.55 (0.009) 0.408 
96. Hare Krishnas      4558 1.55 (0.009) 0.360 
97. White Southerners      4583 1.55 (0.010) 0.428 
98. Black Lives Matter protesters    4584 1.56 (0.010) 0.438 
99. Feminists       4585 1.56 (0.010) 0.442 
100. Members of the Green Party   4571 1.57 (0.009) 0.374 
101. Bernie Sanders supporters     4578 1.58 (0.009) 0.406 
102. Teen moms      4585 1.58 (0.009) 0.405 
103. Iraqi soldiers      4577 1.58 (0.010) 0.428 
104. Political activists      4584 1.58 (0.009) 0.398 
105. Police officers      4580 1.60 (0.010) 0.446 
106. IRS agents      4583 1.63 (0.010) 0.430 
107. People with open sores    4584 1.63 (0.010) 0.425 
108. Jehovah’s Witnesses      4578 1.64 (0.010) 0.457 
109. Scientologists       4577 1.65 (0.010) 0.504 
110. Hillary Clinton supporters     4587 1.66 (0.010) 0.455 
111. Republicans       4578 1.67 (0.010) 0.481 
112. All Lives Matter protesters    4580 1.67 (0.010) 0.497 
113. Liberal media pundits     4570 1.69 (0.010) 0.426 
114. Debt collectors      4582 1.69 (0.010) 0.449 
115. Blue Lives Matter protesters    4585 1.69 (0.010) 0.459 
116. Rednecks       4576 1.70 (0.010) 0.478 
117. Tele-evangelists       4567 1.73 (0.010) 0.444 
118. People who go to the University of Kentucky 4587 1.73 (0.011) 0.583 
119. Members of the National Rifle Association  4588 1.73 (0.010) 0.474 
120. Students who rarely study    4587 1.75 (0.010) 0.425 
121. College teachers with poor English skills  4582 1.78 (0.011) 0.519 
122. Conservative media pundits     4577 1.79 (0.010) 0.466 
123. Hoarders       4587 1.79 (0.010) 0.431 
124. Illegal immigrants      4586 1.81 (0.010) 0.479 
125. People who don’t vote    4585 1.82 (0.010) 0.460 







Target Group N M (SE) Variance 
127. Gamblers       4588 1.85 (0.009) 0.404 
128. People who smoke     4586 1.87 (0.010) 0.455 
129. Contagious people       612 1.88 (0.028) 0.464 
130. People who sell marijuana    4586 1.89 (0.010) 0.434 
131. Lazy people      4588 1.89 (0.010) 0.451 
132. Porn stars      4583 1.89 (0.010) 0.487 
133. People who smell bad    4586 1.90 (0.010) 0.494 
134. People who don’t hold the door for others 4589 1.92 (0.010) 0.433 
135. People who are anti-vaccine    4580 1.94 (0.011) 0.540 
136. Members of the Alt Right   4569 1.95 (0.011) 0.574 
137. Male prostitutes      4589 1.95 (0.011) 0.517 
138. Female prostitutes      4586 1.95 (0.010) 0.504 
139. Ex-convicts       4583 1.98 (0.009) 0.396 
140. Donald Trump supporters     4587 1.98 (0.011) 0.571 
141. People who eat with their mouths open 4587 2.00 (0.011) 0.510 
142. Juvenile delinquents      4583 2.01 (0.009) 0.400 
143. People who go to Purdue University  4584 2.03 (0.012) 0.704 
144. Members of religious cults    4584 2.05 (0.010) 0.492 
145. Alcoholics       4584 2.06 (0.010) 0.450 
146. Drug users      4582 2.07 (0.010) 0.434 
147. Internet trolls      4580 2.11 (0.011) 0.513 
148. Men who go to prostitutes   4589 2.14 (0.010) 0.480 
149. Women who leave their families   4585 2.20 (0.010) 0.492 
150. People who cut in line   4589 2.22 (0.010) 0.451 
151. People who litter     4585 2.22 (0.010) 0.468 
152. People who cheat on exams   4586 2.27 (0.010) 0.433 
153. Homophobes       4590 2.28 (0.011) 0.583 
154. Men who leave their families   4582 2.32 (0.010) 0.490 
155. People who text and drive   4584 2.32 (0.010) 0.453 
156. Gang Members      4586 2.33 (0.010) 0.449 
157. Careless drivers      4587 2.35 (0.010) 0.475 
158. Liars       4588 2.38 (0.010) 0.452 
159. Kids who steal other kids lunch money 4589 2.41 (0.010) 0.450 
160. Men who refuse to pay child support 4586 2.45 (0.010) 0.441 
161. Sexists       4594 2.46 (0.010) 0.480 
162. Negligent parents      4585 2.49 (0.010) 0.469 
163. People who cheat on their spouses  4586 2.55 (0.009) 0.409 
164. Pregnant women who drink alcohol   4583 2.56 (0.009) 0.410 
165. Members of the American Nazi Party  4587 2.62 (0.010) 0.421 
166. Racists       4591 2.63 (0.010) 0.419 
167. Drunk Drivers      4593 2.68 (0.009) 0.356 






Target Group N M (SE) Variance 
169. Members of the Ku Klux Klan  4585 2.70 (0.009) 0.355 
170. Terrorists       4581 2.72 (0.009) 0.353 
171. Child Abusers      4588 2.74 (0.009) 0.335 
172. Child Molesters      4576 2.76 (0.008) 0.317 
173. Rapists       4587 2.76 (0.008) 0.309 
 
Note. A sample of 4,594 Indiana University students were asked to rate how socially acceptable it is to have 
negative feelings toward these target groups (1 = “Definitely not OK,” 2 = “Maybe OK,” 3 = “Definitely OK”). 
These scales were borrowed from previous research on the same topic (Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brien, 2002). 
These data were collected over three semesters (Spring 2017, Fall 2017, and Spring 2018). The target groups 
with lower Ns were either added or removed from the list in the second semester of data collection. Full results 





Table 2. Study 1: Demographic Characteristics (N = 1591 students) 
 
Characteristic N % 
Race   
     White 1119 70.3% 
     Black 89 5.6% 
     Hispanic/Latino 49 3.1% 
     Asian 184 11.6% 
     Other 150 9.4% 
Gender   
     Man 591 37.1% 
     Woman 989 62.2% 
     Other 11 0.7% 
Political Orientation   
     Liberal Leaning 636 40.0% 
     Conservative Leaning 415 26.1% 
     Neither 313 19.7% 
     Choose not to answer / Don’t know 227 14.3% 
Sexuality   
     Heterosexual 1456 91.5% 
     Homosexual 40 2.5% 
     Other (e.g., Bi, Pansexual) 84 5.3% 
     Choose not to answer / Don’t know 11 0.7% 
Disability   
     Physical / Sensory Disability 7 0.5% 
     Mental Illness 147 9.2% 
     Learning Disability 18 1.1% 
     Other Disability 164 10.3% 
     No Disability 1194 75.0% 
     Choose not to answer / Don’t know 61 3.8% 
Religion   
     Atheist/Agnostic 247 15.5% 
     Buddhist 22 1.4% 
     Christian 846 53.2% 
     Hindu 35 2.2% 
     Jewish 113 7.1% 
     Muslim 15 0.9% 
     Other 187 11.8% 
     Choose not to answer / Don’t know 126 7.9% 
Country of Birth   
     United States 1416 89.0% 




Table 3. Study 1: Psychometric Properties of the Major Variables 
 
    Range  
Variable M SD α Potential Actual Skew 
Offensiveness 5.62 2.35 .89 1.0 - 9.0 1.0 - 9.0 -0.22 
Negative Self-Directed Affect 4.48 2.00 .93 1.0 - 7.0 1.0 - 7.0 -0.30 
Negative Other-Directed Affect 2.72 1.54 .87 1.0 - 7.0 1.0 - 7.0  0.73 
Positive Affect 2.25 1.40 .85 1.0 - 7.0 1.0 - 7.0  0.95 
Self-Corrective Thoughts & Actions 4.60 1.48 .92 1.0 - 7.0 1.0 - 7.0 -0.31 
Dismissive/Hostile Thoughts & 
Actions 
2.58 1.26 .85 1.0 - 7.0 1.0 - 7.0  0.60 















ICC R2 p 
      
Measurement Model      
Offensiveness à X1 1.00 ( --- ) 1.84 (0.06) 0.28 0.74 <. 001 
Offensiveness à X2  0.97 (0.03)  1.83 (0.04) 0.24 0.72 <. 001 
Negative Self-Directed affect à X3 1.00 ( --- )  1.82 (0.03) 0.13 0.83 <. 001 
Negative Self-Directed affect à X4  0.94 (0.02)  1.71 (0.03) 0.11 0.75 <. 001 
Negative Self-Directed affect à X5  0.99 (0.02)  1.80 (0.03) 0.14 0.82 <. 001 
Negative Other-Directed affect à X6 1.00 ( --- )  1.35 (0.03) 0.07 0.59 <. 001 
Negative Other -Directed affect à X7  0.99 (0.03)  1.34 (0.05) 0.11 0.71 <. 001 
Negative Other -Directed affect à X8  0.99 (0.03)  1.35 (0.04) 0.07 0.73 <. 001 
Positive affect à X9 1.00 ( --- )  1.36 (0.03) 0.03 0.72 <. 001 
Positive affect à X10  1.03 (0.03)  1.40 (0.04) 0.04 0.79 <. 001 
Positive affect à X11  0.75 (0.04)  1.03 (0.04) 0.03 0.46 <. 001 
Self-Correct à X12 1.00 ( --- )  1.61 (0.04) 0.14 0.74 <. 001 
Self-Correct à X13  0.78 (0.03)  1.26 (0.04) 0.05 0.54 <. 001 
Self-Correct à X14  0.43 (0.03)  0.70 (0.04) 0.02 0.16 <. 001 
Self-Correct à X15  0.95 (0.02)  1.53 (0.03) 0.09 0.65 <. 001 
Self-Correct à X16  0.89 (0.02)  1.44 (0.02) 0.09 0.59 <. 001 
Self-Correct à X17  0.95 (0.03)  1.52 (0.05) 0.11 0.67 <. 001 
Self-Correct à X18  0.94 (0.02)  1.51 (0.03) 0.09 0.68 <. 001 
Self-Correct à X19  0.57 (0.04)  0.92 (0.06) 0.02 0.27 <. 001 
Self-Correct à X20  0.78 (0.03)  1.25 (0.05) 0.11 0.46 <. 001 
Dismiss à X21 1.00 ( --- )  1.10 (0.04) 0.11 0.39 <. 001 
Dismiss à X22  1.06 (0.04)  1.17 (0.04) 0.06 0.53 <. 001 
Dismiss à X23  0.84 (0.07)  0.93 (0.06) 0.02 0.26 <. 001 
Dismiss à X24  1.11 (0.05)  1.22 (0.05) 0.08 0.61 <. 001 
Dismiss à X25  0.99 (0.05)  1.09 (0.04) 0.04 0.58 <. 001 
Dismiss à X26  1.07 (0.05)  1.18 (0.04) 0.07 0.65 <. 001 
      
Note. Maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors, N = 1568, 30 clusters:  χ2 (594) = 2447.04, p 
< .001, Robust CFI = .93, Robust RMSEA = .05, 90% CI [.04, 0.05], SRMR (within covariance matrix) = 0.06, 
SRMR (between covariance matrix) = 0.13; Standard errors in parentheses. ICC indicates the total variance at 
Level 2 for that particular item. 
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Table 7. Study 1: Multilevel Structural Equation Model (ML-SEM) Standardized Factor 
Loadings 
 
Parameter Estimate Standardized p 
   
Structural Model   
   
Direct Paths   
Prejudice Acceptability à Offensiveness -0.74   (0.09) < .001 
Prejudice Acceptability à Negative Self-Directed affect -0.06   (0.05) = .247 
Prejudice Acceptability à Negative Other-Directed affect  0.27   (0.05) < .001 
Prejudice Acceptability à Positive affect  0.14   (0.05) = .005 
Prejudice Acceptability à Self-Correct -0.002 (0.06) = .968 
Prejudice Acceptability à Dismiss -0.06   (0.05) = .196 
Offensiveness à Negative Self-Directed affect  0.64   (0.06) < .001 
Offensiveness à Negative Other-Directed affect -0.16   (0.03) < .001 
Offensiveness à Positive affect -0.09   (0.04) = .017 
Offensiveness à Self-Correct -0.09   (0.04) = .017 
Offensiveness à Dismiss -0.16   (0.03) < .001 
Negative Self-Directed affect    à Self-Correct  1.66   (0.08) < .001 
Negative Self-Directed affect    à Dismiss -0.18 (0.04) < .001 
Negative Other-Directed affect à Self-Correct -0.40   (0.09) < .001 
Negative Other-Directed affect à Dismiss  0.90   (0.07) < .001 
Positive affect à Self-Correct  0.10   (0.09) = .230 
Positive affect à Dismiss  0.67   (0.09) < .001 
   
Indirect Paths   
Prej. Accept. à Offen.à NegSelf -0.47 (0.07) < .001 
Prej. Accept. à Offen.à NegOther  0.12 (0.03) < .001 
Prej. Accept. à Offen.à Positive  0.07 (0.03) = .026 
Prej. Accept. à Offen.à NegSelf    à Self-Correct -0.79 (0.13) < .001 
Prej. Accept. à Offen.à NegSelf   à Dismiss  0.08 (0.02) < .001 
Prej. Accept. à Offen.à NegOtherà Self-Correct -0.05 (0.01) = .001 
Prej. Accept. à Offen.à NegOther à Dismiss  0.11 (0.03) < .001 
Prej. Accept. à Offen.à Positive    à Self-Correct  0.01 (0.01) = .294 
Prej. Accept. à Offen.à Positive    à Dismiss  0.05 (0.02) = .041 
   
Note. Maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors, N = 1568, 30 clusters:  χ2(627) = 2429.81, p < .001; 




Table 8. Study 2: Demographic Characteristics (N = 393 students) 
 
Characteristic N % 
Race   
     White 288 73.3% 
     Black   13   3.3% 
     Hispanic/Latino   11   2.8% 
     Asian   47 11.9% 
     Other   34   8.7% 
Gender   
     Man 108 27.5% 
     Woman 284 72.3% 
     Other     1   0.3% 
Political Orientation   
     Liberal Leaning 179 45.5% 
     Conservative Leaning   75 19.1% 
     Neither   84 21.4% 
     Choose not to answer / Don’t know   55 14.0% 
Sexuality   
     Heterosexual 349 88.8% 
     Homosexual    7   1.8% 
     Other (e.g., Bi, Pansexual)   27   6.9% 
     Choose not to answer / Don’t know   10   2.5% 
Disability   
     Physical / Sensory Disability     5    1.3% 
     Mental Illness   59  15.0% 
     Learning Disability    3    0.8% 
     Other Disability  37   9.4% 
     No Disability 281 71.5% 
     Choose not to answer / Don’t know    8   2.0% 
Religion   
     Atheist/Agnostic   87 22.1% 
     Buddhist    6   1.5% 
     Christian 200 50.8% 
     Hindu   13  3.3% 
     Jewish  27  6.9% 
     Muslim   3  0.8% 
     Other  30  7.6% 
     Choose not to answer / Don’t know  27  6.8% 
Country of Birth   
     United States 362 92.1% 




Table 9. Study 2: Psychometric Properties of the Major Variables 
 
    Range  
Variable M SD α Potential Actual Skew 
Offensiveness 2.05 1.44 .85 1.0 - 7.0 1.0 - 7.0  1.24 
Negative Self-Directed Affect 2.88 1.42 .87 1.0 - 7.0 1.0 - 6.8  0.60 
Negative Other-Directed Affect 1.89 0.91 .79 1.0 - 7.0 1.0 - 5.8  1.29 
Positive Affect 2.90 1.33 .74 1.0 - 7.0 1.0 - 7.0  0.61 
Self-Corrective Thoughts & Actions 3.31 1.04 .78 1.0 - 7.0 1.0 - 7.0  0.35 
Dismissive/Hostile Thoughts & Actions 1.95 0.74 .72 1.0 - 7.0 1.0 - 7.0  1.46 
Stereotype Usage (T2 - T1, Diff. Score) -0.66 2.30 -- -- -8.9 - 8.9 -0.15 
Emotional Tone (T2 - T1, Diff. Score) 2.97 31.55 -- -- -95.2 - 96.1 0.18 
Personal Prejudice 4.12 1.94 .93 1.0 - 9.0 1.0 - 9.0 -0.06 












Table 12. Study 2: Moderated Mediation Model Factor Loadings: Direct Paths 
 
Parameter Estimate Standardized p 
   
Direct Paths   
Prejudice Acceptability à Offensiveness  0.15 (0.06)   .01 
Confrontation                à Offensiveness  0.77 (0.06) < .001 
Interaction Term           à Offensiveness  0.05 (0.06)   .40 
Prejudice Acceptability à Negative Self-Directed affect -0.03 (0.07)   .60 
Confrontation                à Negative Self-Directed affect -0.29 (0.08) < .001 
Interaction Term           à Negative Self-Directed affect -0.07 (0.06)   .27 
Prejudice Acceptability à Negative Other-Directed affect -0.04 (0.04)   .41 
Confrontation                à Negative Other-Directed affect  0.09 (0.05)   .11 
Interaction Term           à Negative Other-Directed affect -0.10 (0.04)   .03 
Prejudice Acceptability à Positive affect -0.04 (0.07)   .53 
Confrontation                à Positive affect -0.01 (0.09)   .93 
Interaction Term           à Positive affect -0.09 (0.07)   .16 
Prejudice Acceptability à Self-Correct -0.01 (0.04)   .75 
Confrontation                à Self-Correct -0.06 (0.05)   .15 
Interaction Term           à Self-Correct -0.01 (0.04)   .88 
Prejudice Acceptability à Dismiss -0.03 (0.03)   .28 
Confrontation                à Dismiss  0.09 (0.03)     .005 
Interaction Term           à Dismiss -0.02 (0.03)   .46 
Offensiveness à Negative Self-Directed affect  0.52 (0.05) < .001 
Offensiveness à Negative Other-Directed affect  0.12 (0.04)    .001 
Offensiveness à Positive affect -0.06 (0.06)  .32 
Offensiveness à Self-Correct  0.36 (0.03) < .001 
Offensiveness à Dismiss -0.03 (0.03)   .29 
Negative Self-Directed affect    à Self-Correct  0.32 (0.03) < .001 
Negative Self-Directed affect    à Dismiss -0.10 (0.02) < .001 
Negative Other-Directed affect à Self-Correct -0.20 (0.05) < .001 
Negative Other-Directed affect à Dismiss  0.55 (0.04) < .001 
Positive affect à Self-Correct  0.11 (0.03) < .001 
Positive affect à Dismiss  0.12 (0.02) < .001 
   




Table 13. Study 2: Moderated Mediation Model Factor Loadings: Indirect Paths 
 
Parameter Estimate Standardized p 
   
Indirect Paths   
Prej. Accept.   à Offen.à NegSelf  0.08 (0.03)   .01 
Prej. Accept.   à Offen.à NegOther  0.02 (0.01)   .04 
Prej. Accept.   à Offen.à Positive -0.01 (0.01)   .34 
Prej. Accept.   à Offen.à NegSelf    à Self-Correct  0.03 (0.01)   .02 
Prej. Accept.   à Offen.à NegSelf    à Dismiss -0.01 (0.004)   .03 
Prej. Accept.   à Offen.à NegOther à Self-Correct -0.004 (0.002)   .08 
Prej. Accept.   à Offen.à NegOther à Dismiss  0.01 (0.005)   .05 
Prej. Accept.   à Offen.à Positive    à Self-Correct -0.001 (0.001)   .35 
Prej. Accept.   à Offen.à Positive    à Dismiss -0.001 (0.001)   .36 
Confrontation à Offen.à NegSelf  0.40 (0.05) < .001 
Confrontation à Offen.à NegOther  0.10 (0.03)    .001 
Confrontation à Offen.à Positive -0.04 (0.04)  .32 
Confrontation à Offen.à NegSelf    à Self-Correct  0.13 (0.02) < .001 
Confrontation à Offen.à NegSelf    à Dismiss -0.04 (0.01) < .001 
Confrontation à Offen.à NegOther à Self-Correct -0.02 (0.01)   .02 
Confrontation à Offen.à NegOther à Dismiss  0.05 (0.02)     .002 
Confrontation à Offen.à Positive    à Self-Correct -0.01 (0.01)   .33 
Confrontation à Offen.à Positive    à Dismiss -0.005 (0.005)   .35 
Interaction      à Offen.à NegSelf  0.03 (0.03)   .40 
Interaction      à Offen.à NegOther  0.01 (0.01)   .42 
Interaction      à Offen.à Positive -0.003 (0.004)   .51 
Interaction      à Offen.à NegSelf    à Self-Correct  0.01 (0.01)   .40 
Interaction      à Offen.à NegSelf    à Dismiss -0.003 (0.003)   .41 
Interaction      à Offen.à NegOther à Self-Correct -0.001 (0.002)   .43 
Interaction      à Offen.à NegOther à Dismiss  0.003 (0.004)   .42 
Interaction      à Offen.à Positive    à Self-Correct < 0.001 (0.001)   .52 
Interaction      à Offen.à Positive    à Dismiss < 0.001 (0.001)   .52 
   




Table 14. Study 3: Demographic Characteristics (N = 318 students) 
 
Characteristic N % 
Race   
     White 218 68.6% 
     Black 18 5.6% 
     Hispanic/Latino 13 4.1% 
     Asian 42 13.2% 
     Other 27 8.5% 
Gender   
     Man 101 31.8% 
     Woman 208 65.4% 
     Other 9 2.8% 
Political Orientation   
     Liberal Leaning 160 50.3% 
     Conservative Leaning 65 20.4% 
     Neither 60 18.9% 
     Choose not to answer / Don’t know 33 10.4% 
Sexuality   
     Heterosexual 270 84.9% 
     Homosexual 11 3.5% 
     Other (e.g., Bi, Pansexual) 31 9.7% 
     Choose not to answer / Don’t know 6 1.9% 
Disability   
     Physical / Sensory Disability 5 1.5% 
     Mental Illness 40 12.6% 
     Learning Disability 4 1.3% 
     Other Disability 42 13.2% 
     No Disability 218 68.6% 
     Choose not to answer / Don’t know 9 2.8% 
Religion   
     Atheist/Agnostic 71 22.3% 
     Buddhist 6 1.9% 
     Christian 165 51.9% 
     Hindu 2 0.6% 
     Jewish 14 4.4% 
     Muslim 7 2.2% 
     Other 36 11.3% 
     Choose not to answer / Don’t know 17 5.3% 
Country of Birth   
     United States 277 87.1% 




Table 15. Study 3: Psychometric Properties of the Major Variables 
 
    Range  
Variable M SD α Potential Actual Skew 
Offensiveness 2.03 1.50 .87 1.0 - 7.0 1.0 - 7.0 1.35 
Negative Self-Directed Affect 2.83 1.41 .84 1.0 - 7.0 1.0 - 7.0 0.71 
Negative Other-Directed Affect 1.91 1.05 .83 1.0 - 7.0 1.0 - 7.0 1.37 
Positive Affect 3.29 1.39 .75 1.0 - 7.0 1.0 - 7.0 0.22 
Self-Corrective Thoughts & 
Actions 
3.23 1.05 .79 1.0 - 7.0 1.0 - 7.0 0.56 
Dismissive/Hostile Thoughts & 
Actions 
2.31 0.75 .73 1.0 - 7.0 1.0 - 7.0 0.98 
Stereotype Usage (T2 - T1, Diff. 
Score) 
-0.57 2.02 -- -- -10.3 - 6.6 -0.02 
Emotional Tone (T2 - T1, Diff. 
Score) 
2.70 29.23 -- -- -96.1 - 95.0 0.10 
Personal Prejudice 5.84 1.15 .82 1.0 - 9.0 1.0 - 9.0 -0.31 







Table 17. Study 3: Moderated Mediation Model Factor Loadings: Direct Paths  
 
Parameter Estimate Standardized p 
   
Direct Paths   
Prejudice Acceptability à Offensiveness  -0.03 (0.07)  .72   
Confrontation                à Offensiveness   0.79 (0.07) < .001   
Interaction Term           à Offensiveness   0.03 (0.07)   .66   
Prejudice Acceptability à Negative Self-Directed affect  0.01 (0.07)   .88 
Confrontation                à Negative Self-Directed affect -0.33 (0.08) < .001   
Interaction Term           à Negative Self-Directed affect  0.03 (0.07)   .64 
Prejudice Acceptability à Negative Other-Directed affect -0.13 (0.06)   .03   
Confrontation                à Negative Other-Directed affect -0.07 (0.07)   .33   
Interaction Term           à Negative Other-Directed affect   0.06 (0.06)   .35   
Prejudice Acceptability à Positive affect   0.01 (0.08)    .95  
Confrontation                à Positive affect  -0.04 (0.09)   .65   
Interaction Term           à Positive affect   0.12 (0.08)   .13 
Prejudice Acceptability à Self-Correct  -0.01 (0.04)   .84   
Confrontation                à Self-Correct  -0.07 (0.05)   .14   
Interaction Term           à Self-Correct -0.03 (0.04)   .44   
Prejudice Acceptability à Dismiss  0.01 (0.03)   .70 
Confrontation                à Dismiss  0.11 (0.04)   .01   
Interaction Term           à Dismiss  0.05 (0.03)   .15 
Offensiveness à Negative Self-Directed affect  0.50 (0.06)  < .001   
Offensiveness à Negative Other-Directed affect 0.06 (0.04)   .15   
Offensiveness à Positive affect -0.01 (0.06)   .89   
Offensiveness à Self-Correct  0.30 (0.04) < .001       
Offensiveness à Dismiss  0.02 (0.03)   .62   
Negative Self-Directed affect    à Self-Correct  0.37 (0.04) < .001   
Negative Self-Directed affect    à Dismiss -0.11 (0.03)    .001 
Negative Other-Directed affect à Self-Correct -0.22 (0.05) < .001       
Negative Other-Directed affect à Dismiss  0.47 (0.04) < .001       
Positive affect à Self-Correct  0.11 (0.03) < .001       
Positive affect à Dismiss  0.09 (0.02) < .001       
   




Table 18. Study 3: Moderated Mediation Model Factor Loadings: Indirect Paths 
 
Parameter Estimate Standardized p 
   
Indirect Paths   
Prej. Accept.   à Offen.à NegSelf  -0.01 (0.03)   .72   
Prej. Accept.   à Offen.à NegOther  -0.002 (0.01)   .74   
Prej. Accept.   à Offen.à Positive < 0.001 (0.004)   .90 
Prej. Accept.   à Offen.à NegSelf    à Self-Correct  -0.004 (0.01)   .72   
Prej. Accept.   à Offen.à NegSelf    à Dismiss   0.001 (0.004)   .73   
Prej. Accept.   à Offen.à NegOther à Self-Correct < 0.001 (0.001)   .74   
Prej. Accept.   à Offen.à NegOther à Dismiss  -0.001 (0.002)   .74   
Prej. Accept.   à Offen.à Positive    à Self-Correct < 0.001 (0.001)   .90 
Prej. Accept.   à Offen.à Positive    à Dismiss < 0.001 (0.001)   .90 
Confrontation à Offen.à NegSelf   0.39 (0.06) < .001         
Confrontation à Offen.à NegOther   0.05 (0.03)   .15   
Confrontation à Offen.à Positive  -0.01 (0.05)   .89   
Confrontation à Offen.à NegSelf    à Self-Correct   0.14 (0.03) < .001         
Confrontation à Offen.à NegSelf    à Dismiss  -0.04 (0.01)    .001   
Confrontation à Offen.à NegOther à Self-Correct  -0.01 (0.01)  .19   
Confrontation à Offen.à NegOther à Dismiss   0.02 (0.01)  .15   
Confrontation à Offen.à Positive    à Self-Correct  -0.001 (0.01)  .89   
Confrontation à Offen.à Positive    à Dismiss  -0.001 (0.01)  .89   
Interaction      à Offen.à NegSelf   0.02 (0.03)  .66   
Interaction      à Offen.à NegOther   0.002 (0.004)  .66   
Interaction      à Offen.à Positive < 0.001 (0.002) .90   
Interaction      à Offen.à NegSelf    à Self-Correct   0.01 (0.01) .66   
Interaction      à Offen.à NegSelf    à Dismiss  -0.002 (0.004) .66   
Interaction      à Offen.à NegOther à Self-Correct < 0.001 (0.001) .66   
Interaction      à Offen.à NegOther à Dismiss   0.001 (0.002) .66   
Interaction      à Offen.à Positive    à Self-Correct  < 0.001 (0.001) .90   
Interaction      à Offen.à Positive    à Dismiss  < 0.001 (0.001) .90 
   









Appendix 1: Social Norm Beliefs Pilot Study Measures 
To what extent do you think that it is socially acceptable for IU students to have negative 
feelings toward the following groups? 
 *We are NOT asking about your personal feelings toward these groups. We are asking you to 
describe what is socially acceptable on campus. 
Most IU students think it 
is definitely not OK to 
have negative feelings 
about this group. 
Most IU students think it 
is maybe OK to have 
negative feelings about 
this group. 
Most IU students think it 
is definitely OK to have 
negative feelings about 
this group. 
1 2 3 
 
 
1. Firemen       
2. Blind people      
3. Deaf people      
4. Mentally retarded people     
5. People with learning disabilities    
6. People who give to charity   
7. Babies       
8. Women in STEM careers     
9. Olympians       
10. Women       
11. Female soldiers      
12. Native Americans      
13. Single fathers      
14. People with physical disabilities       
15. Interracial couples      
16. Single mothers      
17. Dog owners      
18. Business women      
19. Family men      
20. Elderly people      
21. Male nurses      
22. Black Americans      
23. People with mental illnesses    
24. Jews       
25. Women who stay home to raise kids 
26. Domestic violence victims       
27. Scientists       
28. Doctors       
29. Hispanics       
30. Young Adults       
31. Librarians       
32. Spelling bee champions     
33. Stay at home dads    
34. Heterosexual couples      
35. Asian Americans      
36. Canadians       
37. Muslim women who wear hijabs   
38. Farmers       
39. Anxious people       
40. Gay soldiers      
41. Auto mechanics      
42. Manual laborers 
43. Gay people who raise children   
44. Women who frequently play 
videogames   
45. People living with depression       
46. Members of a bowling league   
47. People who put their kids in daycare 
48. Accountants       
49. Lesbians       
50. Middle aged people       
51. Gay Men      
52. Trash collectors      
53. People from big cities    
54. Same-sex couples      
55. Poor people      
56. Bisexual People      
57. Students who attend community college   
58. Cat owners      
59. Muslims       
60. Environmentalists       
61. Rap music fans     
62. People on Medicare     
63. Ugly people      
64. Whites       
65. Catholics       
66. Local residents of Bloomington    
67. Christians       
68. High school cheerleaders     
69. Transgender People      
70. Men       
71. FBI agents      
72. Lawyers       
73. Syrian refugees      
74. People who never went to college  
75. Mentally unstable people     
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76. Entertainers       
77. People with AIDS     
78. Traveling salesmen      
79. Beauty contestants      
80. Fat people      
81. People who are illiterate    
82. Welfare recipients      
83. Hipsters       
84. People accepted into MENSA 
85. Women who breastfeed in public   
86. People who call the Psychic Hotline  
87. People who got a job due to Affirmative 
Action 
88. Women who wear revealing clothing   
89. People who drive fancy cars   
90. Country music fans     
91. Waif fashion models     
92. Drag Queens      
93. Wealthy people      
94. Homeless people      
95. Democrats       
96. Hare Krishnas      
97. White Southerners      
98. Black Lives Matter protesters    
99. Feminists       
100. Members of the Green Party   
101. Bernie Sanders supporters     
102. Teen moms      
103. Iraqi soldiers      
104. Political activists      
105. Police officers      
106. IRS agents      
107. People with open sores    
108. Jehovah’s Witnesses      
109. Scientologists       
110. Hillary Clinton supporters     
111. Republicans       
112. All Lives Matter protesters    
113. Liberal media pundits     
114. Debt collectors      
115. Blue Lives Matter protesters    
116. Rednecks       
117. Tele-evangelists       
118. People who go to the University of 
Kentucky 
119. Members of the National Rifle 
Association  
120. Students who rarely study    
121. College teachers with poor English 
skills  
122. Conservative media pundits     
123. Hoarders       
124. Illegal immigrants      
125. People who don’t vote    
126. Politicians 
127. Gamblers       
128. People who smoke     
129. Contagious people       
130. People who sell marijuana    
131. Lazy people      
132. Porn stars      
133. People who smell bad    
134. People who don’t hold the door for 
others 
135. People who are anti-vaccine    
136. Members of the Alt Right   
137. Male prostitutes      
138. Female prostitutes      
139. Ex-convicts       
140. Donald Trump supporters     
141. People who eat with their mouths open 
142. Juvenile delinquents      
143. People who go to Purdue University  
144. Members of religious cults    
145. Alcoholics       
146. Drug users      
147. Internet trolls      
148. Men who go to prostitutes   
149. Women who leave their families   
150. People who cut in line   
151. People who litter     
152. People who cheat on exams   
153. Homophobes       
154. Men who leave their families   
155. People who text and drive   
156. Gang Members      
157. Careless drivers      
158. Liars       
159. Kids who steal other kids lunch money 
160. Men who refuse to pay child support 
161. Sexists       
162. Negligent parents      
163. People who cheat on their spouses  
164. Pregnant women who drink alcohol   
165. Members of the American Nazi Party  
166. Racists       
167. Drunk Drivers      
168. Wife Beaters 
169. Members of the Ku Klux Klan  
170. Terrorists       
171. Child Abusers      




Appendix 2: Study Measures 
Study 1 Measures 
 
Imagine you are talking with a few acquaintances after class. During the conversation, you make 
a joke that implies something negative about [target group]. An acquaintance of yours 




How would you feel in this social situation? 
 
Does not 
apply at all 
     Applies 
very much 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
____ 1. Disappointed with myself 
____ 2. Embarrassed 
____ 3. Guilty 
____ 4. Tense 
____ 5. Threatened 
____ 6. Uncomfortable 
____ 7.  Annoyed with the other person 
____ 8.  Disgusted with the other person 





Note. The following composites will be made by averaging items together: Negative self-
directed affect (items 1-3), Negative other-directed affect (items 7-9), Discomfort (items 4-6), 
and Positivity (items 10-12). 
 
[Thoughts & Behaviors] 
 
What would you think in this social situation? 
 
 
Not at all 
      
Very much 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
____ 1.  I would think I was wrong 
____ 2.  I would think about what I had said and why 
____ 3.  I would think about the other person’s reaction without getting upset 
____ 4.  I would think I really didn’t mean anything by what I said 54 
____ 5.  I would think there’s nothing wrong with what I said 
____ 6.  I would think this person is being a jerk 
____ 7.  I would think about how my statements violated my personal values 
____ 8.  I would think about how my statements violated the social values of my community 
 
 
54 A priori, this item was meant to be an indicator for the dismissiveness/hostility outcome; however, in internal 
consistency reliability analyses and confirmatory factor analyses, this item did not load well with the others. As a 
result, it was removed from the overall scale. 
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What would you do in this social situation? 
 
 
Not at all 
      
Very much 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
____ 1.  I would apologize 
____ 2.  I would try to avoid such behavior in the future 
____ 3.  I would talk it over with the person and try to work it out 
____ 4.  I would tell the person they’re right and drop the subject 
____ 5.  I would tell the person to lighten up because it was just a joke 
____ 6.  I would tell the other person that my position is right 
____ 7.  I would tell the person they’re being stupid 
____ 8.  I would the other person that they’re actually the biased one, not me 
 
Note. The following composites will be made by averaging items together: Self-correction/Self-
reflection (“Think” items 1-3, 7-8 and “Do” items 1-4); Hostility/Dismissiveness (“Think” items 
4-6 and “Do” items 5-8) 
 
In the space below, feel free to say anything else you would like about how you would feel, 







Please answer the next set of questions about the following group of people: [Target Group] 
 
 
How offensive is it to make negative comments disparaging people from this group? 
 




       
Very 
offensive 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
 
How harmful is it to make negative comments disparaging people from this group? 
 




       
Very 
harmful 





Please answer the next set of questions about the following group of people: [Target Group] 
 
 





       
Positive 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
 





       
Good 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
 





       
Favorable 







Please answer the next set of questions about the following group of people: [Target Group] 
 
Earlier, you were asked to imagine making a joke implying something negative about this 
group. 
 
How likely would you be to make a joke implying something negative about people from this 
group in real life? 
 




       
Very 
likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
[Prejudice Norm Beliefs: Descriptive Norm] 
 
Please answer the next set of questions about the following group of people: [Target Group] 
 
 
Is prejudice against this group a pervasive problem at Indiana University? 
 











1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
[Prejudice Norm Beliefs: Injunctive Norm] 
 
 
To what extent do you think that it is socially acceptable for IU students to have negative 
feelings toward the following groups? 
 
Most IU students think it is 
definitely not OK to have 
negative feelings about this 
group. 
Most IU students think it is 
maybe OK to have negative 
feelings about this group. 
Most IU students think it is 
definitely OK to have 
negative feelings about this 
group. 





Study 2 & Study 3 Measures 
[Creative Writing Task 1: “Day in the Life” Stories] 
The timer has already started! Work quickly. You have 6 minutes total: 
• 1 minute to read the instructions 
• 5 minutes to write your story in the text box.  
  
Reminder: Key Instructions 
• Write a story describing an ordinary day in this person's life.  
• Write your story in the third person, as a third party observer or an omniscient narrator. 
• Focus primarily on the one person in the profile. Do NOT write a dialogue between 
more than one person.  
• Use ALL of the profile information in your story. 
 
Below is your "Person Profile."  You'll notice that the profile is pretty minimal--that's 














Write your "day in the life" story in the text box below. 
 
Do you have writer's block? Try answering these questions: What sorts of things does this 
person like or dislike doing? What is this person’s biggest character flaw? How much money or 





[Creative Writing Task 2: “A Bit of Poetry”] 
For this writing task, we would like you to write a two to four line poem about the positive and 
negative aspects of being an Indiana University student.  
You may use any style of poetry. Your poem can rhyme or not. It’s completely up to you. 
Afterward, your story will be sent to your partner. He or she will read it and send you feedback. 
[Countdown Clock] 
 
Write your poem in the text box below. 
[For Studies 2 & 3, it is at this point the participant is confronted by confederate] 
 
Before moving on to Creative Writing Task #3, we would like to ask you a few multiple choice 




How do you feel right now? 
 
Does not 
apply at all 
     Applies 
very much 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
____ 1. Disappointed with myself 
____ 2. Embarrassed 
____ 3. Guilty 
____ 4. Tense 
____ 5. Threatened 
____ 6. Uncomfortable 
____ 7.  Annoyed with the other person 
____ 8.  Disgusted with the other person 
____ 9.  Angry with the other person 
____10. Amused 
____11. Entertained 










Note. The following composites will be made by averaging items together: Negative self-
directed affect (items 1-3 & 16-17), Negative other-directed affect (items 7-9 & 18-19), 






[Thoughts & Behaviors] 
 
To what extent are you thinking the following thoughts right now? 
 
 
Not at all 
      
Very much 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
____ 1.   I am thinking I was wrong to write some of the things that I wrote. 
____ 2.   I am thinking a lot about what I chose to write and why. 
____ 3.   I am thinking a lot about my task partner's evaluation of my writing. 
____ 4.   I am thinking that I didn’t really mean anything by what I wrote earlier. 
____ 5.   I am thinking there’s nothing wrong with what I wrote. 
____ 6.   I am thinking that my task partner is being a jerk. 
____ 7.   I am thinking some of the things I wrote violated my personal values. 
____ 8.   I am thinking some of the things I wrote violated social values of my community. 
____ 9.   I am thinking about how my task partner is doing a good job evaluating my writing. 
____ 10. I am thinking that my task partner is confused and doesn't really know what he/she is 
doing. 
____ 11. I am thinking about how I stand behind what I've written so far. 
 
To what extent do you want to do the following actions right now? 
 
 
Not at all 
      
Very much 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
____ 1.   I want to apologize to my task partner. 
____ 2.   I want to avoid writing things like what I wrote in the future. 
____ 3.   I want to talk things over with my task partner. 
____ 4.   I want to tell my task partner that their evaluation of my work is accurate. 
____ 5.   I want to tell my task partner to lighten up. 
____ 6.   I want to tell my task partner that their evaluation of my work is flawed or inaccurate. 
____ 7.   I want to tell my task partner that they’re being stupid. 
____ 8.   I want to thank my task partner. 
____ 9.   I want to give my task partner harsh feedback. 
____ 10. I am thinking that my writing was offensive. 
____ 11. I am thinking that my writing was harmful to others. 
 
Note. The following composites will be made by averaging items together: Self-correction/Self-
reflection (“Think” items 1-3, 7-9 and “Do” items 1-4, 8); Hostility/Dismissiveness (“Think” 





In the space below, feel free to say anything else you would like about how you are feeling, what 
you are thinking, or what you want to do. 
 
 
[Creative Writing Task 3: “Another Day in the Life”] 
 
For this writing task, you will get a chance to rewrite your day-in-the-life story from earlier. 
 
For your convenience, we will reprint your original story. You can erase it and start from scratch 
or you can edit and add to it directly in the text box. 
 
Whether or not you choose to incorporate your partner’s feedback is completely up to you. 
  
Afterward, your story will be sent to your partner. He or she will read it and send you feedback. 
 




Give your character a name. What is this person's name? 
 
 [Participant’s original character name] 
 
 
List some of your character’s defining traits. What is this person’s personality like? 
 
[Participant’s original character traits] 
 
 
Revise your original "day in the life" story in the text box below. 
 
[Participant’s original essay] 
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Thank you for participating in all three creative writing tasks! 
Before we share your partner's evaluations of Creative Writing Task #2 and Creative Writing 
Task #3, we have a short survey for you to complete. 
To begin the survey, click the "Next" button. 
 
[Filler items to bolster cover story] 
 
Not at all 
      
Very much 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
____ 1. I enjoy creative writing. 
____ 2. I think I am good at creative writing tasks. 
____ 3. I care deeply about creative writing. 
____ 4. I think I am better at writing stories than writing poems. 
____ 5. Writing poetry just comes naturally to me. 
____ 6. It is difficult for me to do creative writing tasks well. 





[Impressions of Partner] 
Please indicate your impression of your task partner is/has.... 
 
Not at all 
      
Very much 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
____ 1.   hypersensitive 
____ 2.   irritating 
____ 3.   complainer 
____ 4.   troublemaker 
____ 5.   emotional 
____ 6.   argumentative 
____ 7.   likable 
____ 8.   friendly 
____ 9.   honest 
____ 10. easy to get along with 
____ 11. intelligent 
____ 12. independent 
____ 13. responsible 
____ 14. optimistic 
____ 15. respectable 
____ 16. considerate 
____ 17. nice to converse with 
____ 18. made a good impression 
____ 19. would be a good friend 
____ 20. would be a good coworker 
____ 21. a good personality 
____ 22. a strong work ethic 
 
Note. The following composites will be made by averaging items together: Complainer (items 1-
6); Favorability (items 7-22) 
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For the second Creative Writing Task, "A Bit of Poetry," we asked you to write a poem about 
your favorite things about being an Indiana University student. 
Below, we have a few follow up questions about your attitudes toward Indiana University. 
[Filler items to bolster cover story] 











1 2 3 4 5 
 


















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
____ 1.   Overall, my identity as an IU student has very little to do with how I feel about myself. 
____ 2.   In general, my identity as an IU student is an important part of my self-image. 
____ 3.   Being an IU student is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am. 
____ 4.   Being an IU student is an important reflection of who I am.     
 
For the first and third Creative Writing Tasks, "Day in the Life," we asked you to write a short 
story based on a person profile that was randomly assigned to you. 
The person you wrote about was [Target Group]. 





[Prejudice Norm Beliefs] 
Please answer the next set of questions about the following group of people: [Target Group] 
Injunctive 
 
How socially acceptable is it for people in your community to feel negatively toward people 
from this social group? 
 













How common is it for people in your community to feel negatively toward people from this 
social group? 
 




       
Very 
common 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
[Personal Prejudice] 
Please answer the next set of questions about the following group of people: [Target Group] 
 
 





       
Positive 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
 





       
Good 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
 





       
Favorable 









Please answer the next set of questions about the following group of people: [Target Group] 
 
The following items concern your beliefs about people from this social group. 
 
We would like you to respond to the following items based on the beliefs that you hold, 
regardless of whether the way you actually act is always consistent with those beliefs. 
 


















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
____ 1.   I believe that I should not think of people from this social group in stereotypical ways. 
____ 2.   I should not feel uncomfortable in the company of people from this social group. 
____ 3.   I do not believe that my neighborhood should be open to people from this social group. 
____ 4.   I believe that I should never avoid interacting with someone just because he/she is a 
member of this social group. 
____ 5.   I think that people from this social group should have as equal an opportunity as anyone 
else to be hired by an employer. 
____ 6.   I should not feel uncomfortable shaking the hand of a person from this social group. 
____ 7.   I believe that laughing at jokes that play on the stereotypes of people from this social 
group is wrong. 








Please answer the next set of questions about the following group of people: [Target Group] 
 
Sometimes the way we actually respond in a situation is consistent with our beliefs, and other 
times we find ourselves acting in a way that is inconsistent with our beliefs. 
 
For each item below, we are interested in your initial, gut-level reactions, which may or may 
not be consistent with how you believe you should react. 
 


















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
____ 1.   I sometimes have stereotypical thoughts about people from this social group. 
____ 2.   I would feel uncomfortable if I were in a place with lots of people from this social 
group. 
____ 3.   I would not be troubled if people from this social group moved into my neighborhood. 
____ 4.   On occasion, I have avoided interactions with people because they were members of 
this social group. 
____ 5.   If I were an employer, I would initially hesitate to hire someone who was a member of 
this social group. 
____ 6.   I would feel uncomfortable shaking the hand of a person from this social group. 
____ 7.   I sometimes laugh at jokes that play on the stereotypes of people from this social group. 








Please answer the next set of questions about the following group of people: [Target Group] 
 
The following questions concern various reasons or motivations people might have for 
responding in various ways towards people from the above listed social group.  
  
Some of the reasons reflect internal – personal motivations whereas others reflect more 
external – social motivations. Of course, people may be motivated for both internal and 
external reasons; we want to emphasize that neither type of motivations is by definition better 
than the other. 
  
Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements 


















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
____ 1.   Because of today's PC (politically correct) standards I try to appear nonprejudiced 
towards people from this social group 
____ 2.   I attempt to act in nonprejudiced ways toward people from this social group because it 
is personally important to me. 
____ 3.   According to my personal values, using stereotypes about people from this social group 
is OK. 
____ 4.   I try to hide any negative thoughts about people from this social group in order to avoid 
negative reactions from others. 
____ 5.   I am personally motivated by my beliefs to be nonprejudiced toward people from this 
social group. 
____ 6.   If I acted prejudiced toward people from this social group, I would be concerned that 
others would be angry with me. 
____ 7.   Because of my personal values, I believe that using stereotypes about people from this 
social group is wrong. 
____ 8.   I attempt to appear nonprejudiced toward people from this social group in order to 
avoid disapproval from others. 
____ 9.   Being nonprejudiced toward people from this social group is important to my self 
concept. 







[Political Correctness Beliefs] 
 
Please answer the following questions. 
 
 














1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
____ 1.   Do you ever feel as if you have to make an effort to act politically correct? 
____ 2.   Do you feel that there are times when you have to refrain from expressing your opinion 
because it’s not socially acceptable? 
____ 3.   The politically correct (PC) standards in the U.S. bother me because I have to be careful 





Appendix 3: Stigma-Related Dimensions Pilot Study Materials 
 
 
On the following pages, you will be asked a series of questions about different groups of people.  
  
Please read carefully and respond to each question to the best of your ability. Before beginning 
the survey, we ask that you read through the Study Information Sheet. 
  
Thank you for participating today! 
 
[All participants completed the prejudice norm beliefs questions and then were randomly 
assigned to rate each target group along two of the remaining scales: threat, warmth, 
competence, controllability, concealability, likelihood of contact, and entitativity.] 
 
-- 
[Prejudice Norm Beliefs] 
 
We are interested in how you think most Indiana University students feel about the following 
groups. 
  
Below, we have listed different types of people IU students could encounter. To what extent do 
you think most other IU students (not you personally) think it is okay to feel negatively about 
these groups? 
 
Most IU students 
think it is 




... probably OK 
to have negative 
feelings... 




OK to have 
negative 
feelings… 
Most IU students 
think it is 
definitely not 
OK to have 
negative feelings 
about this group. 
5 4 3 2 1 
 








We are interested in what you think most Indiana University students believe about the 
following groups. 
  
Below, we have listed different types of people IU students could encounter.  
  
As viewed by most other IU students (not you personally), to what extent are individuals in 
these groups threatening or dangerous? 
 
Individuals in 














this group are 
not at all 
threatening or 
dangerous. 
5 4 3 2 1 
 





We are interested in what you think most Indiana University students believe about the 
following groups. 
  
Below, we have listed different types of people IU students could encounter.  
  
As viewed by most other IU students (not you personally), to what extent are individuals in 
these groups friendly, trustworthy, or good-natured? 
 
Individuals in 

















this group are 




5 4 3 2 1 
 







We are interested in what you think most Indiana University students believe about the 
following groups. 
  
Below, we have listed different types of people IU students could encounter.  
  
As viewed by most other IU students (not you personally), to what extent are individuals in 
these groups competent, capable, or intelligent? 
  
Individuals in 


















this group are 




5 4 3 2 1 
 





We are interested in what you think most Indiana University students believe about the 
following groups. 
  
Below, we have listed different types of people IU students could encounter.  
  
As viewed by most other IU students (not you personally), to what extent do individuals in 
these groups have control over whether they belong to the group? 
 
Individuals in this 
group have 
complete control 
over whether they 
belong to this 
group 
...quite a lot of 
control... 











5 4 3 2 1 
 








We are interested in what you think most Indiana University students believe about the 
following groups. 
  
Below, we have listed different types of people IU students could encounter.  
  
To what extent do people know whether an individual belongs to each of these groups just by 
looking at them? 
 
People  always 
know whether an 
individual 
belongs to this 
group just by 
looking at the 
person. 
People  usually 
know...just by 





looking at the 
person. 
People  rarely 
know...just by 











1 2 3 4 5 
 
[This scale is used to rate each of the over 170 target groups] 
 
-- 
[Likelihood of Contact] 
 
We are interested in what you think most Indiana University students believe about the 
following groups. 
 
Below, we have listed different types of people IU students could encounter. How likely is the 





that an IU student 
will encounter an 
individual from this 
group in daily life. 
...very likely... ...somewhat likely... ...a little 
likely... 
It is 
not at all 
likely 







5 4 3 2 1 
 







In this study, we are interested in your perceptions of various groups. 
 
One thing that all groups have in common is that each one is a collection of people. 
However, not all collections of people are considered to be a "group." 
 
For example, most people would consider the members of a planning committee to be a group 
but would not consider a bunch of people who happen to be on an elevator together to be a 
group. 
 
Next, we'll ask you to provide your opinion about the extent to which the following 
collections of people are considered "groups." 
 
This collection of 
people is very much a 
"group." 
 This collection of 




people is not 
at all a 
"group." 
5 4 3 2 1 
 





Appendix 4: Stereotypes Pilot Study Materials 
Before getting started with the Stereotype Knowledge task, it is necessary to review some 
important definitions.  
On the following pages, we will share the definitions of stereotypes and social groups as 
defined by the researchers. 
-- 
Important Definitions 
Social Groups are categories that describe people on the basis of traits, attributes, or actions. 
Each of us belongs to many different social groups. Some of our social group memberships are 
based on our stage in life (e.g., child, adult, elder) or our gender or race. Other group 
memberships are based on our beliefs or actions (e.g., political affiliations, religious 
identification). Still others are based on our abilities or traits (e.g., brainiacs, extroverts). 
Some examples of social groups:  
• Women [based on gender identification] 
• Christians [based on religious identification] 
• Conservatives [based on political identification] 
• Deaf people [based on sensory ability] 
• Performers [based on action/activity] 
 The list goes on and on. 
-- 
Important Definitions 
Not every social group is evaluated equally by others. Some social groups are more often viewed 
positively and others are more often viewed negatively. 
Stereotypes are widely shared beliefs about a particular social group. 
Some examples of stereotypes:  
• Women are kind and caring [stereotype based on gender identification] 
• Christians are forgiving [stereotype based on religious identification] 
• Conservatives are mostly old people [stereotype based on political identification] 
• Deaf people are good at lip reading  [stereotype based on sensory ability] 
• Performers are extroverted [stereotype based on action/activity] 




By growing up in the U.S., we are aware of many positive and negative stereotypes about a wide 
variety of social groups. 
However, just because we are aware of a particular stereotype does not necessarily mean that we 
believe it is true. There is a difference between stereotype awareness (i.e., knowing that a 
particular stereotype exists) and stereotype endorsement (i.e., believing that a particular 
stereotype is true). 
Today, the researchers are interested in your awareness of stereotypes--regardless of whether or 





Today, you will work on Stereotype Knowledge task. 
The researchers are trying to compile lists of the most common stereotypes for different social 
groups. 
 
Your task will be to generate as many stereotypes about a social group as you can think of in 
3 minutes. You will do this 3 separate times, for 3 different social groups. 
 
Remember, you do not need to personally agree that these stereotypes are true to list them. We 





You have exactly 3 minutes to list as many stereotypes as you can about [Target Group]. 
Please list as many stereotypes (positive or negative) as you can in the text boxes below: 
 
Stereotype   1  
Stereotype   2  
Stereotype   3  
Stereotype   4  
Stereotype   5  
Stereotype   6  
Stereotype   7  
Stereotype   8  
Stereotype   9  
Stereotype 10  
Stereotype 11  
Stereotype 12  
Stereotype 13  
Stereotype 14  
Stereotype 15  
Stereotype 16  
Stereotype 17  
Stereotype 18  
Stereotype 19  
Stereotype 20  
 
[This is done 3 separate times for 3 different target groups] 
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Appendix 5: Creative Writing Pilot Study Materials 
Creative Writing Task: 
"A Day in the Life" 
 
 For this writing task, we would like you to write a day-in-the-life story about another person.  
  
We have a database of possible person profiles. The computer program will show you one of 
these person profiles at random.  
  




Creative Writing Task:  
"A Day in the Life" 
  
Key Instructions: 
• Write a story describing an ordinary day in this person's life. 
• Write your story in the third person, as a third party observer or an omniscient narrator. 
• Focus primarily on the one person in the profile. Do NOT write a dialogue between 
more than one person.  
• Use ALL of the profile information in your story. 
 
-- 
Creative Writing Task: 
"A Day in the Life" 
  
You will have exactly 6 minutes on the next page. We recommend spending your time in the 
following way: 
• Spend 1 minute reading the person profile 
• Spend 5 minutes writing your day-in-the-life story.  
  






Creative Writing Task #1: 
"A Day in the Life" 
 
The timer has already started! Work quickly. You have 6 minutes total: 
• 1 minute to read the instructions 
• 5 minutes to write your story in the text box.  
 
Reminder: Key Instructions 
• Write a story describing an ordinary day in this person's life. 
• Write your story in the third person, as a third party observer or an omniscient narrator. 
• Focus primarily on the one person in the profile. Do NOT write a dialogue between 
more than one person.  
• Use ALL of the profile information in your story. 
 
Below is your "Person Profile."  You'll notice that the profile is pretty minimal--that's 






Give your character a name. What is this person's name? 
 
 
List some of your character’s positive traits. 
 
 
List some of your character’s negative traits. 
 
 
Write your "a day in the life" story in the text box below. 
Do you have writer's block? Try answering these questions: What sorts of things does this 
person like or dislike doing? What is this person’s biggest character flaw? How much money or 


















Stereotype Content Definition 
1. Abused / Damaged / 
Broken 
…subjected to harmful or improper treatment; loss or harm resulting from 
injury to person, property, or reputation; altered by or as if by breaking 
2. Addictive / Attached / 
Medicated 
…causing or characterized by addiction; reliant on a substance; attached 
to things; to be on a medication or substance; using illicit or harmful 
substances 
3. Afraid / Panicked / Timid …filled with fear or apprehension; of, relating to, or arising from a panic; 
a sudden overpowering fright; lacking in courage 
4. Alone / Isolated …separated from others 
5. Angry / Mean …feeling or showing anger; spiteful 
6. Annoying / Burdensome …causing vexation or irritation; imposing or constituting a burden 
7. Anxious / Stressed …characterized by extreme uneasiness of mind; a state of mental tension 
resulting from stress 
8. Arrogant/Snobby …exaggerating or disposed to exaggerate one's own worth or importance 
often by an overbearing manner; being, characteristic of, or befitting a 
snob; one who tends to rebuff, avoid, or ignore those regarded as inferior; 
one who has an offensive air of superiority in matters of knowledge or 
taste 
9. Attention Seeking / 
Dramatic / Overreacting 
…something that attracts or demands notice; acting in a way that is likely 
to elicit attention and/or validation from others; to react to something too 
strongly; to respond to something with too strong an emotion or with 
unnecessary or excessive action 
10. Beggar / Needy …one that begs or is in need of help; marked by want or need; wants 
handouts 
11. Bigoted / Prejudiced …having or showing an attitude of hatred or intolerance toward the 
members of a particular group 
12. Boring …causing weariness and restlessness through lack of interest 
13. Cautious …careful about avoiding danger or risk 
14. Closed-minded / Stubborn …not willing to consider different ideas or opinions; unreasonably or 
perversely unyielding; difficult to handle, manage, or treat 
15. Controlling / Manipulative …inclined to control others' behavior; serving or intended to control or 
influence others in an artful and often unfair or selfish way 
16. Crazy / Mentally ill …not mentally sound; marked by thought or action that lacks reason; 
marked distress or disability typically associated with a disruption in 
normal thinking, feeling, mood, behavior, interpersonal interactions, or 
daily functioning 
17. Criminality / Corruption / 
Immoral / Unethical 
…the quality or state of being criminal or corrupt; not conforming to a 
high moral standard; morally wrong 
18. Dependent on others / 
Trapped 
…reliant on another for support; placed in a restricted position 
19. Depressed …low in spirits; sad 
20. Destructive …causing destruction; designed or tending to hurt or destroy 




Stereotype Content Definition 
22. Disciplined / Strict …marked by or possessing discipline; stringent in requirement or control; 
having a definite hardness or severity of nature or manner; demanding that 
rules concerning behavior are obeyed and observed 
23. Disgusting …causing a strong feeling of dislike or disinclination; causing disgust 
24. Dumb / Naïve / Unrealistic …lacking intelligence; stupid; marked by unaffected simplicity; deficient 
in worldly wisdom or informed judgment; inappropriate to reality or fact 
25. Dysfunctional Family Life …a family in which conflict, misbehavior, and often child neglect or 
abuse on the part of individual parents occur continuously and regularly 
26. Fatigued …drained of strength and energy; tired 
27. Foreign / Ethnic …situated outside a place or country; of or relating to large groups of 
people classed according to common racial, national, tribal, religious, 
linguistic, or cultural origin or background 
28. Greedy …having or showing a selfish desire for wealth and possessions 
29. Impressionable / 
Conformist / Submissive 
…capable of being easily impressed; one who conforms; a person who 
behaves in accordance with prevailing standards or customs and typically 
dislikes or avoids unconventional behavior; submitting to others; act in an 
excessively subservient manner 
30. Impulsive / Reckless / 
Negligent 
…prone to act on impulse; acting momentarily; marked by lack of proper 
caution; careless of consequences; failing to exercise the care expected of 
a reasonably prudent person in like circumstances 
31. Insecure / Self-loathing / 
Ashamed 
…not confident or sure of oneself; loathing of oneself; self-hatred; feeling 
shame, guilt, or disgrace 
32. Introverted …possessing a reserved or shy nature typically with an inclination to 
solitude 
33. Judgmental …characterized by a tendency to judge harshly 
34. Lazy …disinclined to activity or exertion 
35. Lustful / Horny …excited by lust; desiring sexual gratification 
36. Obsessive in thought …excessive thoughts about something, often to an unreasonable degree 
37. Old …advanced in years or age; showing the characteristics of age 
38. Organized / Tidy …arranged in a systematic way; having one's affairs in order so as to deal 
with them efficiently; neat and orderly in appearance or habits 
39. Outspoken …spoken or expressed without reserve; direct and open in speech or 
expression 
40. Pious / Religious …marked by or showing reverence for deity and devotion to divine 
worship 
41. Political …of, relating to, involving, or involved in politics; interested in or active 
in politics 
42. Poor / Unwealthy …lacking material possessions; not wealthy 
43. Radical / Extreme / 
Activist 
…the quality or state of being extreme; advocacy of extreme measures or 
views; one who is open-minded or not strict in the observance of 
orthodox, traditional, or established forms or ways; a person who uses or 
supports strong actions (such as public protests) in support of or 




Stereotype Content Definition 
44. Rebellious / Anti-
establishment 
…given to or engaged in rebellion; resisting treatment or management; 
opposed or hostile to the social, economic, and political principles of a 
ruling class 
45. Rowdy / Loud …boisterous in behavior; marked by intensity or volume of sound 
46. Rude / Vulgar / 
Disrespectful 
…being in a rough or unfinished state; lacking refinement or delicacy; 
morally crude, undeveloped, or unregenerate; offensive in language; 
lewdly or profanely indecent; to show or express disrespect or contempt 
for; low regard or esteem for someone or something 
47. Self-righteous / 
Sanctimonious / Prudish 
…convinced of one's own righteousness especially in contrast with the 
actions and beliefs of others; narrow-mindedly moralistic; hypocritically 
pious or devout; marked by prudery; having or revealing a tendency to be 
easily shocked by matters relating to sex or nudity; excessively concerned 
with sexual propriety 
48. Selfish / Uncaring …concerned excessively or exclusively with oneself; seeking or 
concentrating on one's own advantage, pleasure, or well-being without 
regard for others; lacking proper sympathy, concern, or interest in others 
49. Serious / Stoic …thoughtful or subdued in appearance or manner; not joking or trifling; 
not affected by or showing passion or feeling 
50. Sneaky / Secretive …marked by stealth, furtiveness, or shiftiness; disposed to secrecy 
51. Tough / Hardened …capable of enduring strain, hardship, or severe labor; to assume an 
appearance of harshness or severity 
52. Traditional / Conservative …following or conforming to tradition; adhering to past practices or 
established conventions; tending or disposed to maintain existing views, 
conditions, or institutions 
53. Trashy / Low Class …being, resembling, or containing trash; of inferior quality or social 
status 
54. Traumatized …affected by physical or emotional trauma 
55. Ugly …offensive to the sight; offensive or unpleasant to any sense 
56. Undisciplined …lacking in discipline or self-control 
57. Unhealthy (physically) …not conducive to health; not in good health 
58. Unlucky / Misfortunate …having or meeting with misfortune; likely to bring misfortune 
59. Unorganized / Disheveled …not organized; marked by disorder or disarray 
60. Unreliable / Irresponsible …not reliable; lacking a sense of responsibility 
61. Unsuccessful …not successful; not meeting with or producing success 
62. Untrustworthy / Deceptive 
/ Lying 
…not worthy of confidence; tending or having power to cause someone to 
accept as true or valid what is false or invalid; tending or having power to 
deceive; a person who tells lies; marked by or containing untrue 
statements 
63. Useless / Incapable …having or being of no use; lacking capacity, ability, or qualification for 




Stereotype Content Definition 
64. Violent …using harmful physical force; prone to commit acts of violence 
65. Wasteful …given to or marked by waste; using or expending something of value 
carelessly, extravagantly, or to no purpose 
66. Weird / Odd …of strange or extraordinary character 
67. Wimpy / Weak 
(physically) 





Appendix 7: Supplemental Analyses 
 In Studies 2 and 3, I included some exploratory measures at the very end to investigate 
how prejudice norms influence reactions to confrontation beyond the affective, cognitive, and 
behavioral reactions described in the main text. The aim of including these measures was to 
inspire future (more confirmatory) research. 
Partner Perceptions 
First, I examined whether confrontation influenced students’ perceptions of their task 
partner who either confronted them (confrontation present condition) or gave them generic 
negative feedback (confrontation absent condition). Previous research suggests that people tend 
to evaluate confronters negatively, as complainers and unfavorable (Cadieux & Chasteen, 2015; 
Czopp et al., 2006; Parker et al., 2018; Schultz & Maddox, 2013; Shelton & Stewart, 2004; 
Simon & O’Brien, 2015; Wang et al., 2015). I expected to replicate these effects. Further, I 
tested whether prejudice acceptability moderated the relationship between confronting and 
partner perceptions. Perhaps, when prejudice acceptability is high, people evaluate confronters 
even more negatively—possibly because the confrontation seems less justified. However, it is 
also possible that people will evaluate confronters more negatively when prejudice acceptability 
is low—perhaps because the confrontation poses a greater threat to one’s self-integrity and 
denigrating the confronter is one way to alleviate some of that self-threat. 
I adapted a person perception measure developed by Kaiser and Miller (2001). 
Participants were asked to indicate their impression of their task partner by indicating the extent 
to which trait words/phrases applied to their partner (7-point Likert scale, 1 “Not at all” to 7 
“Very Much”). The favorability subscale included traits like “likable,” “intelligent,” and “easy to 
get along with (16-items, 𝛼Study 2 = .95; 𝛼Study 3 = .95), while the complainer subscale included 
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traits like “complainer,” “hypersensitive,” and “argumentative” (6-items, 𝛼Study 2 = .77; 𝛼Study 3 = 
.80). 
 Study 2. Multilevel modeling (MLM), with restricted maximum likelihood estimation 
(ReML), was used to examine the fixed effects of prejudice acceptability, confrontation, and 
their interaction on partner perceptions, while accounting for the random intercept for each target 
group (ICCFavorability = .02; ICCComplainer < .001).  
Favorability Perceptions. A multilevel analysis revealed no significant main effects or 
interactions. The main effect of confrontation on favorability perceptions was not statistically 
significant, t(381) = -1.58, b = -0.07, p = .11, nor the main effect of prejudice acceptability, t(8) 
= -0.60, b = -0.04, p = .56, nor their interaction, t(381) = 1.37, b = 0.06, p = .17. 
Complainer Perceptions. A multilevel analysis revealed a main effect of confrontation, 
t(381) = 4.71, b = 0.22, p < .001, such that students who were confronted evaluated their partner 
as more of a complainer than students who were not confronted. However, this main effect was 
qualified by a significant interaction effect, t(381) = -2.25, b = -0.11, p = .02. Simple slopes 
analyses revealed that prejudice acceptability did not affect students’ partner evaluations in the 
confrontation absent condition, t(8) = 0.54, b = 0.03, p = .60. For these students, perceptions that 
their partner was a complainer were consistently low. In the confrontation present condition, 
however, prejudice acceptability mattered, t(8) = -2.68, b = -0.17, p = .03. Specifically, students 
in the low prejudice acceptability condition rated their partner as more of a complainer than 
students in the high prejudice acceptability condition. The main effect of prejudice acceptability 
on partner perceptions was not statistically significant, t(8) = -1.48, b = -0.07, p = .17. 
 Study 3. Two-way univariate ANOVAs were conducted to examine the effects of 
prejudice acceptability, confrontation, and their interaction on partner perceptions.  
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Favorability Perceptions. Inconsistent with the findings of Study 2, the two-way 
univariate ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of confrontation, F(1, 314) = 3.98, p = 
.047, 𝜂p2 = .01, such that people who were confronted reported perceiving their partner more 
favorably (M = 5.53, SD = 0.98) than people who were not confronted (M = 5.33, SD = 0.85). 
Neither the main effect of prejudice acceptability F(1, 314) = 0.03, p = .87, 𝜂p2 < .001, nor the 
interaction were statistically significant, F(1, 314) = 0.40, p = .53, 𝜂p2 = .001. 
Complainer Perceptions. Consistent with Study 2, this analysis revealed a significant 
main effect of confrontation, F(1, 314) = 6.28, p = .01, 𝜂p2 = .02. Students who were confronted 
perceived their partner as more of a complainer (M = 2.45, SD = 1.00) than students who were 
not confronted (M = 2.17, SD = 0.94). This time, however, neither the main effect of prejudice 
acceptability, F(1, 314) = 1.79, p = .18, 𝜂p2 = .01, nor the interaction effect were statistically 
significant, F(1, 314) = 0.12, p = .73, 𝜂p2 < .001.  
Should-Would Discrepancies 
Second, I assessed whether confrontation influenced the degree of prejudice-related 
discrepancies that students reported and whether prejudice acceptability moderated this 
relationship. I adapted a measure created by Monteith and Voils (1998). Whereas the original 
measure was used to assess prejudice-related discrepancies pertaining to race, the adapted 
measure was designed to be more general, so that it could pertain to a wide variety of target 
groups (for the full measure, see Appendix 2). The new measure included 8 items phrased as 
“should” behaviors (e.g., “I believe that I should not think of people from this social group in 
stereotypical ways.”) and 8 corresponding items phrased as “would” behaviors (e.g., “I 
sometimes have stereotypical thoughts about people from this social group.”). Students rated 
their agreement with the “should” behaviors first, then turned their attention to the “would” 
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behaviors. All items used a 7-point scale (1 “Strongly Disagree” to 7 “Strongly Agree”). A 
difference score was calculated for each pair of items (Would item – Should item), then these 
difference scores were averaged together (𝛼Study 2 = .73; 𝛼Study 3 = .67). Negative composite 
scores indicate that students believe they should act more egalitarian than they actually would, 
while positive composite scores indicate that students believe they would act more egalitarian 
than they actually should. 
Grounded in the previous literature, I expected that students who were confronted (vs. not 
confronted) would report greater differences between what they should do and what they would 
do. However, I suspected that the direction of difference would depend on the prejudice 
acceptability level. In the low prejudice acceptability condition, I expected that confronted 
students (vs. non-confronted students) would report that they should act more egalitarian than 
they actually do. By contrast, in the high prejudice acceptability condition, I expected that 
confronted students (vs. non-confronted students) would report that they do act more egalitarian 
than they actually should. 
 Study 2. Multilevel modeling (MLM), with restricted maximum likelihood estimation 
(ReML), was used to examine the fixed effects of prejudice acceptability, confrontation, and 
their interaction on should-would discrepancies, while accounting for the random intercept for 
each target group (ICC = .40). This multilevel analysis revealed a main effect of prejudice 
acceptability, t(8.08) = 4.64, b = 0.91, p = .002, such that students in the high prejudice 
acceptability group reported fewer prejudice-related discrepancies than students in the low 
prejudice acceptability group. On average, students in both prejudice acceptability groups 
reported that they should act more egalitarian toward the focal target group than they actually do. 
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Neither the main effect of confrontation, t(381.52) = -1.01, b = -0.07, p = .31, nor the interaction 
were statistically significant, t(381.52) = -1.36, b = -0.09, p = .17. 
 Study 3. A two-way univariate ANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of 
prejudice acceptability, confrontation, and their interaction on should-would discrepancies. 
Inconsistent with the findings of Study 2, the two-way univariate ANOVA revealed a significant 
main effect of confrontation, F(1, 314) = 4.20, p = .04, 𝜂p2 = .01, such that people who were 
confronted reported greater prejudice-related discrepancies (M = -1.21, SD = 1.57) than people 
who were not confronted (M = -0.86, SD = 1.49). More specifically, students reported that they 
should act more egalitarian toward cigarette smokers than they actually do. Neither the main 
effect of prejudice acceptability F(1, 314) = 0.47, p = .49, 𝜂p2 = .001, nor the interaction were 
statistically significant, F(1, 314) = 1.10, p = .30, 𝜂p2 = .003. However, exploratory simple 
effects tests somewhat corroborate Study 2, indicating that this main effect of confrontation was 
driven by differences within the high prejudice acceptability condition (MDifference = .53, SE = .24, 
p = .03) and not in the low prejudice acceptability condition (MDifference = .17, SE = .24, p = .48). 
Internal and External Motivation to Suppress Prejudice 
Third, I assessed whether confrontation influenced the internal and external motivations 
that students reported and whether prejudice acceptability moderated this relationship. I adapted 
a measure created by Plant and Devine (1998). The original measure assessed internal and 
external motivations to suppress racial prejudice. Again, the adapted measure was designed to be 
more general, so that it would pertain to a wide variety of target groups (for the full measure, see 
Appendix 2). Like the original measure, 5 items assessed internal motivation to suppress 
prejudice (e.g., “I attempt to act in nonprejudiced ways toward people from this social group 
because it is personally important to me”) and 5 items assessed external motivation to suppress 
prejudice (e.g., “I try to hide any negative thoughts about people from this social group in order 
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to avoid negative reactions from others”). All items were presented on a 7-point scale (1 
“Strongly Disagree” to 7 “Strongly Agree”). Internal motivation items were averaged together to 
create a composite score, as were external motivation items. For both studies, the internal 
motivation items (𝛼Study 2 = .83; 𝛼Study 3 = .85) and external motivation items had satisfactory 
internal consistency reliability (𝛼Study 2 = .80; 𝛼Study 3 = .83). 
A priori, I expected that people who were confronted (vs. not confronted) would report 
greater motivation to suppress prejudice. However, I predicted that the type of motivation would 
depend on the prejudice acceptability level. In the low prejudice acceptability condition, I 
expected that confronted students (vs. non-confronted students) would report higher internal 
motivation to suppress prejudice than external motivation. By contrast, in the high prejudice 
acceptability condition, I expected that confronted students (vs. non-confronted students) would 
report higher external motivation to suppress prejudice than internal motivation. 
Study 2. Multilevel modeling (MLM), with restricted maximum likelihood estimation 
(ReML), was used to examine the fixed effects of prejudice acceptability (between-subjects), 
confrontation (between-subjects), motivation type (within-subjects), and their interactions on 
motivation to suppress prejudice, while accounting for the random intercepts for each target 
group and each respondent. This analysis revealed a main effect of prejudice acceptability, t(389) 
= -5.78, b = -0.25, p < .001, and a main effect of motivation type, t(388) = 20.83, b = 0.83, p < 
.001. These main effects, however, were qualified by a significant prejudice acceptability × 
motivation type interaction, t(388) = -3.97, b = -0.16, p < .001. Overall, students reported more 
internal motivation to suppress prejudice than external motivation. Simple slopes analyses 
indicate that, while external motivation did not differ by prejudice acceptability condition, t(391) 
= -1.55, b = -0.09, p = .12, internal motivation did differ by prejudice acceptability condition. 
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Students in the low prejudice acceptability condition expressed greater internal motivation to 
suppress prejudice than students in the high prejudice acceptability condition, t(391) = -6.92, b = 
-0.41, p < .001. The remaining main effects, two-way interactions, and three-way interaction 
were also not significant (all ps ≥ .07). 
 Study 3. Inconsistent with Study 2, a repeated measures ANOVA revealed only a main 
effect of motivation type, F(1, 314) = 265.17, p < .001, 𝜂p2 = .46, such that students reported 
significantly more internal motivation to suppress prejudice toward smokers (M = 4.82, SD = 
1.29) than external motivation (M = 3.35, SD = 1.33). The remaining main effects, two-way 
interactions, and three-way interaction were also not significant (all ps ≥ .20). 
Political Correctness Beliefs 
Fourth, I measured self-reported political correctness beliefs (Plant & Devine, 2001). 
This was measured with 3 items (𝛼Study 2 = .77; 𝛼Study 3 = .77; e.g., “Do you ever feel as if you 
have to make an effort to act politically correct?”) on a 7-point scale (1 “Not at all” to 7 “Very 
much so”). I expected that students who were confronted would report stronger political 
correctness beliefs than students who were not confronted. Moreover, I expected that this 
relationship would be stronger among students in the high (vs. low) prejudice acceptability 
condition. 
 Study 2. Multilevel modeling (MLM), with restricted maximum likelihood estimation 
(ReML), was used to examine the fixed effects of prejudice acceptability, confrontation, and 
their interaction on political correctness beliefs, while accounting for the random intercept for 
each target group (ICC = .001). This multilevel analysis revealed no significant main effects, nor 
interactions (all ps ≥ .41). 
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 Study 3. A two-way univariate ANOVA revealed no significant main effects or 
interactions (all ps ≥ .09). However, exploratory simple effects tests revealed that within the 
high prejudice acceptability condition, students who were confronted felt greater pressure to act 
in politically correct way (M = 4.35, SD = 1.74) than students who were not confronted (M = 
3.80, SD = 1.54, p = .04). This difference was not significant within the low prejudice 
acceptability condition (MConfronted = 3.87, SDConfronted = 1.69; MNot Confronted = 3.96, SDNot Confronted 
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consequences of non-belonging among LGB college students. Poster presented at the SPSP 
Annual Convention, Atlanta, GA. https://osf.io/x7e62/ 
 
Kroeper, K. M., Boucher, K. L., & Murphy, M. C. (2018, March). Perceptions of success and support for 
social psychological interventions. Poster presented at the Intervention Science Preconference, 
SPSP Annual Convention, Atlanta, GA. https://osf.io/7mhwj/ 
 
+Williams, C., Kroeper, K. M., Ozier, E. M., & Murphy, M. C. (2018, March). The psychological 
immune system in action: Coping with negative feedback after confronting racial prejudice. 
Poster presented at the SPSP Annual Convention, Atlanta, GA. 
 
+Lisnek, J., Kroeper, K. M., & Murphy, M. C. (2018, March). Overlooking excessive force perpetrated 
against communities of color: The effect of implicit bias, outcome bias, and cue ambiguity on 
culpability decisions. Poster presented at the SPSP Annual Convention, Atlanta, GA. 
 
+Carter, J. L., Kroeper, K. M., & Murphy, M. C. (2018, March). Foolish or heroic? The influence of 
perpetrator status on perceptions of those who confront prejudice. Poster presented at the SPSP 
Annual Convention, Atlanta, GA. 
 
+Aslinia, C., +Oistad, B., Kroeper, K. M., & Murphy, M. C. (2017, December). Social norms of 
prejudice: investigating perceptions of stigmatized groups. Poster presented at the IUURC 
Conference, Indianapolis, IN. 
 
+Carter, J. L., Kroeper, K. M., & Murphy, M. C. (2017, December). Foolish or heroic? The influence of 
perpetrator status on perceptions of those who confront prejudice. Poster presented at the 
IUURC Conference, Indianapolis, IN. 
 
+Hernandez, Y. E., Kroeper, K. M., & Murphy, M. C. (2017, July). “Most Americans hate the BLM 
movement, but not me”: Social norm beliefs and personal attitudes toward “Lives Matter” 
groups. Poster presented at the Louis Stokes Alliances for Minority Participation (LSAMP) 
Annual Poster Session, Bloomington, IN. 
 
+Abdirisak, M. Z., Kroeper, K. M., & Murphy, M. C. (2017, July). Political orientation and perceived 
social norms regarding religious groups. Poster presented at the Louis Stokes Alliances for 
Minority Participation (LSAMP) Annual Poster Session, Bloomington, IN. 
 
+Dozier, S., Kroeper, K. M., & Murphy, M. C. (2017, July). Social norms, conformity, and the 
expression of anti-LGBT prejudice. Poster presented at the Group STEM Summer Symposium, 
Bloomington, IN. 
 
+Ansari, S. M, Chen, S., Kroeper, K. M., Canning, E., & Murphy, M. C. (2017, April). Being multiracial 
in a monoracial world: Academic and psychological effects of identifying with component 





+Karim, M. F. A., +Jettinghoff, W. M., Kroeper, K. M., & Murphy, M. C. (2017, April). Overlooking 
police brutality: How race and ambiguity affect culpability judgments. Poster presented at the 
Midwestern Psychological Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL. 
 
Kroeper, K. M., & Murphy, M. C. (2017, January). “I do’s” to “you don’ts”: Discrimination in the 
wedding industry. Poster presented at the SPSP Annual Convention, San Antonio, TX. 
 
+Jettinghoff, W. M., Kroeper, K. M., & Murphy, M. C. (2017, January). Overlooking police brutality: 
How race and ambiguity affect culpability judgments. Poster presented at the SPSP Annual 
Convention, San Antonio, TX. 
 
+Ansari, S. M, Chen, S., Kroeper, K. M., Canning, E., & Murphy, M. C. (2017, January). Being 
multiracial in a monoracial world: Academic and psychological effects of identifying with 
component identities. Poster presented at the SPSP Annual Convention, San Antonio, TX. 
 
+Mettert, K. D., Kroeper, K. M., & Murphy, M. C. (2016, June). Encouraging anti-gay bias confrontation 
through threat reduction: Reaffirming masculinity to combat bias in others. Poster presented at 
the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues Conference, Minneapolis, MN. 
 
Kroeper, K. M., +Ansari, S. M., Murphy, M. C. (2016, April). Creating better confrontations: The role of 
context-focused confrontations in addressing racial bias. Poster presented at the Center of 
Excellence for Women in Technology Annual Poster Session, Bloomington, IN. 
 
Kroeper, K. M., +Ansari, S. M., Murphy, M. C. (2016, January). Creating better confrontations: The role 
of context-focused confrontations in addressing racial bias. Poster presented at the SPSP Annual 
Convention, San Diego, CA. 
 
+Mettert, K. D., Kroeper, K. M., & Murphy, M. C. (2016, January). Encouraging anti-gay bias 
confrontation through threat reduction: Reaffirming masculinity to combat bias in others. Poster 
presented at the SPSP Annual Convention, San Diego, CA. 
 
\Kroeper, K. M., +Ansari, S. M., Murphy, M. C. (2015, October). Creating better confrontations: The 
role of context-focused confrontations in addressing racial bias. Poster presented at the Indiana 
University Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences’ Graduate Student Poster Session, 
Bloomington, IN. 
 
+Navarro, K. A., Kroeper, K. M., Ozier, E., & Murphy, M. C. (2015, July). The role of friendship 
networks and motivational goals in interracial interactions. Poster presented at IU-HBCU STEM 
Summer Scholars Institute, Bloomington, IN. 
 
+Greiner, C. V., Ozier, E., Kroeper, K. M., & Murphy, M. C. (2015, July). The role of friendship 
networks and motivational goals in interracial interactions. Poster presented at Project SEED 
Research Symposium, Bloomington, IN. 
 
+Harnish, A. K., Kroeper, K. M., & Young, J. F. (2015, March). Perceived discrimination and elevated 
depressive symptoms among children and adolescents. Poster presented at the SRCD Biennial 
Meeting, Philadelphia, PA. 
 
\Kroeper, K. M., Sanchez, D. T., & Himmelstein, M. S., (2015, February). Confronters as crusaders: 
Perpetrator status moderates perceptions of non-target confronters of sexual minority prejudice. 




Kroeper, K. M., Sanchez, D. T., & Himmelstein, M. S., (2014, June). Meta-perceptions of confronters: 
"Won't confronting prejudice make me look bad?” Poster presented at the SPSSI Biennial 
Conference, Portland, OR. 
 
+DiMaio, S. N., Kroeper, K. M., Young, J. F., (2014, April). The predictive efficacy of discordance in 
reports of parent-child attachment and its effect on youth depressive symptoms. Poster presented 
at the Aresty Undergraduate Research Symposium, Piscataway, NJ. 
 
Cohen, J. R, Kroeper, K. M., Young, J. F., Hankin, B .L., Abela, J. R. Z. (2014, March). Why are 
anxiety and depressive symptoms comorbid in youth?: A multi-wave, longitudinal examination 
of competing etiological models. Poster presented at the SRA Biennial Meeting, Austin TX. 
 
Kroeper, K. M., Sanchez, D. T., & Himmelstein, M. S. (2013, May). He’ll think I’m gay! Masculinity-
related barriers preventing confrontations of sexual prejudice. Poster presented at the APS 25th 
Annual Convention, Washington, D.C. 
 
Kroeper, K. M., Cohen, J. R., Young, J. F., Abela, J. R. Z., & Daryanani, I. (2012, May). Cognitive 
vulnerability in children. Poster presented at the APS 24th Annual Convention, Chicago, IL. 
 
Kroeper, K. M., Sanchez, D. T., & Himmelstein, M. S. (2012, June). The role of precarious manhood in 
confrontations of sexual prejudice. Poster presented at the SPSSI Biennial Conference, 
Charlotte, NC. 
ISSUE BRIEFS 
Brady, S. T., Kroeper, K. M., Ozier, E. M., Henderson, A. G., Walton, G. M. & the College Transition 




Brady, S. T., Li, X. A., Walton, G. M., Kroeper, K. M., Ozier, E. M., & the College Transition 




Kroeper, K. M., Williams, H. E., & Murphy, M. C. (2019). Counterfeiting gender diversity in technology 
organizations: Cueing identity safety or identity threat? [Study Materials]. Available from 
https://osf.io/yzvmp/ 
ADDITIONAL TRAINING 
July 2019 Summer Institute in Social and Personality Psychology (SISPP)  




June 2019 Multilevel SEM with xxM (Todd Little's Stats Camp) 
Conducted in Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA. 
 
February 2019 Improving your Statistical Inferences (auditor) 
  Online Course taught by Dr. Daniel Lakens of Eindhoven University of Technology 
 
July 2018 R Programming (auditor) 
Online Course taught by Dr. Roger Peng, Dr. Jeff Leek, & Dr. Brian Caffo of Johns 
Hopkins University 
  
August 2018 Getting and Cleaning Data in R (auditor) 
Online Course taught by Dr. Roger Peng, Dr. Jeff Leek, & Dr. Brian Caffo of Johns 
Hopkins University 
 
July 2017 Summer School on Social Cognition and Neuroscience (SCONE)  
Conducted at Julius-Maximilians-University (JMU) Würzburg, in Würzburg, Germany. 
TEACHING 
Statistics/Methods Courses 
Social Psychology Lab (Instructor of Record, Spring 2020) 
Statistical Techniques (Associate Instructor, Fall 2019, Summer 2020) 
Social Psychology Lab (Teaching Assistant, Spring 2019) 
Methods of Experimental Psychology (Associate Instructor, Spring 2017) 
Advanced Research in Psychology (Teaching Assistant, Fall 2014, Spring 2015) 
 
Psychology Content Courses 
The Role of Psychology in Legal Doctrine (Teaching Assistant, Spring 2015) 
Cognitive Psychology (Teaching Assistant, Fall 2014, Summer, 2015) 
 
Special Topics Courses 
Psychology of College Life (Teaching Assistant, Summer 2019) 
Careers for Psychology Majors (Teaching Assistant, Fall 2018) 
Knowledge & Power: Issues in Women’s Leadership (Teaching Assistant, Fall 2009) 
MENTORING 
2014 – present  Murphy Lab Undergraduate Research Group (MLURG) 
Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 




2014 – 2016  Group STEM Initiative 
Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 
Graduate Student Mentor 
 
2013 – 2014  First-Year Interest Group Seminars 




Research advisor for Honors and Capstone students:  
 
2020 – 2021  Natalie Neufeld 
B.A. Psychology, Indiana University, May 2021 [Honors Student] 
 
2019 – 2020  Daphne Castro Lingl 
B.A. Psychology, Indiana University, May 2020 [Honors Student] 
Confronting Trumpsters, Bernie Bros, & Clintonites: How social norms shape 
reactions to prejudice confrontation 
*Recipient of the Hutton Honors College Research Grant ($1500) in pursuit of her thesis 
*Recipient of the Sharon Stephens Brehm Excellence in Research Award 
 
Gretchen Nihill 
B.A. Psychology, Indiana University, May 2020 [Capstone Student] 
*Recipient of the Hutton Honors College Research Grant ($750) in pursuit of her project 
 
2018 – 2019  Audrey Fried 
Toward developing practical recommendations for fostering growth-mindset 
classrooms 
B.A. Psychology, Indiana University, May 2019 [Honors Student] 
 
2017 – 2018  Cierra Williams 
Confrontation fatigue: The intrapersonal effects of confronting racial prejudice 
B.A. Psychology, Indiana University, May 2018 [Honors Student] 
 
Jaclyn Lisnek 
Overlooking excessive force perpetrated against communities of color: The effect 
of ambiguity and race cues on perceptions of police 
B.A. Psychology, Indiana University, May 2018 [Honors Student] 
 
2015 – 2016  Kayne Mettert 
The effects of masculinity threat on confrontation of anti-gay bias 
B.A. Psychology, Indiana University, May 2016 [Honors Student] 







2020 – Present  Co-Editor for special issue in Translational Issues in Psychological Science, 
“Perspectives on the Impact of Race on Psychological Processes”  
Peer Reviewer 
2017 – Present   Ad Hoc Reviewer for Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
2017 – Present   Ad Hoc Reviewer for Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 
 
Indiana University Departmental Service: 
 Co-Coordinator for Indiana University’s Social Seminar, 2017-2019 
IU Graduate and Professional Student Government Travel Awards Reviewer, 2015 
Getting You Into IU (GU2IU) Graduate Student Volunteer, 2014, 2015, 2017, 2018, 2019 
POST-BACCALAUREATE RESEARCH EXPERIENCE 
2012 – 2014  The Institute for Research on Youth Depression and Prevention 
Supervised by Dr. Jami F. Young 
Project Coordinator / Lab Manager 
 
Responsible for the day-to-day functioning of an NIMH funded, longitudinal, 
multi-wave, multi-method research project titled, “Genetic, Cognitive, and 
Interpersonal Vulnerabilities to Depression in Youth” (n = 316 parent-child pairs) 
UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH EXPERIENCE 
2011 – 2014  Stigma, Health, and Close Relationships Lab 
   Supervised by Dr. Diana T. Sanchez 
   Honors Thesis Researcher 
 
2010 – 2012  The Institute for Research on Youth Depression and Prevention 
   Supervised by Dr. Jami F. Young 
Senior Research Assistant 
 
2011 – 2012  Social Cognition Lab 
   Supervised by Dr. Laurie Rudman 




IN THE NEWS 
The Benefits of Student-to-Student Mentoring:  
http://spsp.org/news-center/member-newsletters/9-27-18/student-to-student-mentoring  
PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS 
The Society for Personality and Social Psychology (SPSP) 
The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI) 
The Society for the Improvement of Psychological Science (SIPS) 
Society for the Psychology of Women (SPW) 
Association for Psychological Science (APS) 
Midwestern Psychological Association (MPA) 
The American Association of University Women (AAUW)  
SKILLS 
Research: A/B testing; experimental design; interviews and focus groups; survey design; protocol and 
research material development; manuscript preparation; scientific writing; grant writing 
Data Analysis: Multivariate linear and non-linear regression; Analysis of variance (ANOVA); Basic and 
sequential process mediation; Multilevel modeling; Structural equation modeling; Exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analysis; Data visualization 
Computer: R, SPSS, STATA, Qualtrics, Survey Monkey, Google Forms, Audacity Digital Audio Editor, 
Microsoft Office Suite (i.e., Word, Excel, PowerPoint), iWorks Suite (i.e., Pages, Numbers, Keynote), 
iMovie 
